The rejection of three kinds of internalism. by Luk, Ching Kit. & Chinese University of Hong Kong Graduate School. Division of Philosophy.
The Rejection of Three Kinds of Intemalism 
LUK Ching Kit 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
of Master of Philosophy 
In 
Philosophy 
©The Chinese University of Hong Kong 
September 2006 
The Chinese University of Hong Kong holds the copyright of this thesis. Any person(s) 
intending to use a part or whole of the materials in the thesis in a purposed publication 
must seek copyright release from the Dean of the Graduate School. 

Acknowledgment 
I am grateful to Prof. Li Hon Lam and Prof. C.J. Fraser, who did a lot to help me 
improve the thesis. I am indebted to their infinite patience to listen to my opinion and 
their valuable comments when reviewing the draft of this thesis, from which many of 
my ideas have been derived. I also would like to thank Mr. Li King Wai for editing 
the thesis. Without their precious care, I would not have completed the thesis and 
presented the ideas in the way readers see now. 
Abstract i 
Chapter 1 Internalism and Externalism 1 
1.1 An Internalist's Tale and the Theme of this Thesis 1 
1.2 Varieties of Internalism and Externalism 2 
A. Varieties of internalism 3 
B. Varieties of Externalism 5 
1.3 The Nature of Internalism-Externalism Debate 8 
1.4 Looking Forward 12 
Chapter 2 The Rejection of Humean Internalism 14 
2.1 Humean Internalism and the Humean conception of Normative 14 
Reasons 
2.2 Hume's Theory on the Role of Reason and the Justification of 16 
Normative Reasons 
2.3 Williams's Attack on Desire-independent Normative Reasons, 22 
Two Arguments for Williams and Their Weaknesses 
2.4 Two Anti-Humean Arguments on the Justification of 30 
Normative Reasons 
A. Nagel on Desires and the Justifications of Normative 30 
Reasons 
B. Scanlon on the Role of Desires in the Justification of 34 
Normative Reasons and My Modifications 
2.5 The Strength of Desires and the Mechanism of Decision 42 
Making in the Humean and Anti-Humean models 
2.6 The Rejection of Humean Internalism and a Remark 45 
Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 48 
3.1 PAI and the Nagelian Motivation Theory 49 
3.2 The Humean Motivation Theory and the Assessment of the 52 
Nagelian Motivation Theory 
3.3 Argument for the Humean Motivation Theory — The 59 
Direction of Fit 
A. Brief Analysis of Intentional Action, Willing, Goal, 60 
Intention and Motivating Reason 
B. Direction of Fit and the Humean Motivation Theory 62 
3.4 Four Arguments against the Humean Motivation Theory 64 
A. Special Nature of Moral Beliefs 65 
B. The Non-teleological Nature of Moral Actions 70 
C. Argument of Intellectualized Motivation 73 
D. Argument of Irrationality 78 
3.5 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 84 
Chapter 4 The Rejection of Rational Internalism 86 
4.1 Rational Internalism 
4.2 Argument of Incoherence 88 
A. Exposition 88 
B. Criticism 92 
4.3 Proper-grasp Argument 105 
4.4 Virtuous Person Argument 110 
4.5 The Rejection of Rational Internalism 117 
Chapter 5 After the Rejection of Rational Internalism 119 
5.1 Two Problems of Rational Internalism 120 
5.2 Rejection of Rational Internalism and Appropriateness of 124 
Blame 


















Internalism and Externalism are a hectic debate in ethics in recent decades. 
While internalism claims that there is a necessary connection between moral reasons 
and moral motivation, externalism denies such a necessary connection. Upon this 
background, this thesis attempts to reject internalism and defend externalism. 
However, in order to reject the central theme of internalism — the necessary 
connection of moral reasons and moral motivation, we must answer two questions in 
advance, which are (1) 'What are moral reasons?' and (2) 'What can provide 
motivation for human beings?' For a particular kind of internalism to be true, its 
necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation must be based on 
a plausible theory of moral reasons and a plausible theory of motivation; otherwise, it 
ought to be rejected. In this thesis, I will reject three kinds of internalism which are 
Humean Internalism, Thomas Nagel's Pure Ascription Internalism and Michael 
Smith's Rational Internalism. Humean Internalism and Pure Ascription Internalism 
are rejected because they rely on an implausible theory of moral reasons and an 
implausible theory of motivation respectively. And, despite Rational Internalism 
avoids the mistakes committed by Humean Internalism and Pure Ascription 
Internalism, it is still rejected as it plumps for a narrow definition of rationality, which 
unreasonably accuses people of being irrational when they fail to do moral actions. 
After meticulously examining the three kinds of internalism, I will show why 
externalism is a more plausible theory. 
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Chapter 1 Internalism and Externalism 
1.1 An Internalist's Tale and the Theme of this Thesis 
Imagine Henry is a medical professional whose duty is to cure patients in the 
SARS epidemic. As a genuine medical professional, he clearly knows he has duty, and 
hence reason, to cure patients. He also knows that SARS is a new disease that is 
difficult to cure. Some doctors may be infected with SARS when carrying out medical 
treatments and may soon die from it. There is no guarantee for not to be affected. He 
is a rookie and not sure whether it is good for him to continue his job, Harris, the head 
of Henry, tries to persuade him. Harris reminds him that medical professional should 
care more about patients' welfare than his own life. He mulls over Harris's words, and 
concludes that the reason 'curing patients is the duty of every medical professional' 
overrides other kinds of consideration such as the risk of continuing his job and the 
prospects of doing other kinds of job. But then, when he reports for work, he does 
nothing to help the patients. Harris asks him, 'Didn't you say that you have reason to 
cure the SARS patients? Why are you just staying on the sidelines?' He replies, 'I just 
don't have motivation to do it.' ‘Are you joking?' Harris wonders, ‘As long as you 
believe that a reason applies to you, your motivation cannot be separated from your 
apprehension of that reason. You should always question yourself whether you 
sincerely believe a reason if you do nothing accordingly.' Henry objects, 'Hey! You 
have over-simplified the issue in thinking that once one knows about a reason and 
believes it, one will have motivation to do it. But don't you realize that almost every 
action in your life is motivated by desires? Will you eat some food if you just know 
they are delicious but don't have any desires to eat them? We human beings do need 
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desires to provide motivation. My lack of motivation is due to the lack of a 
corresponding desire. Unless you can show me a necessary connection between 
understanding a reason and having the relevant desire, I don't see the problems with 
my behavior. Actually, my case is a typical phenomenon which is enough to drive you 
to re-consider the so-called necessary relation between reason and motivation. How 
can you prove the necessary connection is a conceptual truth?' Harris frowns, 'Okay! 
I admit there are counter-examples to my idea. But I don't want to claim so much. 
When I say there is a necessary connection between reason and motivation, I am 
talking about the behavior of rational people only. For those who are not rational 
enough, that necessary connection cannot be maintained. The counter-examples you 
mention are just cases in which people are not rational.' Henry is skeptical, 'What do 
you mean by rational? And why does a breakdown in the connection indicate 
irrationality?' 
The debate between Harris and Henry will be the theme of this thesis. I will 
compare the plausibility of Harris's position — which represents a common view 
called "internalism" — with Henry's one — which represents "externalism". I will 
argue that externalism is more plausible. Since there is a big controversy over many 
things of the debate, this introductory chapter aims to settle some preliminary disputes. 
In section 1.2, I will introduce the varieties of internalism and externalism, and 
explain which kinds of internalism and externalism I will discuss. Next, I will 
elaborate the nature of the internalism-externalism debate and its intricacies in section 
1.3. In the last section, I will give an overview of what the remaining of this thesis 
will do. 
1.2 Varieties of Internalism and Externalism 
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A. Varieties of intemalism 
The official definition of intemalism is that there is a necessary connection 
between moral reasons and moral motivation. However, depending on the ways moral 
reasons confer motivation, there emerge various kinds of intemalism. Stephen 
Darwell has classified three kinds of intemalism, each portraying a specific way 
moral reasons confer moral motivation (Darwell, 1997, p, 308). Although these three 
forms may not exhaust all kinds of intemalism discussed in the literature, I think his 
classification has highlighted the most popular forms. 
1. Judgment Intemalism: It holds that if an agent judges, or believes, or sincerely 
asserts that she ought to 0，then necessarily, she has motivation to 0 . 
2. Perceptual Intemalism: By holding that there are objective normative facts, it 
insists that it is impossible for a person to know directly or to perceive that a 
normative proposition is true without being moved. 
3. Metaphysical Intemalism: By holding that there are objective normative facts, it 
holds that an agent's being moved under appropriate conditions is either part of 
what it is for a normative proposition to be true of him, or a necessary condition 
for the holding of that normative fact. 
Perceptual Intemalism and Metaphysical Intemalism, which are usually subordinated 
to a broader kind of intemalism called Existence Intemalism, differ from Judgment 
Intemalism crucially in that the former two kinds of intemalism 'see motivation as an 
aspect or consequence of direct knowledge of normative facts, rather than of 
normative belief or sincere normative assertion' ((Darwell, 1997, p, 308)!• However, 
‘There is a slight difference between Perceptual Intemalism and Metaphysical Intemalism. Although 
both of them admit the existence of normative facts, Perceptual Intemalism does not propose a direct 
contact with these facts. According to Perceptual Internalists, normative facts are indirectly known by 
their effects, i.e. one's being motivated. But Metaphysical Intemalism asserts 'the agent's being moved 
under appropriate conditions to be necessary for the holding of the fact of there being some reason for 
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these three kinds of internalism do have something in common. All of them are silent 
on what counts as genuine moral reasons, and just stipulate the necessary connection 
between moral reasons, moral judgments and moral motivation. The status of moral 
reasons does not affect the form of this stipulation. As Judgment Internalism stipulates 
that the way of getting moral motivation is through moral judgments, not through 
moral facts，it deviates slightly from the official definition of internalism, which 
insists a necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation. Thus, I 
want to propose a little wider definition for internalism than the official definition 
stipulates. I suggest that internalism is a thesis insisting a necessary connection 
between moral reasons or moral beliefs and moral motivation. 
Concerning the extent to which moral reasons or moral judgments function 
properly, internalism can be divided into strong internalism and weak internalism. 
Strong internalism states that moral motivation generated by moral reasons or moral 
judgments is so strong that it cannot be overridden by the turbulence triggered off by 
other emotions. Weak internalism is less ambitious and insists only that moral 
motivation generated by moral reasons or moral judgments operates properly only 
when the agent is rational and is not affected by other emotions such as 
‘psychological compulsions, physical addictions, emotional disturbances, depression, 
spiritual tiredness, accident, illness. (Smith, 1995, p, 153) ‘ In other words, it does not 
think moral motivation has privilege over other emotions in one's will. Few people 
(perhaps none) hold strong internalism now, because there seems to be many 
conditions that can disrupt the necessary effect of moral reasons or moral judgments 
on moral motivation. Many counter-examples show that an agent's moral motivation 
her to act, quite independently of any knowledge of this fact.' (Darwell, 1997, p, 309) Metaphysical 
Internalism thinks you are possible to have motivation only because there is a normative fact conferring 
it to you. 
I 
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may not always override other motivation, either because he is assailed by various 
emotions or because he thinks that other things are much more important than 
morality. So, the more popular form of internalism in the current literature is weak 
internalism. Hence, before taking more things into consideration in section 1.3 that 
will broaden the definition of internalism, I propose a preliminary definition of 
internalism, which I dub 'Simple Internalism': 
Simple Internalism claims that when an agent is rational, his recognition of a 
moral reason or his making a moral judgment necessarily entails in him moral 
motivation, although this motivation may not always be sufficient for him to act 
morally, because sometimes it can be overridden by other emotions. 
B. Varieties of Externalism 
Externalists deny there are any necessary connections between moral reasons and 
moral motivation. But they vary concerning their views on the relation between moral 
reasons and moral motivation. There are at least two kinds of externalism^. The first 
kind, which I dub Extreme Externalism, is explained by Nagel as follows: 
Extreme Externalism (EE): Externalism holds that the motivation required to 
act morally is not supplied by ethical principles and judgments alone, but that an 
additional psychological sanction is required to motivate our compliance with 
moral reasons. Externalism is compatible with the view that such a motivation is 
always present — so long as its presence is not guaranteed by moral judgments 
themselves，but by something external to ethics. (Nagel, 1970, p, 7) 
According to Nagel's characterization, externalism must propose an independent 
source of moral motivation — commonly understood to be moral desires — which 
2 This suggestion is a conclusion from what I have been reading so far. There may be other disputes 
between internalists and externalists that I have not covered. 
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is distinct from moral judgments. EE denies that moral motivation can be generated 
purely by moral judgments. EE itself does not explain how moral motivation is 
produced, but Nagel seems to suggest that it must not be generated by moral 
judgments. Perhaps, we can consider a theory of motivation transitivity offered by 
another externalist to supplement the motivation structure of EE (Mele, 2003, Chapter 
4)3. Suppose Wilfred has a desire to go for a journey in Congo. In order to have a 
satisfactory journey, he begins to plan the route. He first considers visiting tropical 
forests and believes using a wagon is the most pleasant way to enjoy the view of 
forests. He then forms a desire to visit the forests and a desire to use the wagon. 
However, after surfing on the web, he finds that wild animals make it quite dangerous 
to travel on land. It is more appropriate to rent a dinghy to view the forests from the 
river. Through reasoning, Wilfred arrives at a new judgment and acquires a new desire. 
According to this picture, it is not practical reasoning that directly generates some 
new desires following new judgments: the desire to go to Congo, the desire to use a 
wagon, the desire to use a dinghy are all derived from his antecedent desire of having 
a good journey. This process of reasoning is intrinsically inferential (because it 
originates from an ultimate desire) and practical (because it generates new motivation 
for action). By the same way, externalists can propose a similar picture for moral 
motivation. They can say that there is an antecedent desire to act for morally right 
actions (R-disposition) in most adult^. The R-disposition is the main motivation 
source for their moral actions. When an agent arrives at a new moral judgment, the 
3 The following picture is proposed by Mele in part 1，Chapter 4 of Motivation and Agency. He has 
proposed two kinds of practical reasoning which are both motivational. To a large extent, they are both 
the typical examples of the Humean practical reasoning, in which desires play the motivational role and 
reason plays the deliberative role to discern appropriate means to satisfy the desires. But Mele has 
supplemented the idea of creating sub-desires to the original desire, which makes the Humean theory of 
practical reasoning more flexible. Among the two kinds of practical reasoning, I choose to discuss only 
one of them. 
4 This is Mele's idea in Chapter 4 of Motivation and Agency. 
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R-disposition will spread its motivational influence over the action, just as in 
Wilfred's case, the desire to use a dinghy is derived from the desire 'to have a good 
journey' plus the judgment that land visiting is dangerous. 
However, we may feel uneasy about the motivation picture of EE because of the 
inertial role of belief playing in motivation (I guess Nagel's aim of introducing EE is 
to draw our attention to this uneasiness that can indirectly move us towards 
internalism). We commonly think that beliefs can play a more direct role in actions, 
either on the R-disposition or on the particular moral motivation. Regarding the 
R-disposition, we think that our moral beliefs can affect or shape its content and 
strength. So, even if in some cases in which particular moral disposition is derived 
from the R-disposition, moral beliefs still have some indirect influence on particular 
motivation. Concerning particular moral motivation, it is simply not necessary that all 
of them are derived from the R-disposition. In some cases, the mechanism of 
motivation transitivity is not operating, and our motivation for an action is directly 
generated by our moral belief. For example, your motivation to pay off the money 
borrowed from your friend can directly be generated by your judgment that you 
should keep all promises to your friend. This case shows that the formation of our 
moral motivation is not a self-standing mechanism independent of moral belief as EE 
suggests. Thus, EE cannot be sustained in the long term as its underlying motivation 
picture is easily refuted by our experience. 
If EE is not a plausible form of externalism, what can externalists do? Simply, 
they can deny that moral judgments are incapable of generating moral motivation. 
David Brink (Brink, 1997), for example, denies only that moral judgments necessarily 
generate moral motivation without ruling out the possibility that moral judgments 
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generate moral motivation^. However, even reforming externalism in this way, 
externalism does not go head-to-head against internalism. I have said that internalism 
is divided into two sub-classes, strong internalism and weak internalism, depending 
on their insistence on the power of moral judgments. Among the two, weak 
internalism is more plausible as it fits our experience more smoothly. The real target 
of externalism should then be the weak internalism, and we should stipulate more 
precisely Brink's idea to get a more plausible form of externalism. So, I propose the 
following definition of externalism which I call 'Simple Weak Externalism' 
Simple Weak Externalism (SWE): An agent is not necessarily irrational even 
if his moral judgment or his recognition of a moral reason do not generate any 
moral motivation. 
1.3 The Nature of Internalism-Externalism Debate 
The previous section has explained the core idea of internalism and externalism. 
To use Jonathan Dancy's word (Dancy, 2000), internalists and externalists are 
disputing with each other over the qualification of reason^, with internalists insisting 
on a necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation and 
externalists denying any necessary connections. The implication of the official 
definition is that the internalism-externalism debate can be separated from other moral 
debates such as the meanings of right and wrong, good and bad, the justification for 
being moral, the foundation of moral reasons, the construction of normative rules, and 
the selection of the decision-making criterion from different normative systems. The 
5 It may be only in this strict sense externalism is called externalism (moral desires obtain an 
independent motivational role in action and no other psychological elements such as moral beliefs can 
cause moral desires). Etiology is not my concern and so I extend the use of externalism. Here, I just 
think this extreme form of externalism is implausible and should be replaced by a moderate one which 
insists only that moral judgments do not necessarily generate moral motivation even if one is rational. 
6 This definition is proposed by Jonathan Dancy in Practical Reality. Although other authors don't use 
the same terminology, they do share the similar idea that internalism is neutral on the foundation of 
morality. 
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only thing dividing internatists from externalists is their different opinions on the 
relation between moral reasons and moral motivation. 
Indeed, aside from the issue concerning the relation between moral reasons and 
moral motivation, internalists and externalists involve in some other issues. These 
other issues include both theoretical and empirical considerations. Empirically, I think 
that certain positions on the nature of moral reasons and the source of motivation rule 
out either internalism or externalism. For instance, if one holds that desires are the 
motivation source and that moral judgments are merely expressions of one's desires (a 
view known as expressivism), then one cannot hold externalism, because desires 
secure the necessary connection between moral judgments and moral desires. Or if 
one holds that there are objective moral reasons which are independent of desires and 
that desires are the motivation source, then it is more difficult to argue for internalism 
as reason and desire are two independent entities. Surely, one may argue that these 
actual theories just reflect the contours of different theories. They do not show that the 
intemalism-externalism debate cannot be examined independently in principle. To 
answer this, we need to jump to a deeper level — the theoretical level. 
At the theoretical level, we can see why the intemalism-externalism debate 
cannot be studied separately in principle. The reason is very simple in fact. As 
internalism and externalism attempt to answer whether there is a necessary connection 
between moral reasons and moral motivation, they must answer what moral reasons 
are and what can provide motivation. And the questions 'What are moral reasons?' 
and 'What can provide motivation?' are exactly the hot spots in the debate of the 
nature of moral reasons and the debate of whether beliefs or desires provide 
motivation. If all these are true, the intemalism-externalism debate is much more 
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intricate. An internalist (or externalist) not only needs to argue for (against) a 
necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation. He also needs to 
argue for a position on the nature of moral reasons and the motivation source. If an 
internalist vindicates, straightforwardly and expediently as it appears, the connection 
of moral reasons and moral motivation at the cost of believing a wrong conception of 
moral reasons or a wrong motivation theory, then his particular kind of internalism 
should be rejected. 
Michael Smith (Smith, 1995, p，12) has outlined two common views on the 
nature of moral beliefs and on what provides motivation that explain why the 
vindication of internalism becomes so complicated. These two views are stated as 
follows. 
1. Moral Judgments of the form ‘It is right that I 0 ‘ expresses a subject's beliefs 
about an objective matter of fact, a fact about what is right for her to do. 
2. An agent is motivated to act in a certain way just in case she has an appropriate 
desire and a means-end belief, where belief and desire are, in Hume's terms, 
distinct existences. 
These two positions make internalism more complicated and enlarge the meaning of 
Simple Internalism. If an internalist rejects (1) and holds (2), then it is not the case as 
stipulated by Simple Internalism that moral beliefs entail in a moral agent moral 
motivation. For instance, the Humean internalists argue that there are no 
desire-independent moral reasons and there are only desire-dependent reasons. When 
we apprehend the desire-dependent moral reasons, we don't need the moral judgments 
to generate moral motivation, because there is a pre-existing moral desire conferring 
moral motivation to us. According to the Humean internalists, desires provide 
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motivation and the justification at the same time. If an internalist holds (1) and rejects 
(2), then he has to prove that instead of moral desires, it is moral beliefs providing 
moral motivation. If an internalist holds both (1) and (2), then he has to find a way to 
connect moral beliefs with moral desires as they are essentially two independent 
psychological factors. These three choices are represented in three distinctive kinds of 
intemalism. 
Humean Intemalism is an internalist view that rejects (1): There are no moral 
facts in the world and so we cannot discover objective moral reasons. Moral 
reasons are instruments to satisfy desires: moral reasons recommend actions that 
can satisfy our desires. As desires are the foundation of both moral reasons and 
moral motivation, there is also an inherent relation between moral reasons and 
moral motivation.^ 
Nagel's Pure Ascription Intemalism is an internalist view that rejects (2): It 
holds that there are moral facts and so there are objective moral reasons. It holds 
that moral beliefs play a motivational role, so there is a direct relationship 
between moral judgment and moral motivation. 
Smith's Rational Intemalism is an internalist view that tries to find a special 
7 I was once asked by Professor Shih Yuan Kang whether Humean Intemalism can still be regarded as 
a kind of intemalism if we accept Simple Intemalism stated in section 1.3, part A, as the orthodox 
meaning of intemalism. He suspects if intemalism is defined as saying that 'when an agent is rational, 
his recognition of a moral reason or his making a moral judgment necessarily entails in him moral 
motivation, although this motivation may not always be sufficient for him to act morally, because 
sometimes it has been overridden by other emotions', the recognition of moral reasons or the making of 
moral judgments has a causal effect on the having of moral motivation. But Humean Intemalism is just 
holding that moral motivation is not entailed by the recognition of moral reasons or the making of 
moral judgments. Professor Shih's worry can be assuaged, I think. The dispute rests on how far 
intemalism means. The meaning of intemalism can be looser or stricter. The stricter definition is the 
one I state in Simple Intemalism. A looser definition is the one according to which intemalism only 
amounts to a necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation. On this looser 
definition, the causal relation between moral reasons and moral motivation is not a significant matter. It 
only concerns the necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation. Actually, many 
philosophers do not exclude Humean Intemalism from intemalism. If so, I follow suit and classify 
Humean Intemalism into intemalism. 
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way to accommodate (1) and (2): It holds that there are moral facts and so there 
are objective moral reasons. Since desires play the motivational role, there must 
be a device coordinating the relationship between moral judgments and moral 
motivation. Rationality is introduced at this point to accommodate the 
relationship: When an agent is rational, his moral beliefs will generate moral 
desires in him, and thus he can be motivated; when the agent is irrational, his 
moral judgment cannot do so. 
However, for the reason given above concerning the nature of internalism-externalism 
debate, not only internalists need to make a choice between (1) and (2), externalists 
need also. As an externalist, I think that both (1) and (2) are plausible, and take them 
as an externalist's view on the nature of moral reasons and the psychological factor 
providing motivation. (I will argue for them in the following two chapters). If we 
embrace (1) and (2), then we should modify SWE as follows: 
Weak Externalism (WE): It holds that (a) moral reasons and moral judgments 
do not depend on desires; (b) desires are the psychological factor that provides 
motivation; (c) an agent is not necessarily irrational even if his moral reasons or 
moral judgments do not generate any moral motivation. 
1.4 Looking Forward 
This thesis is called "The rejection of Three Kinds of Internalism". If, as I have 
pointed out, committing to one kind of internalism inevitably involves committing to 
some positions on moral reasons and motivation theory, then, as a corollary, when I 
reject one kind of internalism, I cannot avoid rejecting some positions on moral 
reasons and motivation theories. In the following chapters, I will discuss three kinds 
of internalism and reject three positions on moral reason, motivation theory and the 
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necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation respectively. In 
Chapter 2，I will discuss Humean Internalism, which embarks an important enquiry on 
the comparative plausibility of two theories of moral reasons, one depending on one's 
desires and one depending on the features of facts. In Chapter 3, I will focus on 
Nagel's Pure Ascription Internalism. It touches the question of which psychological 
factor, beliefs or desires, is the motivation source. In Chapter 4, I will examine 
Smith's Rational Internalism to see whether a necessary connection between moral 
reasons and moral motivation can be sustained. In Chapter 5，after I have rejected 
three kinds of internalism, I will consider the view we should adopt on the connection 
between moral beliefs and moral motivation. 
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Chapter 2 The Rejection of Humean Internalism 
2.1 Humean Internalism and the Humean conception of Normative 
Reasons 
The internalist's tale in Chapter 1 shows that moral motivation can be separated 
from moral reasons or moral judgments. In fact, many counter-examples in our 
experiences deny the necessary connection between moral reasons and moral 
motivation. Hence, internalism cannot be true without further theoretical 
explanation(s) being constructed. Some Humeans think that the separation between 
moral motivation and moral reasons happens because there is a gulf between our 
common conception of moral reasons and moral motivation: We think that motivation 
is provided by desires but there are desire-independent moral reasons. Internalism 
can't be true if this is true. The Humeans hope to find a way out of this stalemate to 
rescue internalism by radically changing our usual conception of moral reasons. They 
propose that there are actually no moral reasons that are independent of desires. All 
normative reasons, of which moral reasons are a particular species, must be grounded 
on desires. That means moral reasons are nothing but instruments to satisfy the desires 
on which they are grounded. Based on this conception of moral reasons, Humean 
Internalism denies that one's moral reason generates moral motivation. Rather it holds 
the opposite: One has a moral reason for 0 -ing if and only if one already has a desire 
to 0，and one would certainly be motivated to 0 if one has a desire to 0 . 
The theme of this chapter is the rejection of Humean Internalism. There are two 
ways to reject Humean Internalism: We can reject either the necessary connection 
between moral reasons and moral motivation or the Humean conception of moral 
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reasons. The first way is not feasible because if it is really the case that all moral 
reasons depend on desires and that motivation is provided by desires, no separation of 
moral reasons and moral motivation is possible�Thus, I choose the second way. If I 
can successfully argue that no desire can be the ground of moral reasons, then, as 
moral reasons and moral desires are independent entities now, they can always come 
apart without further conditions added. Humean Internalism is no longer self-evident. 
But I have to make two remarks here before moving on to further discussions. The 
term 'reason' has two meanings in this chapter. One stands for rationality, a faculty 
for judging truth, falsehood and reasonableness. Another one refers to normative 
reason, an entity telling us that some choices and actions are permissible. I use 
'reason' to represent the first meaning and 'normative reason' the second. Also, I 
won't spare a space to discuss Humeans' and anti-Humeans' views on the justification 
of moral reasons because they just think moral reasons are a species of normative 
reasons, and so their justifications are the same. 
This chapter is organized in this way. In 2.2, I will explain why Hume, the 
ancestor of the Humeans, thinks that there are no desire-independent normative 
reasons and depict his argument. In 2.3，I will discuss Williams's (one of the famous 
Humeans) attack on desire-independent normative reasons. Also, I will mention two 
arguments for the Humeans and their weaknesses. In 2.4,1 will build an anti-Humean 
‘ I must confess that there are two factors affecting the impossibility of the separation of moral reasons 
and moral motivation. The first is weakness of will and the second is a kind of motivation theory which 
proposes that desires are not the motivation source. But still, the Humeans can explain away the 
difficulties posed by these two factors. For the weakness of will, the Humeans can simply say that any 
agent suffering from weakness of will is excluded from the application of Humean Internalism. The 
necessary connection between moral reasons and moral desires only applies to rational agents who do 
not suffer from weakness of will. For the problem of an alternative theory, the Humeans can argue that 
any alternative motivation theory which insists that desires cannot be the motivation source is mistaken. 
Based on our experience, desires play the motivation role. But both the Humean motivation theory and 
the alternative motivation theory require some independent arguments to support themselves. I will 
return to this issue in Chapter 4. Here, we just assume the truth of the Humean motivation theory to 
avoid further complexities. If so, it is impossible for moral reasons and moral motivation to fall apart. 
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model of the justification of normative reasons according to Scanlon's idea and mine. 
Ill 2.5, I will show the difference between Humean and anti-Humean models on our 
decision making. 
2.2 Hume's Theory on the Role of Reason and the Justification of 
Normative Reasons 
Hume is the forerunner of the Humean conception of normative reasons. He lays 
down the most important arguments for a desire-dependent conception of normative 
reasons in the Treatise of Human Nature (Treatise). Humean internalists nowadays 
often borrow Hume's idea as the basic material for their theory building. In this 
section, I will look carefully how Hume argues against a traditional conception of 
normative reasons, which proposes a desire-independent conception of normative 
reasons, and corroborates his own idea. 
We begin by focusing on two famous notions from paragraph 1, Book II，Part III， 
Section 3 of Treatise, where Hume has contravened the common thought that reason 
can control our action by providing motivation. He contends: 
(a) Reason alone can never be the motive to any action of the will. 
(b) Reason alone can never oppose passion in the direction of the will. 
In order to make sense of (a) and (b) and oppose our common thought, Hume has to 
show that the faculty of reason cannot provide any motivation for actions. He begins 
by pondering the role of reason in our experience, and finds that reason has two 
distinctive roles: 
The first role of reason'. Reasons may establish demonstrative truths founded on 
the abstract relations among our idea. These we may think of as the truth of logic 
and mathematics and the like. 
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The second role of reason: Reason may also establish, on the basis of experience, 
the relation of cause and effect between objects and events. (Paragraph 2，Book 
II，Part III, Section 3 of Treatise) 
By appealing to our experience, Hume asserts that reason is a faculty designed to 
judge truth and falsehood. According to Hume, as it is unreasonable to suppose that 
truth and falsehood can supply us with motivation, the faculty that judges truth and 
falsehood — reason — cannot provide any motivation either. On the other hand, 
Hume discovers that the mere fact that we have two beliefs about two different things 
cannot drive us to get any one of them. Only when we desire either of them, say 
desiring X, do we begin to have motivation to get X. From this experience, Hume 
concludes that motivation is supplied by a psychological factor — desires. Up to this 
moment, Hume has vindicated (a) because, instead of reason, it is desires that provide 
motivation for human beings . Claim (b) is just the other side of the coin. For reason 
can oppose passions only if it can yield opposite motivation, counteracting the 
motivation supplied by passions. But (a) has already ruled out this possibility. Thus, 
there is no tension between reasons and passions, and this relation is later summarized 
ill a provocative remark: ‘Reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them.' (Paragraph 2， 
Book II，Part III, Section 3 of Treatise) 
Hume's curiosity leads him to examine the deeper relation between reason and 
passions. Even if we agree with Hume that reason cannot provide motivation, is it 
2 In Hume's practical reason theory, he usually used 'passions' to represent the psychological factor 
that provides the motivation for human beings. But in the contemporary debate between the Humean 
normative theory and anti-Humean normative theory and between the Humean theory of motivation 
and anti-Humean theory of motivation, 'desires' rather than 'passions' are more commonly used. So, I 
take these two words to mean the same thing and use them interchangeably in this thesis. But to 
preserve the originality, I will not replace 'passions' with 'desires' in Hume's original text. I will only 
use desires wherever I need to explain and explicate Hume's idea. 
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reasonable, as our common practices do, to think that passions can be assessed by 
reason, so that some passions are reasonable to have, while others are not? Hume's 
answer is negative. His rationale goes as follows. Passions are occurrent 
psychological states that give rise to certain propensities. Whenever passions occur, 
they provide motivation to act. Passions do not assert anything. In Hume's word, 
passions are not a 'copy of any other existence'. And because they assert nothing, they 
cannot contradict a truth, understood in Hume as a relational property that can only be 
held between 'a copy of other existence' (in Hume's mind, they are beliefs) and other 
existences. While reason is employed to judge truth and falsehood, passions, being 
void of any truth conditions, cannot be evaluated by reason^. 
When the nature of beliefs and passions are distinguished in this way, there exists 
an asymmetry in the role of reason in theoretical and practical matters. In theoretical 
matters, reason can engage in full sense by assessing the truth and falsehood of the 
abstract relations and the empirical beliefs involved in a theory"^. If the abstract 
relations and the empirical beliefs under question are judged by reason to be false, 
then the theory will be a bad one and should be eliminated from our system of 
knowledge. The same story, however, does not repeat in practical cases. According to 
Hume, since desires can yield motivation, they dictate the way we act. Metaphorically 
speaking, desires would command us to satisfy them with appropriate means. 
Moreover, as desires do not admit truth condition, they are beyond reason's 
assessment^. On the other hand, since reason cannot direct the way we act by yielding 
3 Hume has famously written this remark: T h i s is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of 
the whole world to the scratching of my finger. This is not contrary to reason for me to choose my total 
ruin, to prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me. This is little 
contrary to reason to prefer even my acknowledged lesser good to my greater, and have a more ardent 
affection for the former than the latter. (Paragraph 6，Book II，Part III, Section 3 of Treatise�' 
4 In Hume's era, two theoretical subjects are often mentioned as subjects of reason: abstract relations 
of ideas like logic and mathematics; relations of empirical objects like science. 
5 In one occasion, Hume has thought of a kind of desire as unreasonable. It is the case in which desires 
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opposite motivation or informing us the reasonableness of various desires, its role is 
always restricted to the assessment of the truth of various beliefs and abstract ideas 
that are contributive to the satisfaction of desires. With all these ideas, Hume's overall 
picture on the respective roles of reason and desires in actions can be summed up as 
follows: There are many desires in an agent. When he has adopted some of his desires 
as ends, what he will do is determined. The adopted ends grant him the normative 
reason to act in a certain way, i.e., the agent is justifiable to act in those ways. He 
starts to find appropriate means to satisfy them, and reason step in at this point. 
Reason cannot battle with any ends, but is an indispensable implement for discerning 
the most efficient means to satisfy the given end (or ends)^. 
Nevertheless, Hume's idea of the role of reason is more vivid than what I have 
presented. Despite Hume denies that reason can assess desires, he thinks that there are 
numbers of ways in which reason can affect desires. John Rawls has summarized five 
main ways that reason can affect desires: (Rawls, 2000, p, 33) 
i. If we desire to do X in order to Y, we may be brought no longer to desire to 
do X when by reasoning we see that X won't bring about Y. We may then 
desire to do Z instead. The connection via means-to ends reasoning 
subtracts one desire and adds another to what we may call the configuration 
are based on false beliefs, as when we are afraid of something which is in fact not dangerous or do not 
exist. But his extended sense of unreasonable desires does not affect his central idea because it is the 
falsity of beliefs that make the desire unreasonable. Strictly speaking, those desires are not 
unreasonable by themselves. 
6 There is another implication of Hume's practical reasoning. It is the Humean theory of motivation. 
Hume thinks that desires are the only source of motivation, without which an agent possessing merely 
beliefs cannot be motivated to act. This sort of motivation theory is objected by many anti-Humeans, 
who argue that even though desires must be present in every case whenever there is action, desires 
might not be the source of motivation if they are still motivated by further cognitive states, e.g. beliefs. 
This rift over the motivational capacity of desires is not my present concern because I want in this 
chapter to discuss how desires can provide grounds for our normative reasons. I will come back to the 
theory of motivation in Chapter 3 where I will argue that the Humean theory of motivation is more 
plausible than the anti-Humean motivation theories. 
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of our passion. 
ii. If we desire to run because we are worried by the grizzly bear we think we 
have just spotted, we may no longer be worried when we later see that it is a 
black bear. This is correcting our beliefs about the features of things as 
causes or objectives of our passions. 
iii. Deliberation may render a rather indeterminate desire determinate, as when 
a desire to eat arising from hunger turns into the more specific desire for a 
particular dish when there is a menu on the table. 
iv. Deliberation may schedule our activities for the fulfillment of various 
passions in such a way that they can all be satisfied quite effectively over a 
certain interval of time. 
V. Deliberation may also lead us to see that there are decisions in which we 
must decide which of our passions are more important to us. Perhaps we 
face a conflict between final ends and there is no way to schedule them, or 
to render them more determinate, so as to avoid the conflict. In this case, we 
must assign weights, or priorities, to our ends. It seems that the general 
appetite to good must have an important role here. 
Among the five ways, (i) and (ii) show that reason affects our desires by correcting 
our false beliefs; (iii) shows that reason can make our desires more specific; (iv) 
shows that reason can schedule our activities to satisfy various desires, having a more 
important way than merely finding means to satisfy one desire; (v) shows that reason 
can assign weight to conflicting desires to ensure the making of decisions more 
smooth. 
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We should not be distracted by the diversities of effects that reason has on 
desires. Numerous effects there might be, they are about the extended function of 
reason, but not about the ground of normative reasons. Hume never admits that reason 
can determine which desire to act on, and more subtly that reason can guide us to 
choose which desire is reasonable to be satisfied. We see that some desires are 
assessed and rejected by reason because they are incompatible with the ultimate desire, 
on the basis of either their impediment to the satisfaction of the ultimate desire or 
their inefficiency in satisfying it. It is always true in Hume's account that ultimate 
desires, unlike intermediate desires, cannot be further assessed by reason. And human 
beings have normative reasons only when there has been laid down an antecedent 
ultimate desire. 
As I understand, because of a wrong presumption of the function of reason, 
Hume seems to limit the possible grounds of normative reasons. Hume thinks that as 
the primordial assessed objects of reason such as the relation of things, propositions 
and abstract ideas are assessed in terms of truth conditions, the only function of 
reason is to assess truth conditions. As desires do not have truth conditions, they and 
the actions motivated by them cannot be assessed by reason. But this idea is 
fundamentally susceptible. There is no reason why the function of reason cannot 
include the evaluation of the ‘reasonableness，and 'appropriateness' of desires and 
actions. In fact, this always happens in our lives as when we judge whether doing a 
particular action would spoil other plans, albeit different people may use different 
criterion. Hume may counter argue that as reason cannot provide motivation, it cannot 
counteract desires and change our behavior. It is futile extending this function of 
reason. There are two replies to Hume. First, it is possible for reason to yield 
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motivation. It is certainly possible and not contrary to Hume's idea that reason can 
indirectly lead one to act by yielding desires that subsequently generate opposite 
motivation against the original motivation^. Second, even if we rule out this 
possibility, the assessment of desires and actions is still important. Our aim of 
assessing desires and actions can be merely theoretical. Why can't the assessment of 
desires and actions be as valuable a theoretical matter for its own sake as other 
theoretical works such as literature which also doesn't change the world? If all these 
are sound, then there would be a radical change on the ground of normative reasons. 
As all desires are assessable objects of reason, no desire can be the ultimate ground of 
other desires and normative reasons. We must provide another criterion on which 
reason can assess desires and actions as the justificatory ground of normative reasons. 
I will discuss this issue in section 2.3. Now we go to see why the Humean conception 
of normative reasons is so commonly accepted. 
2.3 Williams's Attack on Desire-independent Normative Reasons, Two 
Arguments for Williams and Their Weaknesses 
Contemporary Humean Bernard Williams has done a supplementary work 
regarding the discovery of normative reasons in his well-known paper "Internal and 
External Reasons". As a Humean, he shares Hume's central idea that normative 
reasons are grounded on desires. Comparing to Hume, what is more constructive is 
that he tries to show how reason can help someone discover his own normative 
reasons from his own 'subjective motivation set’ (S) on the one hand and attack the 
plausibility of desire-independent normative reasons on the other^. Regarding his first 
7 It does not violate Hume's idea because Hume only doesn't allow reason to generate motivation 
directly, but not to generate desires which have responsibility for generating motivation. 
8 In "Internal and External Reason", Williams uses different names to represent the things we are 
talking about. Internal reasons mean desire-dependent normative reasons; external reasons mean 
desire-independent normative reasons; internalists represent the Humeans as well as himself; 
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task, Williams has proposed the following mechanism. Every human being has his 
own S, which comprises not only desires, but also other elements such as goals, 
projects, and achievements which are not in Hume's theory As all elements in S are 
what an agent desires to do, all of them are possible candidates for normative reasons. 
To be the actual normative reasons for an agent, the elements in S must pass a 
deliberation route in which reason can combine, eliminate, verify, arrange and assign 
different weights on them (Williams, 1981，p，365). The process of deliberation can 
enhance the coherence and the unity of the elements in S. The content of S will be 
adjusted, and so each individual's normative reasons change relative to the new shape 
of S. Some normative reasons may no longer exist after deliberation if their 
corresponding desires have been eliminated, and some normative reasons may be 
generated when the relevant desires are added to S. No matter how complicated the 
process of deliberation is, the final normative reason is still based on one's S. And 
since all normative reasons are related to S, they must be capable of motivating 
agents. 
From the above, we can see that Williams has added some new functions to 
reason when comparing to Hume. Although Hume has admitted that reason can 
schedule desires and avoid conflict of desires by assigning weights and priorities to 
some of them, he does not claim like Williams that reason can eliminate and add 
desires. Thus, on Hume's theory, the desires that lose some of their weights are still 
potential normative reasons. If these desires get back the strength and override other 
desires, then they are the new normative reasons the agent has. But Williams object 
externalists represent the anti-Humeans. As Williams's terms can be replaced by the terms I am using 
throughout this thesis without distorting his meaning, I use my terms for the sake of simplicity. 
9 It should be noted that the range of elements in S is boarder and more flexible than Hume's version 
because S does not contain desires only. 
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this idea. He thinks that when some desires are judged disadvantageous to the agent 
in an overall way, they should be dropped from the S and could not regain their 
potential to be normative reasons in virtue of their strength. And if the existing desire 
needs further implements (e.g., the desire to have a free time on Sunday has to be 
further specified by the desire to have an outdoor picnic), then Williams suggests that 
reason should add the new relevant desires. 
If all of our normative reasons must spring from S, then Williams has enough 
materials to suspect the plausibility of desire-independent normative reasons. If 
anti-Humeans want to prove there are really desire-independent normative reasons, 
Williams believes, they ‘must conceive in a special way the connnexion between 
acquiring a motivation and coming to believe the reason statement. (Williams, 1981, p, 
368)，As the anti-Humeans have already cancelled the connection between 
desire-independent normative reasons and desires (or any element in S), they have to 
argue that our motivation has to be acquired by coming to believe the reason 
statement. Some anti-Humeans may want to claim even more radical that our 
motivation is necessarily acquired through coming to believe the reason statement. 
What is bitterer for the anti-Humeans is to show how it is possible to have motivation 
solely on the basis of believing the reason statement. Without providing any 
arguments for the impossibility of acquiring motivation by coming to believe a reason 
statement, Williams concludes, however quickly, that the desire-independent reasons 
cannot provide us motivation. 
From the above characterization of Williams's idea, we should notice that 
Williams stresses heavily on the motivational capacity of normative reasons. In 
another piece of his work, he admits this and explicitly writes, 
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'If it is true that A has a reason to 0，then it must be possible that he should 0 
for that reason; and if he does act for that reason, then that reason will be the 
explanation of his acting. So the claim that he has a reason to 0 — that is, the 
normative statement 'He has a reason to 0 ‘ � introduces the possibility of 
that reason being an explanation. (Williams, 1995, p, 36) 
Note that an agent will take an action only if he has motivation, which is supplied by 
S. So, the only possible normative reasons that can explain an agent's action must be 
desire-dependent normative reasons. This also explains why Williams is so 
unsatisfactory with the anti-Humeans whose desire-independent normative reasons 
have no motivational capacity and lack the power of explaining actions. However, 
Williams seems to be too quick to conclude that the anti-Humeans cannot find a way 
in which judgments can generate motivation. The anti-Humeans can insist that 
rationality is the device to fill this missing step. This idea will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter 4, and I shall not say too much here. The main point is that if the criterion 
of judging why Williams's conception of normative reasons prevails over the 
anti-Humeans' is merely based on the motivational capacity of normative reasons, 
then there is no irresolvable difficulty with the anti-Humeans. 
But apart from explanatory power, are there other arguments that could support 
Williams's position? Williams does not provide further arguments. But I have found 
two arguments from Shafer-Landau (Shafer-Landau, Russ, Chapter 7, Part III)— 
The Browbeating Argument and The Avoidability Argument — to support 
Williams'®. Although I think they share the same spirit, I now treat them as two 
independent arguments and discuss them individually. I will come back to their same 
spirit later. 
There are four arguments in total in that part. I just pick out two in this thesis. 
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The Browbeating Argument aims to show the comparative theoretical advantage 
of Williams's position. As the desire-dependent normative reasons subordinate to S, 
even if agents have to go through a complicated deliberation to discover them, to do 
what they requires can best promote the interests of agents. But the 
desire-independent normative reasons are totally different. Because of their 
irrelevance to S, to act in accordance with them would not promote the agents' 
interests; in some occasions, it would even sacrifice the agents' interests. Intuitively, it 
is quite odd to ask others to do something that is in fact unfavorable to them. But the 
anti-Humeans employ the means of menace and mock to get the agents adhering to 
the desire-independent normative reasons. If the agents still deny the 
desire-independent normative reasons, then the anti-Humeans would charge them for 
irrationality or unreasonableness. Apart from the bad feelings produced by the rhetoric, 
the anti-Humeans are actually producing no ground for adhering to the 
desire-independent normative reasons other than mouthing and browbeating. 
The Browbeating Argument places the anti-Humeans in an embarrassing position 
as few people would think it is good to browbeat others. On the other hand, Williams 
enjoys all the advantages because he does not browbeat others. However, Williams's 
position is not as lenient as he supposes. Recall that on Williams's position, an agent 
must go through a complicated deliberation to discover his own normative reasons. 
Unluckily, not everyone can conduct deliberation in the full sense. Deliberative ability, 
the amount of information and psychological depression can impede one's discovery 
of his normative reasons. One then would deny some normative reasons which are 
really true of him. Although he may not be regarded as essentially irrational by 
Williams, he would be blamed for denying the existence of some real normative 
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reasons. Williams would even browbeat him into adhering to them. 
Williams may counter-argue that the point of blame is to re-direct agent's 
behavior, and the merit of his position for linking the justification of normative 
reasons to the S is that the agent can change his behavior in principle, even if the 
deliberation route is sometimes impeded. If the impediment is once erased, the agent 
will discover his normative reasons and change his behavior accordingly. But the 
desire-independent normative reasons cannot do so in principle. Williams's reply is 
correct only if the point of blame is to redirect a person's behavior. But blame does 
not only serve this function. In many situations, we blame someone not for the 
purpose of changing his behavior, but for revealing the wrong features of his action to 
him. Even if the blame cannot produce any effects on his behavior, that does not 
undermine the truth of the verdict. We should distinguish the efficacy of issuing blame 
and whether an agent deserves blame. 
The Avoidability Argument obtains its plausibility by sticking firmly to a basic 
moral principle — ought implies can. The argument runs as follows: 
1. If one ought to have refrained from 0 -ing, then one could have refrained from 
0 -ing. 
2. If one could have refrained from 0 -ing, then such avoidance must be licensed 
by one's subjective motivational set. 
3. Therefore, if it is proper to blame one for 0 -ing, then refraining from 0-ing 
must be licensed by one's subjective motivational set. 
What has to be clarified is the meaning o f can'. 'Can' has two interpretations. One is 
the physical sense and the other the rational sense. If we use the physical sense, the 
idea of the argument would become freak. It is because even though normative 
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reasons would not recommend us to do the things we cannot do physically, sometimes 
they would not recommend us to do the things that we can do physically. Physical 
'can' does not imply normative 'should'. So, 'can' should be better used in the 
rational sense. So the argument runs: An agent can only rationally do or not do the 
things related to his S. As the desire-independent normative reasons do not relate to S, 
an agent is rationally unable to refrain from doing the action they require. And if one 
cannot rationally refrain from doing what a normative reason requires, that normative 
reason is not his normative reason at all. 
In order to undermine this argument, we need not question its underlying 
principle — ought implies can. At least, I believe that all moral theories take it to be 
the starting point. The problem of this argument lies in premise (3). This premise 
simply begs the question in favor of the Humeans. We can grant both that when an 
agent ought to refrain from 0 -ing，he has a normative reason to refrain from 0 -ing， 
and that an agent has a normative reason to refrain from 0 -ing only when he is able 
to refrain from 0 -ing. However, premise (3) assumes that the only way for an agent 
to refrain from 0 -ing is by his S. That means an agent could not refrain from 0 -ing 
if 0 -ing has no relation to his S. The argument is circular in this way. 
More positively, anti-Humeans can argue that it is perfectly possible for agents to 
do or refrain from doing what desire-independent normative reasons require if the 
agent is rational ‘ ‘. They proceed by arguing that when rational persons are persuaded 
by a third party about the availability of desire-independent normative reasons, their 
judgments can generate desires which then generate motivation. For example, having 
good health is a normative reason for all human beings, regardless of whether they 
“ A c t u a l l y , I will argue later in Chapter 5 that one's rationality will not be spoiled if one fails to act on 
the reasons which one judges right. Anyway, we can now just suppose it to be a way out that external 
reasons can motivate one to act without an antecedent linkage to one's S. 
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have desire to do so. To undermine the claim that a person ought not to refrain from 
eating the things that are bad to his health because there is no relevant element in his S 
allowing him to refrain from so doing, the anti-Humeans argue that an agent can 
refrain from eating the things that spoil his health by having desires generated by 
recognizing the importance of caring about one's health, so long as he is rational. If 
all these are possible, then it is not true for Williams to say that motivation must be 
derived from antecedent desires in S. One's judgment can generate motivation and 
add new desires to S even without the aid of antecedent desires. 
I have mentioned the Browbeating Argument and the Avoidability Argument 
share the same spirit. Both arguments derive their force from normative reasons' 
defined role — the most important job of normative reasons is to explain action. If a 
so-called normative reason cannot motivate a particular agent and explain his actions, 
then it is not really his normative reason at all. The Browbeating Argument actually 
focuses on the positive side of normative reasons: How normative reasons can 
motivate people and explain actions. One is not browbeating others only if the 
normative reasons applicable to others can really provide motivation and explain 
actions. As desire-independent normative reasons cannot provide motivation and 
explain actions, they cannot apply to anyone. Mouthing that one should adhere to this 
or that desire-independent normative reason is just browbeating. The Avoidability 
Argument, on the other hand, focuses on the negative part of normative reasons: How 
a normative reason can ask an agent to refrain from doing an action. Again, if 
desire-independent normative reasons cannot motivate people to act in a certain way, 
they cannot motivate people to refrain from acting in a certain way. These two 
arguments reveal lack of explanatory power of desire-independent normative reasons 
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in the light of execution and avoidance of actions. However, as the Browbeating 
Argument and the Avoidability Argument have their own weaknesses, they do not 
support Williams. But they support anti-Humean neither as they do not show how the 
justification of normative reasons can be grounded on things other than desires. I will 
try to do this in the next section. 
2.4 Two Anti-Humean Arguments on the Justification of Normative 
Reasons 
If the Humean conception of normative reasons is true, then one can always deny 
that some normative reasons apply to him if they are not grounded on his (antecedent) 
desires. This is so even if to act on the desire is objectively unreasonable and bad, e.g. 
the desire to punch others. However, we have an anti-Humean idea on normative 
reasons that they are applicable to human beings not because they can produce 
satisfaction, but because some actions, by their very characteristics, are really good or 
bad that human beings should do or avoid doing. What remains is how we can support 
this anti-Humean idea. There are many works that aim to consolidate, systematize and 
justify this anti-Humean idea in academic institutions. They usually proceed in two 
ways with different emphases. The first emphasizes more on the internal problems of 
the Humean position while the second stresses more on the construction of an 
anti-Humean position — what, instead of desires, provides the grounds for moral 
reasons? I will introduce both ways in the following with Nagel being the 
representative of the first way and Scanlon the second. I will also comment on their 
weaknesses where necessary so as to increase the plausibility of the anti-Humean 
position. 
A. Nagel on Desires and the Justification of Normative Reasons 
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In The Possibility of Altruism (Nagel, 1970，p，34), Nagel argues against the 
Humean conception of normative reasons. He begins by noting a theoretical merit of 
the Humeans. He asks us to imagine the following scenario. One day Mathew wants 
to drink Coke. He discovers that, contrary to his expectation, there is no Coke in his 
refrigerator. He then decides to buy it from a machine by inserting a dime in the 
machine. On the Humean approach, since Mathew has the desire to drink, he goes to 
look for Coke in his refrigerator. After he finds that the refrigerator contains no Coke, 
his wants push him to get one through other means. With the aid of the beliefs that 
there is Coke in the machine and that inserting a dime in the machine will get him a 
Coke, he gets the Coke. Humeans argue that it is ‘the desire to have Coke' that 
provides both the normative reason and motivation for Mathew to act. They claim that 
if Mathew had not had this desire, these could not have provided any normative 
reasons or motivation for him to insert coins in the machine, no matter what other 
‘things' he had possessed, such as the advice from her mother that Coke is beneficial 
to his health. 
The second approach proposed by some anti-Humeans such as Nagel and 
Scanlon argues that normative reasons are grounded on the features of things, not 
desires 12. That means it is the thing's valuable features that provide us the normative 
reason to act. This approach allows that whenever we have normative reason for a 
thing there is a desire at the same time. It just denies that desire adds to the amount 
and the strength of our normative reasons. Going back to our example, the second 
There is a third approach that explains why we have moral reasons to act. It is the constructivist's 
approach. According to this approach, the validity of norms and the existence of moral reasons are 
produced by consensus of agents under the regulation of norms. This approach might seem to elude the 
difficulty of vindicating moral reasons as objective, agent-independent. But it cannot elude the 
difficulty at last, for if different people have different opinions on the validity of moral reasons, they 
cannot settle the dispute if they do not have a criterion to explain why some reasons are really moral 
reasons at all. 
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approach will hold that the good features of Coke provide the normative reason for 
1 'J 
Mathew to have it . 
Nagel claims that the Humean approach is problematic. He says, 
It is of course true that when one sees that the only way to get a drink is to put a 
dime in the slot, one then wants to put a dime in the slot. But that is what 
requires explanation: it is a desire motivated by thirst plus certain information. If 
we simply add it on as a further motive, we shall not do justice to its peculiar 
appropriateness; for any arbitrary desire might be added on in that capacity. 
(Nagel, 1970’ p, 34) 
Nagel has not explained clearly the main idea in this passage but I think his idea is 
approximately like this. Mathew's action is co-produced by his thirst and the 
information that the only possible means to get Coke is buying it from the machine. 
His want to put a dime in the machine is not simply the desire to put a dime, but is 
driven by his thirst and information about how to get a drink. Nagel opposes the 
postulation of a desire to explain every action. In our case, it is the desire 'to put the 
dime in the machine' that explains Mathew's ‘putting the dime in the machine'. But 
what we want to know is exactly why Mathew wants to put a dime in the machine or 
why Mathew has the desire to put the dime in the machine. The Humean approach is 
circular. 
The postulation of desire commits a more serious problem — arbitrariness. On 
the Humean approach, we just need to postulate another desire to explain the action in 
question if the original explanation does not make sense. For example, if Mathew 
13 This second approach treats motivation in a special way comparing to our common sense. Instead of 
desires, it thinks that motivation is supplied by the recognition of the features of the desired objects. I 
am not satisfied with this model and will argue in Chapter 3 that motivation should be the job of desires. 
Anyway, rejecting the motivation picture of this approach does not affect the other insistence of this 
approach — normative reasons are based on the features of facts — with which I agree. 
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knows that his brother, Alfred, will obey any of his commands, then he decides to stay 
at home and asks Alfred to buy a Coke for him. As some of the details in the case 
have changed, the Humean approach tries to explain this new action conveniently by 
postulating the desire 'Mathew wants to give a command to his brother'. However, as 
one may notice, this kind of desire postulation is so arbitrary that one can postulate 
any desire after the action is done. If an explanation is arbitrary, it is not really 
explanation at all'" .^ 
If the weaknesses of the Humean approach are all about circularity and 
arbitrariness, then the Humeans will not have bitter feeling. The Humeans can agree 
with Nagel that the desire 'to put the dime in the machine' has to be further explained, 
and the postulation of a desire on any actions is arbitrary when that action was done. 
But they can argue that the desire 'to drink Coke' is enough to rescue their theory. 
First, the desire 'to put dime in the machine' can be viewed as a desire derived from 
the desire 'to drink Coke' plus other information. This derived desire is not 
miraculous as we always have derived desires. More importantly, this strategy fulfills 
the requirement that some desires require further explanations. Second, for the 
accusation that the postulation of desire is arbitrary, the Humeans can argue that the 
ultimate desire one has limits the ways and numbers of postulations. The desire ‘to 
give a command to his brother' can be regarded as a desire derived from the desire ‘to 
drink Coke' if the only way to get the Coke is to give the order. But the desire ‘to 
drink Coke' does not entail desires which are wholly irrelevant to it. For example, if 
14 Someone may argue that Mathew has only one ultimate desire, namely the desire to drink in this 
case so that all other desire postulations, as means to subserve the desire to drink, are logically possible 
as well as reasonable. But I think this cannot escape from Nagel's objection. Nagel's objection aims to 
attack any explanations based on the postulation of desire made after the action is done. Even though 
all desires that can subserve a desire are reasonable to postulate, the postulation of these desires should 
not be arbitrary, a way in which desire is postulated after an action is done. 
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Mathew helps a stranger on the way to buy the Coke, his normative reason is not 
derived from the desire 'to drink Coke'. It may be derived from the desire to ‘help the 
strangers if they need help'. If Mathew did not have the desire ‘to help the strangers if 
they need help', then the Humeans would simply conclude that Mathew in fact would 
not do the action. 
B. Scanlon on the Role of Desires in the Justification of Normative Reasons and My 
Modifications 
If Humeans can answer Nagel's objection by adding an ultimate desire to justify 
all the intermediate, more specific desires, then what can anti-Humeans do? 
Obviously, the best way is to argue that even ultimate desires need further 
justifications. In What We Owe to Each Other, Scanlon attempts this approach to 
'defend the stronger claim that desires almost never provide [normative] reasons for 
action in the way described by the standard desire model (the Humean model). 
(Scanlon, 1998，p，43)，His strategy is to consider a number of cases in which desires 
seem to be the justificatory ground for normative reasons, and then contends that they 
are not doing the justificatory work actually. 
Scanlon introduces three kinds of cases in which desires exist and seem to 
provide justification for normative reasons (Scanlon, 1998，Chapter 1，section 9). The 
first case is the one where there are desires in the directed-attention sense. Desire in 
the directed-attention sense is defined by Scanlon as 'the thought of P (any desire) 
keep occurring to him or her in a favorable light, that is to say, if the person's 
attention is directed insistently toward considerations that present themselves as 
counting in favor of P. (Scanlon, 1998, p, 39)，Having desire in the directed-attention 
sense, Scanlon argues, does not add something more to the normative reasons one 
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already has. Consider the example of thirst. When one is thirsty, he wants to drink a 
cup of tea to relieve the dryness in his throat. There are two elements in this case: (1) 
the man considers taking pleasure in drinking a cup of tea to be the reason to drink it, 
and (2) there is desire in the directed-attention sense assailing him. Affected by desire 
in the directed-attention sense, he wants to drink a cup of water desperately at this 
moment. Nevertheless, the coexistence of the two elements does not prove that desire 
in the directed-attention sense can be the constituent of normative reasons because if, 
coiinterfactually, the man did not have the desire in the directed-attention sense to 
drink a cup of tea, the reason for drinking would not disappear. The normative reason 
of drinking a cup of tea is constituted, other than desires, by (1) the fact that we have 
dryness feeling in our throat; (2) the judgment that a cup of water can relieve the 
dryness feeling and such feeling would not go away by itself; (3) I enjoy the pleasure 
of drinking water. These three elements, so to speak, constitute the normative reason 
to drink when they are combined regardless of whether one has desire in the 
directed-attention sense. In this particular case, desire in the directed-attention sense 
cannot make the things that constitute the normative reason of drinking a cup of tea 
disappear. It only endows us with some urge feelings. 
Some may still want to claim the case in which there is desire in the 
directed-attention sense does not represent the whole story about the ground of 
normative reasons. They claim that when some species of desire in the 
directed-attention sense such as urges occur in the agent, he acts directly from the 
urges, but not from the features of things specified in cases like thirst. Don't these 
cases show that not only do urges motivate the agent to act, they also provide 
normative reasons for the agent? We can agree that in these cases the agent may be 
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motivated solely by urges, but the main dispute is whether agents who only act from 
urges have normative reason to act in that way. The answer of the latter is uncertain. 
For some urges motivate us to act, we are not merely acting on these urges. For 
examples, as Jonathan Dancy points out, ‘the urge to eat another slice of cake, or to 
touch a woman's elbow, are surely grounded in the idea that it would be good in some 
form to do these things. (Dancy, 2000, p, 36)’ But if people are motivated solely by 
urges, there is serious doubt on whether these people are acting from normative 
reasons. Quinn has used a good example to illustrate this point. He imagines a man 
who 'feels an urge to turn on every radio he sees. It is not that he sees anything good 
about the radios' being turned on; he does not want to hear music or news or even just 
to avoid silence; he is simply moved to turn on every radio that he sees to be off. 
(Scanlon, 1998，p，38)' Even if we agree that this man is acting intentionally^^, it is 
obviously not true that he is acting from normative reasons, because in so acting, the 
agent lacks what normative reasons should essentially have — to see something 
good of the object. Thus, the appeal to urges cannot help Humeans. The above point 
shows either that some urges are reasonable to act for because of some valuable 
features of the urged objects or that there is no normative reason to act from urges at 
all. 
The second case is the one in which there is no desire in the directed-attention 
sense. A good example of this case is studying. I do not mean that it is impossible for 
someone to enjoy studying. But many will find that there is no desire in studying at 
the very beginning. One of the features of studying, as many will claim, is its benefits 
15 I have disputes with Quinn and Scanlon here. While I think that acting intentionally does not require 
seeing normative reasons, they insist intention can not be separated from normative reasons. I think that 
if we agree that toddles are acting intentionally as long as they are conscious without actually seeing 
something as reason due to their brain development, we need not to hold a rigid definition of 
intentionality as Quinn and Scanlon do. 
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to one's spiritual life and daily life in terms of its contribution to thinking and career, 
regardless of whether ones desires it or not. This case shows that desire in the 
directed-attention sense does not affect the normative reasons one has. 
In the third case, desire has a totally different meaning from desire in the 
directed-attention sense. It is about the pleasure derived from doing a certain act. For 
example, a person's normative reason for drinking a cup of tea can simply be the 
pleasure derived from drinking, but not something like the alleviation of dryness of 
throat, or the judgment that the dryness cannot go away by itself. Doesn't this case 
show that the Humean position is partly true? Scanlon doesn't think so He writes, 
'such states are not original sources of reasons. Rather, they are instances of an 
agent's identifying some other considerations as reasons, and they derive their 
reason-giving force from a combination of these reasons and the agent's decision to 
take them as grounds for action. (Scanlon, 1998, p, 45)' What does Scanlon mean by 
'they (desire) derive their reason-giving force from a combination of these reasons' 
and 'the agent's decision to take them as grounds for action'? Scanlon introduces 
Michael Bratman's account of intention to explain this idea'^. According to Bratman, 
the most important idea behind intention is that having an intention requires us to 
carry that intention out, which involves three steps. First, when a person has an 
intention, it limits the range of normative reasons he has*?. For example, if I intent to 
16 Scanlon has borrowed the idea from Michael Bratman's paper "Taking Plan Seriously" (in Reason, 
Emotion and Will, edited by R. Jay Wallace, Aldershot, England, 1999, pp, 85-104). Bratman, in his 
paper, expresses many ideas than those borrowed by Scanlon, such as the criteria of making good plans, 
the scope of plans, the circumstance where plans arises, etc. For more details, one can refer to his paper. 
But Scanlon's borrowed idea is enough for our discussion on the justificatory role of desires on 
normative reasons. 
17 Joseph Raz has a similar idea. In "Reasons for Actions, Decisions and Norms" (in Practical 
Reasoning, edited by Joseph Raz, Oxford University Press, 1978，pp, 128-143)，he uses the term 
‘exclusionary reason' as a device that limits the considerations an agent would take into account in 
order to carry out a decision. That means, if one has an exclusionary reason for decision X，then he will 
not easily re-consider decision X even if there are some slightly new considerations available to him. 
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have an ice-cream, the normative reason that water can relieve the dryness of throat is 
irrelevant. Also, intention is not static. If a person has found that certain 
considerations counting in favor of an action are in fact not normative reasons, he 
may either adopt a new intention or adopt no intention (i.e. do nothing). Finally, 
adopting an intention will exclude adopting other intentions. Since the power of 
human beings is limited, an agent cannot adopt all the intentions he finds valuable 
within a particular interval. He has to select. Once he adopts a particular intention, he 
will have the normative reason to realize that intention rather than the others. 
How can Bratman's theory of intention be applied to the case we are discussing? 
The case of selecting among intentions is similar to the case of selecting among 
considerations of doing an action. When we decide what to do in the near future, we 
decide to take some considerations into account and see whether these considerations 
really count in favor of an action. However, just like the selection of intentions, we 
cannot take all considerations into account. A more moderate, feasible way is to 
consider a limited number of considerations. Admittedly, this similarity does not set 
any constraints on the scope of considerations. These considerations can be, for 
example, the pleasure derived from acting, the urge to act according to one's duty, the 
recognition of other's interests. Also, there is another kind of consideration that 
always occurs in our action, namely the desirability to act. In the above case of 
drinking a cup of tea, the person is actually taking the desirability of tea as one of the 
considerations. 
There is a common misunderstanding on the anti-Humean position that it is 
incompatible with the concept of desirability as one of the constituents of normative 
reasons. In fact, the anti-Humean theorists are barely reluctant to accept the 
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desirability of things as one of the constituents of normative reasons. They just see it 
in a different way from the Humeans. The anti-Humeans don't think that the 
desirability of things is constituted by one's desire. Some features of things are 
desirable because these features are desirable in themselves. The mere fact that 
someone desires these desirable features does not make them more desirable. Nor are 
these features less desirable when they are not desired by anyone. More importantly, 
the anti-Humeans do not imitate the Humeans who hold that the desirability of things 
is the only normative reason for agents. They think that the desirability of things will 
have to be weighted with other kinds of consideration. Desirability is justified to 
satisfy if no other normative reasons override it. Therefore, there is no danger of 
collapsing to the Humean position when the anti-Humeans accept the desirability of 
things as one of the constituents of normative reasons. I conclude Scanlon's 
anti-Humean position as the following: 
Scanlon's anti-Humean conception of normative reasons: It says that no 
desires can be the justificatory ground for normative reasons. Normative reasons 
are grounded on the features of facts. Whether there is desire or not, it will not 
affect the amount of our normative reasons. 
Yet, I think Scanlon misses to explain one important thing, namely, the nature of 
the satisfaction of desires. Many of us will agree with the proposal of utilitarianism 
that we have normative reason to promote contentment and avoid frustration. As the 
satisfaction of desires will bring about contentment, desires, whenever they occur, 
seem to be able to generate normative reasons. Note that the satisfaction of desires is 
different from the desirability of things. The desirability of things focuses on some 
pleasurable features of things, emphasizing on the objects themselves. But the 
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satisfaction of desires stresses on the desires themselves. It is possible that even if a 
particular thing has no pleasurable features in the view of ordinary people, an agent 
might still get satisfaction by satisfying his desire, albeit we regard his taste as rather 
strange. Thus, if the claim ‘I have a normative reason to 0 because I desire to 0 ’ 
means ‘I have a normative reason to 0 because 0-ing can give me satisfaction', 
then the Humean position on normative reasons seems to make sense. 
The Humeans are right to point out two things — the satisfaction of desires is 
objectively valuable, and it is valuable independent of some pleasurable features of 
things — but they are mistaken to go on claiming that the existence of desires is the 
justificatory ground for the satisfaction of desires. When the satisfaction of desires is 
counted as one of the normative reasons, it does not have substantial content. That is, 
it does not spare to know which particular desire is going to be satisfied. It only insists 
that as a formal normative requirement, the satisfaction of desires is one of the 
normative reasons by itself. Its justification does not and can not lie in the desires 
themselves because we are asking the justification of satisfying these desires^^. One 
possible answer as to why the satisfaction of desires is justified may be the utilitarian 
approach, which claims that the satisfaction of desires can promote the well-being and 
the overall development of human beings'^. The existence of various desires, 
therefore, only informs the agent what is to be satisfied. They don't have the force to 
tell us that we are justified to satisfy them. More importantly, just as the desirability of 
18 I was asked by Professor Shih Yuan Kang how I could explain our intuition that the desire to smoke 
justifies one's smoking. The sense of desire in this case is exactly the satification of desires. Apparently, 
it is true to claim that when one has the desire to smoke, one has the reason to do so, because 
forbidding him to do so would cause frustration. This explanation is convenient; it does not explain 
why we are justified to satisfy the desire to smoke at the very beginning. And if we try to answer the 
justification, the answer must not be based on the desire to smoke itself, because that is circular. So, 
eventually, the justification of the satisfaction of desires must be independent of any desires. 
19 This idea sounds like utilitarianism but it seems to me plausible. It would be quite strange and awful 
to disregard the promotion of well-being as one of the reasons human beings have and propose a much 
more strange idea that suffering is a reason. 
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things is one of the normative reasons among others, the satisfaction of desires is also 
one of the normative reasons. The status of the satisfaction of desires is not an 
overriding normative reason, and it always has to be weighted against other normative 
reasons. In many possible cases, it may be overridden. 
Perhaps, what is more controversial with the satisfaction of desires as one of the 
normative reasons is whether a desire adds one more normative reason to the agent's 
decision making when it occurs. Although they do not provide the justificatory ground 
for the satisfaction of desire, it seems incompatible with Scanlon's anti-Humean 
position which says that desires do not affect the amount of normative reasons human 
beings have. I think that Scanlon's anti-Humean position needs to make some 
modifications to face this Humean challenge. We should accept the claim that when 
desires occur, we have to consider one more normative reason. We have to weigh the 
satisfaction of desires against other normative reasons. For example, if an agent's 
satisfaction of a particular desire will affect other's right, then he is not justified to 
satisfy his desire, even though that will bring frustration to him. However, to admit 
the above point does not mean that we are in a Humean position. As I see it, what 
divides Humeans and anti-Humeans is not whether desires can be added to the 
amount of normative reasons, but whether when desires are understood to have added 
the amount of normative reasons, they are the justificatory ground of the normative 
reasons. Our idea that when desires occur they add to the amount of normative 
reasons So long as the justificatory ground for the satisfaction of desires is the 
benefits of its contribution to human beings, desires, by themselves, are not providing 
the justificatory ground which is the exact position the anti-Humeans want to argue 
for. The difference between the Humeans and the anti-Humeans is still obvious. So, I 
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propose the following modified anti-Humean conception of normative reasons 
Modified anti-Humean conception of normative reasons: It says that no 
desires can be the justificatory ground for normative reasons. Normative reasons 
are grounded on the features of facts. But when desires occur, we have one more 
normative reason to consider in decision making, namely, the satisfaction of 
desires. But the justificatory ground of the satisfaction of desires, just as the 
justificatory ground of other normative reasons, is still not based on desires. 
2.5 The Strength of Desires and the Mechanism of Decision Making in 
the Humean and Anti-Humean models 
It may be challenged by Humeans that when I introduce the satisfaction of 
desires as one of the normative reasons, I have unconsciously collapsed to their 
position on the mechanism of decision making, i.e., judging which action should be 
done. They will argue that if we think we have a normative reason to satisfy a desire 
with a greater strength than with a smaller strength as the former can bring about 
greater satisfaction, then when I take the satisfaction of desires as one of the 
normative reasons, I have admitted that the strength of desires can provide the 
justificatory ground for us to satisfy a particular desire. Now, on the anti-Humean 
model, we have to discern the action that will produce the greatest satisfaction, a 
mechanism which is similar to that of the anti-Humean model, which proposes action 
is the outcome of the competition of the strength of desires. 
However, the mechanism of judging which action should be done on the 
anti-Humean position is far more complicated than the Humeans conceive. In some 
cases, it may be trivially true that an agent has a normative reason to act for the 
strongest desire on both the Humean and the anti-Humean positions. But the rationale 
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between two positions is different. On the anti-Humean position, an agent is 
permissible to do the action which produces the greatest satisfaction either because (1) 
that the object of the strongest desire is objectively valuable to satisfy, or (2) that to 
have greatest satisfaction is an objective normative reason whose validity does not 
depend on this or that person's desire. On the Humean position, the rationale is just 
that one desire defeats another desire by its relative strength. But in other complicated 
cases, it is common that the final normative reason we act for has nothing to do with 
the strength of desires, a mechanism which is entirely different from the Humean 
position. For example, in a small scale Chinese family where there are three members: 
a son and two parents. The son decides whether to eat before his parents. If he is 
hungry, he has a strong desire in the directed-attention sense to eat first. On the other 
hand, doing so is impolite in Chinese society. After weighing the importance of the 
two normative reasons, the child concludes that the normative reason of preserving 
the rite of Chinese family is more important, and it defeats the normative reason of 
consuming the food as fast as possible. If we view this situation from the Humean 
model, the above mechanism will not occur. It will merely be a situation in which the 
desire to eat competes with the desire to comply to the courtesy of the Chinese, and 
the decision about which desire the agent should act on depends on which desire is 
stronger. 
The above case shows that the anti-Humean position does not take the strength 
of desires to be the only constituent of normative reasons or the most important 
normative reason. Apart from the strength of desires, the anti-Humeans think of other 
things as relevant considerations. But what count as relevant considerations raises 
further questions. Scanlon (1998，Chapter 1，section 10) suggests that judging which 
43 
Chapter 2 The Rejection of Humean Internalism 
considerations are relevant requires a background of knowledge. This can be 
explained by his contrast between belief and action. In the belief case, what force us 
to believe something are certainly some considerations that are proved true. But what 
counts true is not an isolated matter; rather it is engendered by some other beliefs that 
an agent accepts implicitly. Only when taking these implicit beliefs into account could 
the agent have enough materials to decide what is true and false. When one has a 
certain amount of background beliefs, that affects what one takes to be true; when one 
arrives at some newly true beliefs, it will correct some old beliefs. Similarly, what 
considerations count as relevant to a particular action depends on some background 
beliefs, intentions and principles. When there are different considerations counting in 
favor of different things in a particular situation, this happens because there is a more 
general framework of value underlying the situation. Usually, relative to each 
individual's own background, different values have different degrees of importance. 
When these values are relevant to what we do, they shape different things as 
considerations for us. Because of the distinctive role of these values in our life, they 
inform us that some considerations counted as relevant under a particular value 
system may not be counted as relevant under other value systems. 
Humeans seem unable to account for the degree of importance of different 
considerations apart from the strength of desires. Even if they add the factor of each 
individual's background as a variable to their decisions, the criterion of decision 
making of each individual still depends on the strength of desires in their own life. 
The mechanism remains the same. The attractiveness of the anti-Humean position is 
that it can avoid some absurd conclusion. Suppose two kinds of desires, caring about 
the feelings of a friend and winning the title in a friendly match, occur in an agent. He 
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must choose to act on either way, and he happens to have a stronger desire for the 
latter. On the Humean position, he should win the title but we incline to think that 
friendship is an overriding normative reason and no human being should sacrifice 
friendship in pursuit of title. The anti-Humean position keeps reminding us what 
matters is not only the strength of desires, but also some objective values that depend 
not on desires. Decisions should be made on wider, more scrupulous deliberation. 
2.6 The Rejection of Humean Internalism and a Remark 
In this chapter, I have tried to introduce a way to vindicate internalism. To do so, 
we have to believe the Humean idea that all of our normative reasons are grounded on 
desires. As desires provide the ground for normative reasons and motivation, there is 
no gap between normative reasons and motivation, and thus internalism is a 
self-evident theory. But we doubt whether the conception of normative reasons 
proposed by the Humean is really correct. Of course, this doubt is motivated by our 
intuition that when a normative reason applies to someone, it applies to others in 
similar situation regardless of whether they desire to do so. But what motivates us to 
begin is one thing, whether we can justify our thought is quite another. In order to 
reject the Humean conception of normative reasons, I employ two anti-Humean 
approaches — Nagel's approach and Scanlon's approach. Among them, I think that 
Scanlon's is more plausible (because the Humeans can deal with Nagel's challenge). 
Scanlon's strategy is to analyze two meanings of desires (desires in the 
directed-attention sense and the desirability of things) and examine whether when 
they occur, they provide the justification for normative reasons. He concludes that no 
matter which sense of desire we are talking about, their occurrence does not affect the 
amount of normative reasons we have. Conversely, normative reasons are constituted 
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by some valuable features of things. I add to Scanlon's approach one more sense of 
desire — the satisfaction of desires — which seems to support the claim that when 
there is a desire, we have normative reason. I argue that the justification of the 
satisfaction of desires as a kind of normative reasons is provided by the good features 
of the satisfaction of desires. The occurrence of a particular desire only informs us 
which desire is to be satisfied. It cannot be the justification of the satisfaction of 
desires. If these anti-Humean arguments are sound, then we can reject the Humean 
conception of normative reasons. And if normative reasons are not grounded on 
desires and desires provide motivation, then unless other devices are inserted, it is 
always possible that motivation can come apart from normative reasons. Humean 
Internalism is no longer a self-evident theory. 
One should be very cautious here that the anti-Humean position that normative 
reasons are grounded on the features of facts does not imply either a position of moral 
realism or a situation where no further controversy is involved. No matter it is 
naturalistic moral realism or non-naturalistic moral realism, moral realism is a 
position supporting the existence of moral facts as part of the fabric of the world. To 
establish a moral realism position, one has to answer three questions: (1) which 
features are moral features; (2) why some features are really moral features; (3) what 
facts are moral facts on which moral features depend. Admittedly, the anti-Humean 
position I propose only preserves the idea that the features on which normative 
reasons are grounded are objective facts. Why these features of facts can play an 
important role in shaping an objective value is beyond my ability to proceed on. 
Although I think that some moral principles such as ‘Don't inflict wanton pain on 
others' are self-evident objective principle and some values such as 'learning' and 
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"health caring' are commonly agreed by all parties, these are not qualified for a moral 
realism position. On the other hand, my anti-Humean position does not guarantee 
there is no dispute on which features of facts are valuable and are qualified for the 
justification of normative reasons. There may be disputes, e.g., disputes over the 
relevance of an aborigine's practice as normative reasons，disputes over the relative 
importance of two moral principles. But these inadequacies, if you would like to say, 
do not resist us to insist that normative reasons are not grounded on desires. I think 
this is enough to undermine the Humean position, for its central idea that desires 
provide the justification for normative reasons cannot be sustained. 
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Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
In Chapter 2，I have rejected Humean Internalism for its underlying incorrect 
conception of normative reasons. Meanwhile, I have replaced it with an anti-Humean 
conception of normative reasons, according to which the justification of normative 
reasons is grounded on the features of facts. The problem now is how to vindicate 
internalism if we stick to this anti-Humean conception of normative reasons. There 
are two possible ways. One is to dispose of the Humean motivation theory, a kind of 
motivation theory insisting that desires are the psychological factor among others that 
provides motivation, and to argue that beliefs alone can motivate human beings. 
Another is to continue to hold the Humean motivation theory but tries to find a way to 
connect normative reasons and desires reliably (because desires provide motivation). 
Thomas Nagel's Pure Ascription Internalism (PAI) attempts the first way while 
Michael Smith's Rational Internalism tries the second. 
In this chapter, I will argue against PAI (shortly after I will tell why Nagel's 
particular kind of internalism is called PAI). I will discuss Michael Smith's Rational 
Internalism in the next chapter. The reason for rejecting PAI will be based on what I 
take a good motivation theory to be, but not on my opinion about the necessary 
connection between moral reasons and motivation, if there is any. As I think that the 
motivation theory underlying PAI is less convincing than its alternative — the 
Humean motivation theory, PAI ought to be rejected for being established on a 
implausible motivation theory. So, in order to reject PAI and to support the Humean 
motivation theory, this chapter will be organized in the following way. In 3.1，I will 
introduce what PAI is and the content of its underlying anti-Humean motivation 
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theory (the Nagelian motivation theory). In 3.2，I will introduce the Humean 
motivation theory, examine the problem of the Nagelian motivation theory and 
discuss the real dispute between anti-Humeans and Humeans over the motivation 
problem. In 3.3, I will try to offer an argument for the Humean motivation theory in 
terms of the idea of the direction of fit inspired by Michael Smith. In 3.4,1 will defend 
the Humean motivation theory against four anti-Humean challenges. 
Before starting the discussion, I want to make two remarks. First, I call the 
motivation theory underlying PAI the Nagelian motivation theory hereafter. Second, 
when making the contrast between Humeans and anti-Humeans in this chapter, I am 
referring to their views on motivation theory, not views on normative reasons that I 
have discussed in Chapter 2, unless otherwise specified. 
3.1 PAI and the Nagelian Motivation Theory 
The Nagelian motivation theory is supposed to be the archrival of the Humean 
motivation theory. The Humean motivation theory insists that desires provide 
motivation. On the contrary, the Nagelian motivation theory insists that beliefs 
provide motivation. Even though the Nagelian motivation theory is a particular kind 
of anti-Humean motivation theory, it claims much less than typical anti-Humean 
motivation theories do. While typical anti-Humeans (Scanlon, 1998, Chapter 1 and 
Dancy, 2002, the pure cognitive view of motivation) assert that all kinds of belief are 
intrinsically motivating, the Nagelian theory claims that only two kinds of belief are 
intrinsically motivating, namely moral beliefs and prudential be l ie fs�Other kinds of 
belief are motivationally inert and they must be accompanied by desires to generate 
I Perhaps Nagel has thought that apart from moral beliefs and prudential beliefs, there are other kinds 
of belief that are intrinsically motivating. But in The Possibility of Altruism, he mentions that only 
moral beliefs and prudential beliefs are intrinsically motivating. So, it is more appropriate to say that 
only these two are intrinsically motivating here. 
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actions. 
Nagel begins his argument for the Nagelian motivation theory by distinguishing 
two kinds of desire, unmotivated desires and motivated desires. The motivational role 
of these two kinds of desire is wholly different. Unmotivated desires are those that 
'simply assail us', and when they occur, they provide motivation for the doer, as when 
our drinking a cup of tea is motivated by the unmotivated desire 'a thirst for some 
drinks'. Motivated desires are of a very different sort. They are desires 'arrived at by 
decision or after deliberation' (Nagel, 1970，p, 29). When we think that it is wrong to 
lie to a friend, and decide to tell him the truth, we obtain a motivated desire to tell the 
truth. Or when we think that we ought to promote the welfare of our offspring, we 
obtain a motivated desire to promote the welfare of our offspring. But Nagel does not 
simply want to tell us the causal relation between deliberation and motivated desires 
that motivated desires are generated by the recognition of goodness of actions: In the 
first example, the desire to tell the truth is generated by the recognition of wrongness 
of lying, or sometimes the right relation between true friends; in the second case, the 
desire to promote the welfare of our offspring is generated by the recognition of the 
welfare of offspring, or the love we devoted to them. He intends to further argue that 
in these cases, motivated desires are not the motivation source. Indeed, we are 
motivated by the recognition of the goodness of the action. Nagel writes, 
‘If the likelihood that an act will promote my future happiness motivates me to 
perform it now, then it is appropriate to ascribe to me a desire for my own future 
happiness. But nothing follows about the role of the issue [motivated desires] as 
a condition contributing to the motivational efficacy of those considerations [the 
recognition of the goodness of action]. It is a necessary condition of their 
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[motivated desires] efficacy to be sure, but only a logically necessary condition. 
It is not necessary either as a contributing influence，or as a causal condition.' 
(Nagel, 1970, p, 30) 
In The Possibility of Altruism, Nagel does not explain his idea very clearly and 
how his argument works. But Dancy (Dancy, 2002, p, 85) has provided a useful 
supplementary explanation. Actions must be done from motivation. For an action to 
be done successfully, a necessary condition is that there is no contrary motivation or 
the motivation for that action is the strongest among others. Provided that there is no 
contrary motivation, the explanation of motivation is the same as that of action. We 
need to find a route through which the motivation can lead one to do the action 
directly. Motivated desires, as mentioned above, are a kind of desire that do not stand 
by itself independently. They are by definition generated things. The only suspicion is 
whether motivated desires are further generated by more fundamental desires or some 
evaluative judgments. But the suspicion that motivated desires are generated by 
further desires is soon erased as motivated desires are by definition generated by 
evaluative beliefs. Since motivated desires are generated by evaluative beliefs, their 
motivation force is also generated by evaluative beliefs. Motivated desires, then, do 
not contain any motivation by themselves. There is no connection, Nagel concludes, 
between an agent's having moral motivation or prudential motivation and the 
presence of motivated desires. As long as evaluative judgments are enough to provide 
motivation, motivated desire can always be omitted from the production of moral 
actions and prudential actions. The reason why we are likely to say that desires are the 
explanation of action is merely because we are accustomed to say that ‘I do this 
because I desire this'. If we really cannot get rid of this explanatory picture, Nagel 
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concedes, we can retain it by ascribing motivated desires to every explanation of 
actions. This is why I call Nagel's internalsim the Pure Ascription Intemalism. But 
this concession is used merely to preserve a certain form of action explanation. It does 
not change the central idea that evaluative judgments instead of motivated desires 
provide motivation. If the Nagelian motivation theory is true, Nagel can vindicate 
intemalism. It is because moral beliefs capture the content of objective moral reasons 
and provide moral motivation at the same time, and so there is no gap between 
recognizing moral reasons and having moral motivation. 
3.2 The Humean Motivatiion Theory and the Assessment of the 
Nagelian Motivation Theory 
I think the Nagelian motivation theory is problematic. But since it is used to 
oppose the Humean motivation theory, I would like to delay the assessment of it until 
I have fully elaborated what the Humean motivation theory says. The ideas of the 
Humean theory can be traced back to Hume's view on the functions of beliefs and 
desires. Starting with what he takes to be an empirical discovery that we are 
motivated to act only when we desire a thing, Hume moves to a universal claim that 
desires are the only psychological factor providing motivation. However, he does not 
overlook the function of another psychological factor — beliefs — in the 
production of actions. As mentioned in Chapter 2, beliefs are responsible for 
informing how desires are to be satisfied. Without beliefs to guide them, desires will 
be unable to push us to act effectively, just as a train cannot operate if there is no track. 
But Hume's universal claim faces objections quickly. If the only evidence to conclude 
that we have motivation only when we desire a thing is the feeling of desires, how 
about those cases in which we have no feeling of desires? Suppose we think that 
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helping people in need is right. When we are thereby motivated to help them in virtue 
of that thought, it seems that we have no feeling of desires (perhaps feeling means 
impulse), and we do not think that that is done by the aid of desires. Don't these cases 
reveal that desires are not the only motivating state, even if desires may be one of the 
motivating states? Hume quashes this objection by insisting that there is no need for 
one to have distinctive feelings in order to be in desire states. He argues that desires 
can be divided into two classes depending on their affections on human beings. In 
some occasions in which we have distinctive feelings of desire and are motivated to 
act, violent passions are operating. And when we have no feeling, it is not that beliefs 
provide the motivation, but that calm passions are operating in a silent, dispassionate 
way. Thus, through introducing certain sub-classes of desire, it is still true that desires 
provide all motivation for human beings in all kinds of cases. 
However, Hume's provocative slogan that 'Reason is the slave of the passions' 
and his idea that beliefs set their main target on the conditions of truth and falsehood 
yield an extreme version of the Humean motivation theory. This extreme version 
produces the worry that the theory does not allow desires to be caused by reason or 
other psychological factors such as beliefs. From Hume's texts, I think we cannot 
deny that he thinks that reason, without the aid of antecedent desires, is incapable of 
causing desires . However, a revised Humean motivation theory needs not to follow 
Hume's every idea. Being a theory about the source of motivation, the revised 
Humean motivation theory concerns whether desires are the motivating state. It needs 
not to deny any causal relations between reason and desires. If so, the revised theory 
2 I say 'reason alone is incapable of causing desires' because Hume has admitted that if reason, 
accompanied by some antecedent desires, is able to cause desire. Although I think it is more suitable to 
say the new desires are caused by the antecedent desire, it remains true in Hume's idea that reason 
alone cannot cause desires. 
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can still preserve the spirit, or at least one of the spirits, of the extreme version of the 
Humean motivation theory, namely that desires are the only psychological factor that 
provide motivation. As to the question of whether beliefs can cause desires in the 
Humean motivation theory, there is nothing that can be drawn from Hume's text to 
confirm definitely that beliefs are totally causally inefficacious^. More importantly, 
just as embracing the idea that reason can cause desires does not affect the spirit of the 
extreme version of the Humean motivation theory, Humeans do not mind to include 
also the idea that beliefs can cause desire'^. Clearly mindful of these two new ideas, I 
revise the Humean motivation theory as follows: 
The revised Humean Motivation theory (I still call it the Humean motivation 
theory for simplicity): It only insists that desires are the only psychological 
factor that provide motivation without denying that reason or beliefs can cause 
desires. 
Refining the Humean motivation theory in this way, I now turn to the assessment 
of the Nagelian motivation theory. I conduct this in two directions. One concerns how 
far the Nagelian theory has successfully attacked the Humean motivation theory and 
the other about the weaknesses of the Nagelian theory. Nagel thinks that he has 
attacked the core idea of the Humean motivation theory by showing the presence of 
motivated desires. By definition, motivated desires are desires generated by evaluative 
3 I think that the term 'cause' at least means two things. First, it may be that a belief can create a new 
desire without any aid of an antecedent desire. Second, the belief may affect the strength of the desire, 
either making it stronger or weaker. So, when we say a belief causes a desire, we have to know whether 
it means a kind of generation or a kind of affection. 
4 The claim that reason and beliefs can cause desires has invited people like my supervisor Professor 
C.J. Fraser to think that reason and beliefs can program our motivation and actions. This claim is true 
only if'program' amounts to the affection produced on desires by reason and beliefs. Viewing action as 
a whole, Hume also admits that reason and beliefs can 'program' our actions. This can be seen from his 
maintenance that every action must consist of a pair of beliefs and desires. But the Humeans are 
focusing on source of motivation, which should be understood as a part of actions. They want to argue 
that reason and beliefs, without the aid of desire, can't program our actions fully. So, we must keep in 
mind that the real dispute between the anti-Humeans and the Humeans is about the motivation source, 
but not about every part of action. 
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judgments or deliberation. They differ from ordinary unmotivated desires. We can be 
suddenly assailed by unmotivated desire but the force of unmotivated desires can also 
disappear just as suddenly. However, motivated desires are 'tamed' desires that follow 
after our decisions, and are contiguous to the evaluative judgments as long as the 
evaluative judgments are present. If there are such desires, then beliefs are shown to 
be causally efficacious because they can cause desires. However, Dancy (2002, pp, 
81-4) argues that this view is irrelevant to the question of whether beliefs can 
motivate. As shown from the above, what the Humean motivation theory concerns is 
the genuine motivating state. It needs not deny the causal relation between reason, 
beliefs and desires. Thus, even if there are motivated desires generated by prudential 
beliefs or moral beliefs as Nagel supposes, the Humeans can still argue that motivated 
desires differ from unmotivated desires only in their production processes. Nagel 
seems to think that 'if moral beliefs can cause something, they can cause other things'. 
But this rationale is problematic. Consider an example. When I throw a rock into the 
sea, there will be bubbles. Although my throwing causes the rock to drop into the sea, 
the throwing is not the direct cause of the bubbles. It is the fact that the rock dropping 
into the sea causes the bubbles. Similarly, whenever there are moral beliefs, there are 
moral actions, this fact does not imply that moral actions are directly caused by moral 
beliefs. There may be some elements other than moral beliefs in the process that are 
responsible for causing the actions, and we have to dig in to find out what they are. 
Not only has Nagel attacked the Humean motivation theory irrelevantly, his 
motivation theory is also problematic. Dancy has criticized Nagel in terms of the 
problem of hybridity (Dancy, 2002，p, 81). Hybridity occurs when one tries to admit 
two or more contradictory fundamental relations in a general theory. In my view, 
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hybridity counts as problem on theoretical construction because of our view on what a 
good general theory should be. Two criteria of a theory having good explanatory 
power are simplicity and stability of the defined relation(s) of theoretical entities. We 
demand simplicity because a theory that makes lots of ad hoc assumptions and treats 
similar things in different ways has low explanatory value. We demand stability 
because if the theoretical entities have two or more defined but contradictory relations, 
there will be some confusion over which particular relation is true in a particular case, 
and for the worst, it fails to explain what it is supposed to explain. The Humean 
motivation theory fulfills the two criteria. First, when it tries to explain the formation 
of human motivation, it restricts the theoretical entities to beliefs and desires. Second, 
when it maintains the contribution of beliefs and desires to motivation, it insists that 
the structure of all kinds of motivation is the same, i.e., it has stipulated a rigid 
relation between beliefs, desires and motivation, and this relation does not change 
across different kinds of motivation. It does not discriminate one kind of motivation 
from another, and so, the Humeans can consistently explain why we have and do not 
have motivation in virtue of psychological factor. When we have desire, we have 
motivation; when we don't have desire, we don't have motivation. All the while, the 
Humeans have been offering us one general theory on motivation. The Nagelian 
motivation theory is entirely different. While Nagel admits the Humean motivation 
theory is true to certain kinds of motivation, he tries to draw a special region to which 
his own motivation theory, opposite to what the Humean motivation theory says about 
moral motivation and prudential motivation, applies. In Nagel's mind, this special 
region is only reserved for moral motivation and prudential motivation. However, 
even if we do not at this moment question Nagel's basic assumption that no belief 
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O t h e r than prudential beliefs and moral beliefs can provide motivation, thereby 
unambiguously stating the effects of various kinds of belief on motivation, the 
Nagelian motivation theory is not as a good explanatory theory on moral motivation 
as Nagel wants it to be. As Nagel finds that there are cases in which moral agents are 
unmoved by their moral beliefs, he concludes that sometimes moral beliefs may be 
inert. Whereas rational agents' moral beliefs are themselves sufficient to provide 
moral motivation, less rational or irrational agents do need desires, particularly moral 
desires, as complements to provide moral motivation. So in the special region, both 
moral beliefs and moral desires can provide moral motivation, depending on the level 
of rationality the agent is possessing. This admission is harmful to the Nagelian 
motivation theory because the theory loses its explanatory power by ruling out, 
though unconsciously, the possibility of an agent's not having moral motivation. This 
point is explained as follows. Provided that no moral agent is in a vacuum, every 
moral agent must possess either moral beliefs or moral desires or both of them. So, 
every moral agent must have moral motivation if it is true for the Nagelian motivation 
theory to claim that both moral beliefs and moral desires can provide moral 
motivation. But there are definitely numerous cases where moral agents don't have 
moral motivation. A good motivation theory must be able to explain this phenomenon, 
and since the Nagelian motivation theory fails to do so, it is not a good motivation 
theory. 
As I conjecture, Nagel may rescue the Nagelian motivation theory by confining 
it to a theory devised to explain the structure of moral motivation of rational agents. 
Thus, a rational moral agent has moral motivation when he has moral beliefs, and he 
doesn't have moral motivation when he doesn't have moral beliefs. This reply, 
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however, leaves an important question unanswered. If we can fairly claim that moral 
beliefs can provide moral motivation simply in virtue of themselves, then there is no 
reason to appeal to another faculty — in this particular case, rationality — in order 
for them to work. Rationality may affect the agents' progression to understand a moral 
claim, but it does not stripe moral beliefs of their basic motivational capacity that in 
fact belongs to the moral beliefs themselves. Even if two moral agents may have 
differences in the level of rationality, both of them should have moral motivation once 
they have the same moral belief, as it is the moral beliefs, not rationality, that provide 
moral motivation. So, just confining the Nagelian theory to the task of explaining the 
motivation of rational agents may face more theoretical problems than the alternative. 
A more fundamental fallacy of the Nagelian motivation theory lies in Nagel's 
seemingly untenable basic assumption that moral beliefs and prudential beliefs differ 
essentially from other kinds of belief in their motivational capacity. Let us assume that 
|j. is the nature of beliefs and 0 is the nature of desires�. In order to be beliefs or 
desires, an object must have p. or 0. There is no problem in the Humean motivation 
theory because it holds that in all cases, beliefs have |a, and desires have 0. But the 
Nagelian motivation theory is problematic. It agrees with the Humeans on the one 
hand that non-moral beliefs have |LI and non-moral desires have 9 as their essential 
5 External examiner Professor Hua Tai has asked me to prove that Nagel has indeed committed to 
taking |i (or 9) be the feature of beliefs (or desires). But to have this prove is unnecessary. It is 
appropriate to say of Nagel holding fx be the feature of belief not because there is textual evidence, but 
because of what the Nagelian motivation theory says. The central idea of the Nagelian motivation 
theory is that there are two distinctive kinds of belief in the world: moral beliefs and prudential beliefs 
as a pair and ordinary beliefs. The former kind is intrinsically motivating whereas the later is not. So, if 
we use a symbol to represent the two kinds of belief, it must be true that when one is represented by a 
symbol, say, the other should be represented by the converse of the symbol, It does not matter 
which symbol we use for representing moral beliefs and prudential beliefs at the very beginning, or 
Nagel has committed to. What is important is only that when we pick up a symbol for moral beliefs and 
prudential beliefs, non-moral beliefs must be represented by its converse. Moreover, the advantage of 
using |i and 0 as symbols for representing beliefs and desires respectively is that it does not assume the 
truth of either the Humean motivation theory's or the Nagelian motivation theory's analysis on the 
nature of beliefs and desires. My final aim is just to show the problem of a theory if it holds two 
opposite views on the nature of beliefs and desires. 
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feature, but proposes on the other hand that moral beliefs have -p, and moral desires 
have � Q as their essential feature. However, as long as one has defined the essential 
feature of beliefs as and of desires as 0, cannot be the essential feature of any 
kinds of belief and � 0 the essential feature of any kinds of desire. We deny anything 
which has the nature of � a s belief because is opposite to the essential feature of 
beliefs. The same applies to desires. Nagel has just committed to this problem when 
he claims that moral beliefs are a kind of belief but has the essential feature exactly 
opposite to the essential feature of ordinary beliefs. It is doubtful in the Nagelian 
motivation theory whether moral beliefs are still a kind of belief and moral desires a 
kinds of desire. Nagel, undoubtedly, can argue that -jo, is the essential feature of all 
kinds of belief and ~0 the essential feature of all kinds of desire. But then, all beliefs 
are also essentially motivationally capacious, a result which I am sure Nagel will not 
want. No matter at the end which essential feature Nagel argues moral beliefs and 
moral desires are to have, the basic principle he should not violate is that no entity can 
have two contradictory essential features. 
3.3 Argument for the Humean Motivation Theory 一 Direction of Fit 
Although I have pointed out that the Nagelian motivation theory has at most 
showed moral beliefs' causal capacity, which is irrelevant to the genuine debate 
between Humeans and anti-Humeans about which psychological factor is 
motivationally efficacious, I have not presented any arguments for the Humeans. In 
order for the Humeans to argue for their favorable motivation theory, it is 
inappropriate to follow Hume's approach to appeal to a limited number of actions as 
that only proves that desires are the motivation source of some of our actions. In my 
view, a better approach for the Humeans is to show that motivation and desires share a 
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certain conceptual similarity which is not shared with beliefs. This section aims to do 
this thing. I will borrow Michael Smith's idea of two directions of fit to construct the 
argument (Smith, 1995, pp，116-125)6. But the argument will take a little while to 
develop, so I divide it into two parts. The first part will analyze intentional action and 
its relation with motivation. The second part will concern the relation between 
motivation and desire. 
A. Brief Analysis of Intentional Action, Willing, Goal, Intention and Motivating Reason 
When we talk of actions, we are not talking of something merely happening. We 
are usually talking of intentional actions (I simply use 'action' in the subsequent 
discussion). Actions comprise two independent but correlated elements: willing and 
bodily movement. They are independent in the sense that either one cannot be reduced 
to another. They are correlated in the sense that the will of human beings has certain 
kinds of casual effect on physical body. The occurrence of the former is necessary for 
the occurrence of the later. So, willing is a necessary condition for anything to qualify 
for action. But can we further analyze the concept of willing? Ordinary language 
gives us some hints. When someone says that 'I am willing to do something', he 
means that there is a goal (or some goals) he wills to satisfy. As I understand, willing 
always involves goal that an agent wants to achieve. Without goal as something 
making sense of the direction of willing, it is somehow impossible to understand what 
it means when someone claims ‘I will to do something'. Metaphorically, willing is 
something like gasoline which provides driving force, while goal is the destination 
6 When I say I borrow Smith's idea of two directions of fit, I mean that I only use his idea of two 
directions of fit, but not all terms involved in it, as an argument for the Humean motivation theory. For 
example, Smith has used the term 'goal' as a contrast with motivating reason and desire. But I have 
used 'intention' to include goal and willing and contrast it with motivating reason and desire. I use 
intention instead of goal because of two reasons. First, intention is more commonly used in the 
literature. Second, intention seems to involve some forces, whereas goal seems to be just a destination 
which cannot make a direct contrast with motivation, the main issue which we are concerning. Anyway, 
all these don't affect Smith's and my central position that desire is the only genuine motivating state. 
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which makes sense of the whole driving process, especially the utilization of gasoline. 
We can use 'intention' to group willing and goal together. That means an 
intention consists of gasoline like willing and destination like goal. When an agent has 
an intention, he is in an active state in which he will have motivation to do various 
things to achieve his intention because the state involves force and goal. It would be 
odd to say that an agent has an intention but does nothing?. Apart from combining 
willing and goal, intention has another function. It serves to explain why an agent acts 
in one way rather than the other. In this aspect intention resembles motivating reason. 
Motivating reason is different from normative reason . Normative reason is a kind of 
reason saying that ‘ 0 is justified from the perspective of the normative system 
(Smith, 1995, p, 95)', while motivating reasons is the one that is 'potentially 
explanatory of her 0 -ing. (Smith, 1995, p, 96)，The reason why we say that intention 
resembles motivating reason much more than normative reason is that unlike 
normative reason, motivating reason does not set a normative requirement to require 
all agents to do an action or a certain kind of action. It is neutral on the value of our 
action. It attempts only to explain why, given all kinds of action an agent can do either 
in physical sense, psychological sense or rational sense, he chooses to do a particular 
7 Some people may object that having intention does not necessarily involve doing something. There 
can be intention without action. For example, it is common to find that a boy may do nothing even if he 
has intention to ask a girl for her phone number. However, I think that this is not an accurate 
description of the case. First, while the boy may have intention to ask for the girl's phone number, he 
may also have the intention of not wanting to be rejected and insulted. These two other intentions may 
make him hesitate to do anything. Second, just sitting can be understood as action, although this 
'action' is different from ordinary sense of active actions. The most crucial thing to understand 'action' 
is whether the subsequent 'movement' can fulfill one's intention, but not what kinds of 'movement' it is. 
In the above case, if just sitting can avoid being insulted, then there is no reason to oppose sitting as a 
kind of action. 
8 Many philosophers do not like this classification. They do not think that there can be two kinds of 
reason, each specifying what the agent should do. In their view, only normative reason is reason. 
Motivating reason is not genuine reason at all as it only explains why the agent will act in a certain way 
without ever requiring, recommending, and prescribing what the agent should do. I find this dispute 
unimportant. When introducing motivating reason, Smith does not intend to mix it up with normative 
reason. He also knows that he intends only to explain an agent's motivation by this term. If clear 
description is given in advance, what is so problematic to extend the meaning of'reason'? 
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action by focusing on the psychological factors that would potentially lead him to act. 
Since what motivating reason can explain is what can lead the agent to act, and what 
is potentially able to lead us to act in one way rather than the other is intention we can 
say that motivating reason is another way to represent intention. Moreover, as 
intention is active in nature, motivating reason should also be active in nature; 
otherwise, motivating reason cannot explain why an agent does something actively. 
If we accept the above analysis of action, we have actually accepted two things 
at the same time. The first thing is that we must have intention in every action in order 
to make sense of action. The second thing is that having intention resembles having 
motivating reason in terms of their explanatory power on action and their active 
nature. Bearing these in mind, we are a step closer to vindicate the Humean 
motivation theory. The Humean theory aims to argue that desire provides motivation. 
If we can show the similarities between desire, intention and motivating reason, then 
the Humean theory is a plausible motivation theory. But if it is the case that belief 
shares the same characteristic with intention and motivating reason, then the Humean 
theory suffers a total failure. 
B. Direction of Fit and the Humean Motivation Theory 
Mark Platts，following G.E.M. Anscombe, has invented a concept — direction 
of fit — to mark the difference between beliefs and desires that can provide the 
materials for us to consider which psychological factor resembles motivating reason 
and intention. He writes, 
'The distinction is in terms of the direction of fit of mental states with the world. 
Beliefs aim at the true, and their being true is their fitting the world; falsity is a 
decisive failing in a belief, and false beliefs should be discarded: beliefs should 
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be changed to fit with the world. Not vice versa. Desires aim at realization, and 
their realization is the world fitting with them; the fact that the indicative content 
of a desire is not realized in the world is not yet a failing in the desire, and not 
yet any reason to discard the desire; the world, crudely, should be changed to fit 
with our desires, not vice versa.' (Platts, 1979，pp, 156-7) 
Platts's idea, though presented in a metaphoric way, is not hard to grasp. He first 
categorizes beliefs as something relating to knowledge and desires as something 
relating to action, and then compares the difference between beliefs and desires in 
terms of their relation to the world. In the case of knowledge, our beliefs have to 
emulate what the world in fact is. That means beliefs are something like mirror, whose 
distinctive function is to reflect the things meticulously and correctly. If the image in 
the mirror does not fit exactly with the real object, it's the responsibility of the mirror 
to change the image and to fit the object again. Beliefs are passive in their relation to 
the world in this sense. Unlike beliefs, desires take an active role in their relation to 
the world. Desires do not aim to represent the things outside the world, i.e. desires are 
not representational states. They play an active role in their relation to the world by 
realizing something which does not exist in the world. A more crucial and important 
dimension of desires is that they does not have to correct their content to fit the 
content of the objects in the world. They rather aim to change the state of affairs of 
the world to fit themselves. 
If marking the difference between desires and beliefs in terms of the direction of 
fit is plausible, then the Humeans are ready to answer the question as to which 
psychological factor resembles intention and motivating reason. Since intentions and 
motivating reasons aim to create something in the world, they take an active role in 
63 
Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
the world. And since desires are also sharing this active role in it relation to the world, 
they are the psychological factor that resembles intentions and motivating reasons. 
Desires' ability to provide motivation and beliefs' disability to provide motivation are 
determined by their respective features, but not by our feelings of desires in every 
particular case. Thus, even if Nagel can prove that moral beliefs can cause moral 
desires, the motivation capacity of moral desires will not be replaced in the causal 
process unless he has proved that moral beliefs differ from ordinary beliefs in their 
directions of fit. 
However, what I have objected so far is only the Nagelian motivation theory. I 
have not objected Nagel's underlying ambition on the necessary connection between 
moral beliefs and moral motivation — internalism. So, what is fatal to Nagel is not 
his idea of internalism, but his approach to the defence of internalism. But if Nagel's 
final destination is to establish internalism, I nonetheless think that the truth of 
Humean motivation theory is not a piece of bad news to him. For now, although 
internalism cannot be maintained in the most direct way as Nagel suggests, it can be 
maintained indirectly. Provided the truth of the anti-Humean conception of normative 
reasons and the Humean motivation theory, the following picture can be possible: 
Moral beliefs cause moral desires moral beliefs inform the agent how to act and 
moral desires motivate the agent to act -> moral actions. 
3.4 Four Arguments against the Humean Motivation Theory 
Despite I have presented an argument for the Humean motivation theory in terms 
of its plausible explanation on the nature of action, intention and desires, there are 
numerous literature objecting the Humean motivation theory. In what follows, I will 
discuss four main arguments against the Humean motivation theory. I pick out these 
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four arguments for two reasons. First, they are all well-know in the literature of 
motivation theory. Second, they represent the central view of the anti-Humeans on the 
nature of moral belief, moral action and rationality. By answering these anti-Humean 
objections, I hope one can have more confidence in believing the Humean motivation 
theory. 
A. Special Nature of Moral Beliefs 
Some anti-Humeans argue that we in fact have very reason to object Smith's 
directions of fit argument. They begin their maneuver by asking us to consider some 
differences between moral beliefs and ordinary beliefs. For example, when we 
proclaim the moral belief 'Hurting someone is wrong', we don't merely intend to 
report some things happening in the outside world as the ordinary belief ‘There is a 
car in front of you’ does. Moral beliefs do not report the truth of a moral realm only; 
they have some extra contents that express that something is condemned not to be 
done and something is recommended to be done^. The implication of this discovery is 
that moral beliefs have two directions of fit: On the one hand, they fit the moral realm 
by representing the right thing truly; on the other hand, they ask you to do something 
in the actual world to fit their contents. So, even if Smith has been right to point out 
that ordinary beliefs have only a passive direction of fit, we would be mistaken to 
treat ordinary beliefs and moral beliefs as the same thing, thinking that moral beliefs 
have only a passive direction of fit too. If anti-Humeans succeed in arguing that moral 
beliefs have two directions of fit at the same time, then moral beliefs replace moral 
desires as the genuine psychological factor to provide moral motivation for either 
9 This idea was first heard in a conversation with my supervisor, Professor Li Hon Lam, whose 
valuable comments have enriched the content a lot. Later, I find the similar idea in Michael Smith's 
discussion of J.E.J. Altham's term 'besire'. For more details, please refer to The Moral Problem, pp, 
118-119. 
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refraining from doing the bad things or doing the right things. Humeans cannot just 
reply that moral beliefs resemble ordinary beliefs in all aspects, including the passive 
direction of fit, as that would beg the question. Instead, they have to explain why it is 
more reasonable to believe that moral beliefs have one direction of fit rather than two. 
Although it is consistent to think of moral beliefs as having two directions of fit, 
I think that if we stick to this idea, we are unable to explain why some people would 
have no moral motivation when they come to have a moral belief. This explains why 
it is more reasonable to believe the Humeans than the anti-Humeans. Assume now 
that Tracy comes to have a moral belief and that this moral belief has two directions 
of fit, i.e., it must both fit the world and pushes her to act so as to make part of the 
world — namely, her action — conform to it. When she has a moral belief, that 
recognition ensures that Tracy knows something about the moral realm and has moral 
motivation to act on the basis of the moral belief. Nevertheless, this anti-Humean idea 
can hardly explain why Tracy would know something about the moral realm but has 
no moral motivation, as the definition of moral beliefs has stipulated that being in a 
moral belief state ensures the provision of moral motivation. But this phenomenon 
can be explained by the Humeans very smoothly. The Humeans say that since desire 
states are completely independent from belief states, the occurrence of latter never 
guarantees the occurrence of the former. Without any further devices inserted to 
manage the connection of the two independent psychological factors, the recognition 
of a moral claim will always follow by no moral motivation. 
Usually, the anti-Humeans counter-argue that the effects moral beliefs can 
produce depend on the level of rationality of each individual. Were Tracy a rational 
agent her moral belief would certainly produce moral motivation. Tracy's lack of 
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moral motivation is completely imputed to her low level of rationality. However, as I 
have pointed out when criticizing the Nagelian motivation theory, the appeal to 
rationality is not a convincing reply. The odd thing in this anti-Humean reply is that if 
moral beliefs, by themselves, are really capable of providing moral motivation, then 
they must always be capable of providing moral motivation whenever an agent comes 
to have them. As long as the anti-Humeans hold that moral beliefs provide moral 
motivation, it is very strange for them to claim that two agents with the same moral 
belief may differ in the possession of moral motivation, one having moral motivation 
because of his high level of rationality, one having no moral motivation because of his 
low level of rationality, as they are believing the same thing. The original matter 
Humeans as well as anti-Humeans are concerned about is which psychological factor, 
independent of any other faculties, is capable of providing motivation, but not which 
psychological factor, plus other faculties, is capable of providing motivation. It has 
just been shifted to another different question when the anti-Humeans suggest that 
moral beliefs provide moral motivation only if the agent is rational: For now, even the 
anti-Humeans are not enquiring about whether moral beliefs have two directions of fit 
and whether moral beliefs provide moral motivation by their own; they are in fact 
asking 'How much rationality can help moral beliefs to generate moral motivation?' 
They go astray unconsciously. 
However, I think that even if we allow the anti-Humeans to appeal to rationality, 
they can't prove that moral beliefs have two directions of fit. First, we have to clarify 
the sense of irrationality an agent has when he has no moral motivation after coming 
to have a moral belief, the thing which the anti-Humeans forget to explain. As I 
foresee, one of the senses of rationality is logical sense, which is usually found in the 
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case of logical beliefs. In a logical belief case, when Tracy knows ‘p，and ‘if p，then q， 
there is some logical force to demand Tracy to believe 'q'. Provided that Tracy is 
rational, she will admit the truth o f ' q ' . Tracy, however, is irrational if she denies 'q' 
when she knows 'p ' and ‘if p，then q � . For the same reason, when Tracy has a moral 
belief 'x ' , there is some force to demand her to have moral motivation 'y ' . Provided 
that Tracy is rational, she will have moral motivation ‘y� . Tracy, however, is irrational 
if she doesn't have moral motivation 'y' when she has the moral belief 'x'. Generally, 
the route from moral beliefs to moral motivation will be blocked to anyone if one is 
not rational enough to deliberate from the moral beliefs, just as the route from 'p' to 
'q ' will be blocked to anyone if he is not rational enough to deliberate from the logical 
rule Modus Ponens. In the logical belief case, we have reasonable ground to charge 
the agent irrational because there is the logical rule Modus Ponens which connects 'p' 
and The violation of this logical rule will discredit his intelligence. But in the 
moral belief case, there is no such kind of logical contradiction. In all range of cases, 
an agent only has the moral belief 'x ' . He is not given any logical rules to infer from 
the moral belief 'x ' to another wholly different thing, namely the moral motivation 'y'. 
And as there is no such logical rule, we can't say that one is irrational not to have 
moral motivation after recognizing a moral belief. The appeal to logical rationality 
turns out to be worthless to prove that moral beliefs have two directions of fit. 
Perhaps, as I conjecture, what the anti-Humeans have in mind is not logical 
irrationality but practical irrationality. To interpret irrationality in this way looks more 
promising than in logical sense because the constitution of practical irrationality needs 
not invoke any logical rules. But then the case used to contrast with moral beliefs has 
to be changed completely. I think that the best contrast now is between moral beliefs 
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and inductive logic. For example, when I know that the sun has been rising in the 
morning over the past thousands of years, I have reasonable ground to believe the sun 
will also rise tomorrow. Although I am not logically irrational not to believe that the 
sun will rise tomorrow, I am in some sense irrational if I believe otherwise. Similarly, 
even though I am not logically irrational not to have moral motivation after having a 
moral belief, I am in some sense irrational not to have it. 
However, if the sense of irrationality in the case of moral beliefs is not logical 
irrationality, the anti-Humeans cannot get what they want. In the case of sun rise, the 
ground for me to believe that the sun will rise tomorrow is not deductively derived 
from the belief that the sun has risen for the past thousands of years following an 
inference rule such as Modus Ponens, but inductively concluded from the ample 
amount of experiences. But when the anti-Humeans argue that moral beliefs have two 
directions of fit, they never want the truth of moral beliefs' two directions of fit to be 
based on experiences. This can be seen when they claim that moral motivation must 
be obtained by deliberating rationally on moral beliefs. So, even if practical rationality 
seems to establish a reliable connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation 
and apparently support that moral beliefs have two directions of fit, the idea is never 
the original idea of the anti-Humeans. 
However, even if the anti-Humens would like to forgo their original idea and are 
satisfied to accept experiences as the only evidence supporting their position that 
moral beliefs are two-directional, there are, unfortunately, not enough evidences to 
show that moral beliefs are really two-directional instead of one-directional. Suppose 
we experience that moral motivation always follows moral beliefs in rational agents. 
Admittedly, this experience can be well explained by the assumption that moral 
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beliefs are two-directional, so that they can directly provide moral motivation. But the 
same experience can also be well explained by another assumption that moral beliefs 
are one-directional and moral desires provide moral motivation. Now, in rational 
agents, the reliable connection between moral beliefs, moral desires and practical 
rationality explains why moral motivation always follows moral beliefs — moral 
beliefs reliably generate moral desires through rationality. As an explanation to the 
reliable connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation, we should find it 
hard to decide which assumption is better, because no one can conclude decisively 
whether there is another psychological element standing between moral beliefs and 
moral motivation, mediating the subtlest causal connection. However, if we consider 
the cases in which sometimes no moral motivation follows moral beliefs, we have 
more reasons to believe that moral beliefs are one-directional, as the cases are best 
explained by the fact that moral beliefs cannot provide moral motivation. In other 
words, the best explanation is that there are two independent psychological factors, 
one responsible for representing the truth of moral claims, one responsible for 
providing moral motivation. As the Humean motivation theory insists on this kind of 
division of labor among two psychological factors, we have more reasons to believe 
the Humeans than the anti-Humeans, who put everything into moral beliefs. 
B. The Non-teleological Nature of Moral Actions 
The Humean motivation theory states that desires are the spring of motivation. 
As the nature of desires is to bring something out, the Humean motivation theory has 
implicitly granted that all actions motivated by desires are done for some ends (telos). 
But some anti-Humeans think that this is not the only way of understanding actions. 
For example, Shafer-Landau (2003, p，135) thinks that there are non-teleological 
70 
Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
actions, the doing of which does not aim to achieve some ends. He thinks that moral 
actions are a typical example of these non-teleological actions. We do moral actions 
not for some ends. For example, when we see an injured person, we are likely to help 
him simply because of his injury, without having any ends going to be fulfilled by 
helping him. If this view on moral actions is correct, then the anti-Humeans can argue 
that we do not need a motivating state whose essential feature is to bring out some 
ends to motivate us in the case of moral actions (perhaps at this moment, 
anti-Humeans do not quarrel with Humeans and admit that belief has a passive 
direction of fit and desire has an active direction of fit. But I am not sure!). Some 
psychological states that have a passive relation with the world — moral beliefs — 
are enough to provide moral motivation for non-teleological moral actions. It is not 
crucial in this argument whether some kinds (or parts) of morality are teleological. It 
is crucial in this argument whether the agents think they are acting teleologically 
when they accept a teleological moral theory lo . So long as the agent thinks he is not 
acting teleologically, moral belief motivates him to do the moral action'\ 
I think this understanding of moral actions is peculiar. I suspect anything can be 
regarded as action if it is not done for an end or some ends. Suppose a robot raises its 
hand because its computer program malfunctions. Will we regard the robot's raising 
hand as action? Or do we merely think that that should be interpreted as physical 
movement? I believe that we will opt for the second because any physical movements 
Egoism and Utilitarianism are two famous teleological moral theories. They define morally right 
actions in terms of the goodness of the state of affairs these moral actions bring. This implies that 
acting morally is for the teleology of promoting some non-moral ends. 
“ I hesitate to use the word 'motivated' in the case of the so-called non-teleological moral actions. As 
motivation is usually associated with intentional actions with teleology, I am not sure whether the 
proponents of this argument would like to say 'agents are motivated to act non-teleological moral 
actions'. Anyway, in order to avoid the complication of using new terminology, I think it is alright to 
say that people are motivated to act for non-teleological moral action, so long as the readers understand 
these non-teleological moral actions are motivated by the belief that these actions are right. 
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without an end are not really action. If so, then all 'moral actions' that are not done for 
some ends are physical movements only. They are not action at all. I don't think the 
anti-Humeans will accept this analysis of moral actions that 'degrades' moral actions 
to mere physical movements. I conjecture their intention of introducing this peculiar 
idea is that moral actions should not be done for any ends other than morality itself 
This idea may be inspired by Kant's moral philosophy. Kant restricts that the value of 
morality can be retained only if when we act morally, our intention is to act for the 
sake of morality, but not for other ends. Kant's idea, I cannot deny, may fit our 
intuition on the value of morality squarely. But it does not show that Kant 
recommends us to understand moral actions in the peculiar way suggested by the 
anti-Humeans. 
Here, we have to see more clearly the meaning of teleological actions. 
Teleological actions can be divided into two main kinds. This idea is originated from 
Aristotle, who manifests that actions are valuable in two senses. One is intrinsically 
valuable and the other instrumentally valuable'^. An action is intrinsically valuable 
when it is not being used as an instrument for the promotion of another action, and the 
state of affairs it promotes is already valuable. Playing chess or other sports are 
themselves intrinsically valuable, and when anyone plays chess, his end is simply to 
play chess. An action is instrumentally valuable when it is used simply as means to 
promote further actions whose state of affairs are valued by the doer. For instance, 
when I am hungry, I want to go out to by some food. I find that I must walk past this 
street in order to buy the food. Walking past this street, then, is valuable so long as I 
have the want to buy food. 
12 Colin Mcginn distinguishes actions into instrumental actions and non-instrument actions. But his 
idea is the same as Aristotle's. For more details, please refer to The Character of Mind, Second edition, 
P, 123. 
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The above classification of teleological actions has some important implications 
on moral actions. An action which is not done for some further ends does not imply 
that it is not done for an end. It can be done for its own sake. Indeed, doing moral 
actions is similar to playing chess. Just as the end of playing chess can be the chess 
itself, the end of acting morally can be morality itself. Surely, we agree that when we 
regard moral actions as means for further non-moral ends, morality will be deprived 
of some of its dignity or value. But preserving morality its highest value doesn't 
imply that we have to act non-teleologically. The thing that determines whether the 
value of morality is spoiled is not the presence of ends, but the appropriateness of 
ends. The value of morality can still been preserved as long as we act for the morality 
itself. Acting teleologically and preserving the value of morality are basically two 
compatible concepts. If all these are true, then we still need a motivating state that has 
the active direction of fit essentially in the moral case as we are acting teleologically 
when we act morally. 
C. Argument of Intellectualized Motivation 
In What We OM>e to Each Other (Scanlon, 1998，pp, 37-41)，Scanlon argues that 
no desire can play the motivational role in the production of actions. He begins his 
argument by dividing desires into two types, motivated desires and unmotivated 
desires, and sees how the two types of desires do not contribute to the agent's 
motivation. Since Scanlon's treatment of motivated desire is similar to Nagel's, I will 
in this section only deal with Scanlon's argument on the motivational incapacity of 
unmotivated desires and the weaknesses of his argument 
Unmotivated desires mainly include instinctive desires like thirst, hunger, sexual 
desire. The motivational force of this kind of desire, it is commonly supposed, do not 
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lie in the recognition of some elements beyond the desire itself. Unmotivated desires 
alone can motivate us to act in a certain way. For example, when we desire to drink a 
cup of tea, we are usually motivated to drink it. We do so simply because of the 
unmotivated desire we have, but not some antecedent judgments about the features of 
the tea we may have when deliberating on the object. But Scanlon argues that the 
above view on the motivational role of unmotivated desires is mistaken. He claims 
that if we are careful enough to see the so-called motivational force of unmotivated 
desires, we should find that the motivation is in fact grounded on something other 
than the unmotivated desires. Suppose we are thirsty and decide to drink a cup of tea. 
Scanlon identifies three elements in this process, ‘a present sensation (there is the 
unpleasant sensation of dryness in my mouth and throat), the belief that some action 
would lead to a pleasant state in the future, and my taking of this future good to be a 
reason to be so acting. (Scanlon, 1998，p，38)，Scanlon claims that we are motivated to 
drink the tea by beliefs about all these goodness. He contends that the presence of an 
urge to drink tea does not motivate us further. 
The most difficult thing for Scanlon to explain is the motivation source of those 
cases in which we are obviously motivated by some kinds of unmotivated desire, for 
instance, urge. Although this kind of case does not refute Scanlon's idea outright 
(because it is a separate question as to whether it is true to claim that we can be 
motivated by evaluative beliefs about the goodness of objects), it shows the 
inadequacy of Scanlon's motivation theory. Scanlon can at most show that sometimes 
we are motivated by unmotivated desire and sometimes by evaluative belief. Here, 
Scanlon gives a skillful reply. He borrows an example from Quinn and asks us to 
imagine there is a man who feels an urge to turn on every radio he sees (Scanlon, 
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1998，p, 38). When this man turns on every radio he sees, he does not see anything 
good about the radio's being turned on. He does not want to hear music or news. He 
just wants to turn them on. Scanlon argues that although this man may be doing 
something, he is not doing an action as the urge that motivates him 'lacks the power 
to rationalize action. (Scanlon, 1998，p, 38)' Desire, as Scanlon goes on to define, is 
commonly understood as 'something involves having a tendency to see something 
good or desirable about the objects. (Scanlon, 1998, p，38)，As Scanlon's argument 
runs in this way, his motivation theory must be true. Scanlon has already established 
that we are motivated by evaluative beliefs in the case of unmotivated desire. If we 
are in fact motivated by urge，then we are actually motivated by apparently 
'unmotivated desire'. As these 'unmotivated desires' lacks the element of 'seeing 
something good', thereby not qualified for ordinary desire, the 'actions' motivated by 
them are not really actions at all — these 'actions' are movements in Scanlon's mind. 
So, it is always true that if we have done an action, we are motivated by evaluative 
beliefs. 
Scanlon's idea can be criticized in two directions, one concerning whether 
desires and actions can only be understood in Scanlon's sense and the other 
concerning whether an agent is really motivated by evaluative beliefs in the case of 
unmotivated desires. Regarding the first concern, Scanlon's definition of desires and 
actions is quite odd. Quite contrary to what he says, his definition of desires and 
actions is not ‘we ordinary mean by'. What Scanlon has given us are an 
intellectualized meaning of desires (Mele, 2003, p, 78-9) and a false dichotomy of 
actions. To see this, we can consider the example of toddlers. Toddlers are 
understandably lack of the ability of normal reasoning. There are also considerable 
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evidences that younger three-years-olds tend not to have a proper concept of beliefs. 
Although the concept of desires emerges earlier, it does not emerge until around the 
age of two'^. So, when toddlers drink water, they can only be motivated by mere urge 
as they haven't developed the capacity to see the good features of water as reasons. 
According to Scanlon's definition of action, toddlers are not performing action any 
more than the crazy man turning on every radio in the Quinn's example is performing. 
But we ordinary think that toddles are doing action. It is because a sharp difference 
occurs between toddles' drinking water and the crazy man's turning on every radio. 
We as well as Scanlon can reasonably claim that the crazy man is not performing an 
action because he seems unconscious, i.e., he doesn't know what he is doing. But 
toddlers are usually conscious of what they are doing, and their actions are in this 
sense crucially different from the crazy man's. Surely, there is still a difference 
between toddlers' and normal adults' actions. Unlike normal adults' actions, toddlers' 
actions usually do not involve seeing the good features of things and are motivated 
simply by the prospect of things. Being attracted by the prospect of things is different 
from seeing the good features of things as reason in that the former is a spontaneous 
reaction to objects, whereas the later is resulted from a more or less complicated 
deliberation. When toddlers are attracted by the prospect of drinking water, they will 
be motivated to drink it solely on the basis of that prospect. But the whole drinking 
process still qualifies for action as long as the toddlers use various means to get the 
water because that shows they are conscious and have intention. Scanlon is just 
mistaken to suppose that any actions that don't involve seeing the good features of 
things as reason must be unconscious actions like Quinn's example of crazy man. No 
13 These scientific findings are the conclusion from Alison Gopnik's paper "How we know our minds -
The Illusion of 1 ^'-Person Knowledge of Intentionality". This paper can be found in Behavioral and 
Brain Sciences 16: 1-14. 
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sooner is the doer conscious than all his actions motivated by the good prospects of 
objected are intentional actions. Even though the example of toddlers cannot refute 
Scanlon's claim that evaluative judgments can provide motivation, it at least shows 
that some of our actions are still motivated by unmotivated desires. 
The implication of the toddlers' case can be extended to adults. Even though 
normal adults equip with the ability of reasoning, the concepts of beliefs and desires, 
they are sometimes attracted by the attractiveness of things and act on their desires. 
Similar to the toddlers, when normal adults are attracted by the attractiveness of 
things and try to use various means to get the things they want, they in fact perform 
actions. 
On the other hand, even if there remain some actions that are not motivated by 
the prospects of objects, I don't really think they are motivated by evaluative 
judgments as Scanlon suggests. Scanlon's idea seems to be that when there is really 
an action, we can see two different kinds of components: the evaluative beliefs about 
the objects and desires. After citing these two components, Scanlon quickly asserts 
that it is evaluative beliefs instead of desires motivating us. But why is he so certain 
about the truth of his claim? Most probably, I think Scanlon is appealing to our 
experience that we think we are motivated by evaluative beliefs when we have 
evaluative beliefs, even if we have desires at the same time. This kind of argument is 
not convincing, for the Humeans can deploy the same approach — there are desires 
in us when we do an action and we have the feeling of being motivated by desires — 
to argue that we are motivated by desires rather than evaluative beliefs. If we object 
the Humeans to deploy this approach as a good argument for their motivation theory, 
the same applies to Scanlon. We should be reminded that the crucial thing to 
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determine which element provides motivation is not the elements we can cite in every 
action we do, but the nature of these elements. This brings us back to the examination 
of the nature of beliefs and desires. The Humeans can agree with Scanlon that a set of 
evaluative beliefs and desire always co-exist in actions. But the Humeans are warier 
than Scanlon. They do not think it is enough to conclude definitely which thing, 
evaluative beliefs or desires, provides motivation by just appealing to our feeling. 
They attempt to find the nature of evaluative beliefs and desires before concluding 
which psychological factor provides motivation in a desire-belief pairing. Scanlon has 
just missed this kind of analysis, and so he cannot succeed in arguing for his own 
motivation theory. 
D. Argument of Irrationality 
This argument is proposed by Christine Korsgaard in her paper "Skepticism on 
Practical Reason" (Korsgaard, 1986). The argument has the overall aim to show that 
pure practical reason, a kind of practical reason that an agent acts for the sake of 
morality, is sufficient for providing motivation without the aid of desires. Korsgaard's 
strategy is to argue that even Hume has to admit that instrumental practical reason has 
motivational capacity. If so, when we prove the existence of pure practical reason, this 
kind of practical reason is also possible to be motivationally capacious. I will first 
depict Korsgaard's argument on the motivational capacity of instrumental practical 
reason and then examine to what extent this argument can revoke the Humean theory 
of motivation. 
Korsgaard maintains that apart from those cases in which a desire is based on an 
object that does not exist and in which there are false beliefs, Hume's account of 
reason allows for the third kind of irrationality, namely, the 'failure to be motivated by 
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the consideration that the action is the means to your end. (Korsgaard, 1986, p，378)' 
This kind of irrationality does not assume that we have false beliefs; rather it assumes 
that we have true beliefs and are deliberating correctly on the means that satisfy the 
desire. It is a situation where agents do not correspond to the consideration that a 
certain action is the means to his end, i.e., they are 'willfully' blind to the means-end 
consideration. Korsgaard thinks that even the Humeans would regard these agents as 
irrationally 
Why is an agent unmotivated by the consideration that some actions are means to 
his end necessary irrational? Korsgaard replies, "being motivated by the 
consideration that an action is a mean to a desirable end is something beyond merely 
reflecting on that fact. The motive force attached to the end must be transmitted to the 
means in order for this to be a consideration that sets the human body in motion — 
and only if this is a consideration that sets the human body in motion can we say that 
reason has influence on action. (Korsgaard, 1986, p, 378)' Korsgaard argues that 
unlike theoretical reasoning, practical reasoning does not only aim at some mental 
operations — that is, merely to discover some casual links that some actions are 
causal means to ends. Practical reasoning concerns how an action could be done 
ultimately. We can doubt whether there is really such thing as practical reasoning, but 
once we suppose that there is practical reasoning, we must answer how practical 
reason functions and connects with action in rational agents. If an agent know he has 
reason to do some actions but is then unmoved, then he is irresponsive to reason and 
is irrational in this sense. As the instrumental practical reason theory says that an 
14 Korsgarrd's conclusion, however, is contestable for Humeans. At least, she does not cite any textual 
evidence to show that Hume or the Humeans allow the third kind of irrationality under the means-end 
irrationality. In her words, Korsgarrd just writes, 'it looks as if the theory of means-end rationality 
ought to allow at least one form of irrationality, namely, failure to be motivated by the consideration 
that a given action is a means to a desired end.' ("Skepticism About Practical Reason"，p, 378) 
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agent has a reason to do an action only when doing that action can satisfy his desire, 
Korsgarrd argues that one dimension of rational agents in the Humeans' mind should 
be motivated to do the means identified by instrumental practical reason. Irrational 
agents are those unmoved by the consideration that some means are contributive to 
the satisfaction of their desires identified by instrumental practical reason. 
However, even if it is one of the characteristics of rational agents to be 
responsive to the means, Korsgaard does not think that it is an easy task to be rational. 
Other psychological forces such as rage, passion, depression, distraction, grief, 
physical or mental illness are disruptive to one's rationality. When these emotions 
occur, an agent may not respond to his means and thus degenerates into an irrational 
agent. Disruptive these emotions are. They don't deprive rationality of its basic power. 
Therefore, even though there are irrational agents, Korsgaard believes that it is still 
true for her to claim that rational agents, to the extent of being rational, will be 
motivated to do the means identified by their practical reason. 
If instrumental practical reason as one kind of practical reason can really 
motivate rational agents, then the problem left for the Kantians is to establish pure 
practical reason. Korsgaard's argument for the possibility of pure practical reason is 
as follows: 
1. The source of motivation is from subjective motivational set (hereafter, S). 
2. The elements contained in S depend on what kind of reasoning is possible. S may 
contain many elements. 
3. We cannot assume that S consists only of individual or idiosyncratic elements 
because that would close off the possibility that reason can yield conclusions that 
every rational being can acknowledge and can be motivated accordingly. 
80 
Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
4. So S may contain the consideration for action proposed by pure practical reason. 
5. So pure practical reasoning is possible. 
6. As shown in arguments in the instrumental practical reason, practical reason can 
motivate agents. 
7. Therefore, pure practical reason may also motivate agents. 
Korsgaard asks us to consider an agent who accepts a principle with ultimate 
justification. Through theoretical reasoning, the agent understands the justification. As 
the agent understands it, he comes to accept it. Once he accepts it, we have ground to 
say that 'this principle is in his subjective motivational set. (Korsgaard, 1986，p，383)' 
As the principle is now in the agent's S, it is reasonable to expect that he will do what 
the principle requires. So, Korsgaard concludes that even if our deliberation does not 
start from desires, as the Humeans claim the reverse, we can still obtain motivation 
through deliberation guided by reason. 
I think we can assess Korsgaard's argument in two ways. First, whether she 
represents the Humean motivation theory correctly. Second, whether her proposed 
motivation theory prevails over the Humean motivation theory. I think Korsgaard has 
to some extent misconstrued the Humean motivation theory. The crucial idea in her 
argument is that when an agent is rational and motivated to act in accordance with 
instrumental practical reason, the motivation is supplied by the instrumental practical 
reason, but not, as the Humeans holds, by desires. We can agree with Korsgaard on 
three things: (1) it may be rational to act for the sake of morality; (2) it is rational to 
be motivated by an appropriate means-end pairing; (3) it is irrational not to be 
motivated by an appropriate means-end pairing. However, the wrangle between 
Korsgaard and Humeans is whether the motivation of rational agents, who are 
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motivated by an appropriate means-end pairing, is supplied by the instrumental 
practical reason. For typical intentional actions, the Humeans maintain that the 
motivation is supplied by the end you have, and only because you find some means 
are necessary to satisfy the end, the motivation of the end is transferred to those 
means based on the principle of motivation transitivity. The mere recognition of the 
relation between an end and appropriate means discovered by reason does not provide 
motivation for the agent. The Humeans would surely regard someone as irrational if 
they fail to respond to the appropriate means-end pairing. They are irrational because 
they don't act in accordance with what they think they have reason to do. However, 
the criterion of judging an agent's rationality is different from the question of the 
source of motivation of rational agents If these two questions are separated, 
Korsgaard's argument would only reveal the former matter but cannot vindicate the 
latter. To the extent that reasons constitute one's rationality, reasons are not shown to 
possess motivational capacity. 
However, Korsgaard may protest that what she offers is a correct motivation 
theory, and charges the Humeans for not appreciating enough the power of 
instrumental practical reason in generating motivation. Korsgaard's rationale may be 
that when we have desire X and discover through instrumental practical reason that 
doing Y can satisfy X，we have motivation to do Y because instrumental practical 
reason gives motivation to us. Her point is reinforced when we think that 
counterfactually, if an agent had not equipped with instrument practical reason that 
helps him discover that Y could satisfy X，it would not have been possible for him to 
have motivation to do Y'^. Perhaps, in Korsgaard's mind, it is not that the motivation 
15 In fact, I am not very sure about the motivation structure of instrumental practical reason in 
Korsgaard's mind. Since she has not written out her idea, I can just make a reasonable interpretation on 
her text. 
82 
Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
Stored in X transfers to Y through rationality, but that rationality create new 
motivation after it discovers a piece of information that Y is a mean to X'^. It seems 
that Korsgaard's motivation theory can explain how we obtain motivation in the case 
of instrumental practical reason quite smoothly. I am not going to evaluate her theory 
before I have briefly reviewed the motivation picture offered by the Humeans. The 
Humeans never underestimate the importance of reason and beliefs in the production 
of actions. As the Humeans find that desires are unable to discern the appropriate 
means to satisfy itself, reason and beliefs serve as an indispensable tool to discover all 
the means. If an agent did not discover the mean Y，he would not have motivation to 
do Y certainly. But that is only because the information that Y is an appropriate means 
to satisfy X is not available to him. The motivation stored in X cannot find a route to 
spread its motivation to Y. Metaphorically, reason is like a pipe which coaxes the 
motivation in an ultimate desire into different specific desires. The whole process is 
not possible either if there is no pipe or the pipe is obstructed. This Humean 
motivation picture is commonly known as 'motivation transitivity'. It appears that if 
we focus on cases in which agents obtain motivation in the case of instrumental 
practical reason, Korsgaard's motivation theory and the Humeans' motivation 
transitivity are equally plausible as both of them can explain the reliable connection 
between knowing something as means to an end and obtaining motivation. But I think 
that Korsgaard's motivation picture can't overtake the Humeans' motivation 
transitivity if we consider another kind of case in which one has no motivation to do Y 
because he has no desire for X. If it is true of Korsgaard's motivation theory that in 
the case of instrumental practical reason, reason can give motivation to the means by 
16 This other interpretation on Korsgaard is proposed by Professor C.J. Fraser. I would like to thank for 
his interpretation, which encourages me to consider Korsgaard's theory in a broader way, even though I 
don't agree with him over Korsgaard's extent of success in attacking the Humean motivation theory. 
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itself without really needing the motivation stalled in the end to be conferred on the 
means, then her theory can hardly explain why in the case in which Y is the mean for 
X and the agent has no desire for X, the agent would have no motivation to do Y. This 
problem cannot be explained away by appealing to the agent's irrationality. The agent 
in question can be fully rational in knowing that Y is the most efficient mean to satisfy 
X and he is not suffering from other emotions' disturbance, but certainly lacks the 
motivation to do Y. The only reasonable explanation to this kind of case is the 
motivation transitivity offered by the Humeans: As the only way of having motivation 
is through desires, the agent will absolutely have no desire to do Y if he has no desire 
for X，the end Y promotes. Since Korsgaard's motivation theory is unable to explain 
this case, it explains less than the motivation transitivity, and so, the Humeans provide 
a better motivation theory. 
3.5 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
In this chapter, I have used a lot of spaces to establish the Humean motivation 
theory from two sides. On the positive side, I give support to the Humean theory by 
the argument from the direction of fit. This simple argument tries to show that a 
similarity — an active relation with the world — is shared by intentions, motivating 
reasons and desires, but not shared by intentions, motivating reasons and beliefs. And 
so, desires are the psychological factor that provide motivation. On the negative side, 
I attempt to defend the Humean motivation theory against four anti-Humean 
challenges by pointing their problems. 
If we have reason to accept the Humean motivation theory, then we have reason 
not to accept the Nagelian motivation theory. There are two main weaknesses in the 
Nagelian theory. First, it does not attack the core idea of the Humean theory because it 
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can only shows that some kinds of desire (motivated desire) are caused by moral 
beliefs and prudential beliefs, a causal relation which can be plainly embraced in the 
Humean motivation theory without causing any troubles to the Humeans' view on the 
nature of beliefs and desires. Second, the Nagelian motivation theory is a hybrid 
motivation theory, a problematic motivation theory that constructs two or more 
fundamental but contradictory relations in one general theory. Hybrid theory is not a 
good general theory because we will be confused as to which fundamental relation is 
true in a particular case. At last, it fails to explain what it is supposed to explain. In the 
particular case we are discussing, the Nagelian theory fails to explain why an agent 
would have no moral motivation when it claims that both moral beliefs and moral 
desires can provide moral motivation, why moral beliefs' own motivation capacity 
would be stripped of when one is not rational, and why moral beliefs are still a kind of 
belief when their essential feature is entirely different from that of non-moral beliefs. 
At last, if the Nagelian motivation theory cannot be sustained, then PAI ought to 
be rejected as it is based on the implausible Nagelian motivation theory. I have to note 
that the rejection of Humean Internalism and the rejection of PAI do not combine to 
refute the central idea of internalism, i.e. the necessary connection between moral 
reasons and moral motivation. They only establish a conception of normative reasons 
based on the features of facts and a motivation theory grounded on desires. Therefore, 
they should best be viewed as providing some necessary materials for discussing 
internalism. In the next chapter, I will base on these two conclusions to see whether 
there is really a necessary connection between moral reasons and moral motivation. 
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Chapter 4 The Rejection of Rational Internalism 
In rejecting two kinds of internalism in the previous two chapters, I have actually 
argued against and for two positions respectively. In rejecting Humean Internalism, I 
have undermined its implicit conception of moral reasons, which insists that the 
justification of moral reasons is grounded on each agent's desires. Moreover, I have 
replaced it by an anti-Humean position, according to which the ground of moral 
reasons is based on the features of facts. Reforming the conception of moral reasons 
in this way, we retain the common idea that moral reasons are universal that when 
they are applicable to an agent in one situation, they apply to others in the relevant 
similar situation. Standing firmly on this conception of moral reasons, I turn to 
discuss the possibility of defending another kind of internalism, according to which 
moral beliefs contain the objective content of moral reasons and provide moral 
motivation at the same time. I conclude in Chapter 3 that this approach (PAI) is 
implausible. It is because no matters which kinds of belief we are talking about, 
ordinary beliefs or moral beliefs, they are all passive in nature. Their direction of fit is 
incompatible with the active direction of fit of intentions and motivating reasons. As 
desires (and also moral desires) have the same direction of fit with intentions and 
motivating reasons — all of them have active direction of fit — I conclude that 
instead of beliefs, desires are the genuine motivation source of human beings. The 
difficulty we are facing if we want to establish internalism is that since beliefs and 
desires are two independent psychological states, they can always come apart. 
4.1 Rational Internalism 
Upon this background, this chapter focuses on the third kind of internalism — 
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Michael Smith's Rational Internalism^ Smith tries to argue that it is still possible to 
vindicate internalism even if we stand firmly on the above two conclusions. In The 
Moral Problem, Smith has outlined three main arguments for Rational Internalism. 
They are, as I dub them, the Proper-grasp Argument (Smith, 1995, section 3.4)，the 
Virtuous Person Argument (Smith, 1995, section 3.5) and the Argument of 
Incoherence (Smith, 1995, section 5.9). In my view, the Argument of Incoherence is 
the core argument because it is a positive argument that argues for the plausibility of 
Rational Internalism. The other two arguments are supplementary arguments designed 
to give moderate support to Rational Internalism and attack externalism respectively. 
Just because of their relative importance, I will discuss the Argument of Incoherence 
in the first place, and then the other two less important arguments. 
Smith's central argument on the necessary connection between moral beliefs and 
moral desires is braced by rationality. He argues that moral desires will follow moral 
beliefs in a fully rational agent because rationality requires agents to achieve a 
coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires. If an agent fails to be motivated to do 
the right thing, he is necessary irrational because he fails to achieve the requirement 
of rationality. In order to get rid of the charge of irrationality, this agent must correct 
his behavior by utilizing his rationality to generate in himself moral desiresto do the 
right thing. 
I do not agree with Smith for his accusing those who fails to be motivated to do 
the right things of being necessarily irrational. In other words, I do not think one is 
necessarily irrational if he fails to be motivated to do the right thing. Whether one is 
irrational for not being motivated to do the right thing depends on many factors other 
than the mere fact that he fails to be motivated to do the right thing. There is simply 
‘Rat ional Internalism is my innovated terminology ascribed to Smith's particular kind of internalism. 
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no mono-standard to judge the appropriateness of the charge of irrationality. Rather, it 
has to be judged from case to case. I will discuss these in detail in section 4.2. Section 
4.3 will deal with the Proper-grasp Argument and its problems. Section 4.4 will 
ponder the Virtuous Person Argument and its weaknesses. 
4.2 Argument of Incoherence 
A. Exposition 
The argument of incoherence is talking about the incoherence of one's moral 
beliefs (moral judgments) and moral desires. Incoherence occurs when the content of 
one's moral belief is 0 and moral desire is not 0 or no moral desire at all. So, how 
does Smith argue that the incoherence between moral beliefs and moral desires signal 
irrationality? He proposes a two-step argument: 
Premise 1: If agents are morally required to 0 in circumstances C，then there is a 
requirement of rationality or reason for all agents to 0 in 
circumstances C (Smith, 1995, p, 62). (Rationalism) 
Premise 2: An agent has a reason to 0 in her actual circumstances just in case, if 
she were fully rational, she would want herself to 0 in her actual 
circumstances (Smith, 1995, p, 151) . (Belief-identity claim) 
Conclusion: If an agent judges that it is right to 0 in circumstances C, then either 
she is motivated to 0 in C or she is practically irrational (Smith, 
1995，p, 61). (Rational Intemalism) 
For Rational Intemalism to be true in Smith's proposed two-step-argument, both 
Rationalism and Belief-identity claim have to be t rue� . I think that Rationalism is true, 
2 By the way, the term 'Belief-identity claim' is not Smith's own term. It is attributed by David Copp 
in his paper "Belief, Reason, and Motivation: Michael Smith's The Moral Problem". I use it because of 
convenience. 
3 I must draw your very attention that I am now explicating Smith's own argument, but not examining 
his argument. So, when I say that 'for Rational Intemalism to be true, both Rationalism and 
88 
Chapter 3 The Rejection of Pure Ascription Internalism 
and any attempts to abolish Rationalism will place us in an embarrassing position in 
which normative reasons are arbitrary made on custom. They are no more than some 
artificial conventional rules that fortuitously exist in our practice and have no ultimate 
justification for their existence apart from practice. This outcome seems unpleasing. 
In Chapter 2，I have tried to argue for a conception of normative reasons based on the 
features of facts. If I am successful in doing that, then at least we have objective 
justification for normative reasons. Their content can be accessed by us with the use 
of rationality. However, some may still think that normative reasons and moral 
reasons should not be put in the same category because normative reasons are the 
requirements of rationality while moral reasons are not. Regarding this matter, I stand 
on the same ground as Smith. As Smith suggests, it would be quite odd to insist that 
we have normative reasons to, say, maximize our happiness on the one hand but deny 
we have moral reasons to do so on the other. It is simply the case that moral reasons 
are a species of normative reasons with a distinctive kind of content such as 
others-regarding issues. For all we know at present, there is ‘no other way of thinking 
about moral facts that would be at the least conceptually satisfying (Smith, 1997， 
117)，than consider them as a kind of normative reasons. So, unless other good 
arguments are given, I take it that moral reasons are a kind of normative reasons and 
the requirements of rationality, albeit various substantial contents of moral reasons are 
yet to be filled. So, the truth of Rational Internalism in Smith's proposed two-step 
argument is now based on the plausibility of the Belief-identity claim. 
Belief-identity clam have to be true,' I don't mean I agree that the truth of Rationalism and 
Belief-identity claim is enough to secure the truth of Rational Internalism, Rather, I mean that if 
Smith's two-step argument were true, then the truth of Rationalism and Belief-identity claim would be 
enough to secure the truth of Rational Internalism. I will discus my opinion that the truth of Rational 
Internalism require more premises than just Rationalism and Belief-identity claim in Part B of Section 
4.2. 
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Smith argues for the Belief-identity claim in two steps. The first step is to 
imagine two worlds — the evaluating world and the evaluated world. The evaluating 
world is composed of only fully rational agents who have four main characteristics: 
have no false beliefs, have all true beliefs, deliberate correctly, have a coherence of 
belief and desire. The evaluated world is lived by actual selves who are likely to make 
mistakes in deliberation and who possess some false beliefs. Under Smith's 
stipulation, there is no difference in the objective circumstances between the 
evaluating world and the evaluated world, and therefore, the objective right things in 
both worlds are the same. However, since the agents in the evaluated world are not 
fully rational, they usually have biases in discovering the right things and may have 
wrongly believed something right that is in fact wrong. Because of these possible 
biases, the fully rational agents in the evaluating world are responsible to give advice 
to the agents in the evaluated world by correcting their wrong beliefs and informing 
them the right thing. But what determines the content of the advice of the fully 
rational agents? This goes to the second step of the argument. 
Smith thinks that the right things for fully rational agents to do are simply those 
commonly desired by fully rational agents. It means that when fully rational agents 
exercise their deliberation, the right thing is the desirable thing of which they favor. It 
just remains the question 'How does a fully rational agent determine a thing that is 
desired by all other fully rational agents?' to be answered. Smith tries to explain this 
idea as follows. There are various desires, general desires and specific desires, in an 
agent. Typically, specific desires are the things that fill the subtle content of general 
desires. For example, ‘the desire to eat ice-cream' is the thing that fills the more subtle 
content of a more general desire ‘to consume cold things'. Nevertheless, both general 
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desires and specific desires are chaotic in many ways: General desires will have 
conflicts with other general desires due to their relative strengths; scattered specific 
desires which cannot be categorized into a general desire will hamper the efficiency of 
decision making; some desires may be unjustifiable to possess, given all the desires 
one has. So, it is more rational for a person to have a coherent set of desires in which 
some unjustifiable desires are dumped and some justifiable desires are added, and in 
which all desires are formed in a hierarchical order. Smith thinks that the procedure 
for having such a coherent set of desires is certainly available. He says, 'Suppose we 
take a whole host of desires we have for specific and general things; desires which are 
not in fact derived from any desire that we have for something more general. We can 
ask ourselves whether we wouldn't get a more systematically justifiable set of desires 
by adding to this whole host of specific and general desires another general desire, or 
a more general desire still, a desire that, in turn, justifies and explain the more specific 
desires that we have. (Smith, 1995, p，159)' For example, we can add a general desire 
'eat any delicious things' to many specific desires such as ‘eat French food', ‘eat 
Chinese food', 'eat Italian food' that makes the specific desires more systematic and 
justifiable to possess. And if this procedure is finally carried out, then 'the new set of 
the desires — the set we imagine ourselves having if we add a more general desire to 
the more specific desires we in fact have — exhibits more in the way of, say, unity, 
we may properly think that the new imaginary set of desires is rationally preferable to 
the old. (Smith, 1995, p，159)，After the procedure, the objects of general desires and 
specific desires are all desirable, and the agent is justified to pursue any of them. 
Just as we can reasonably expect that fully rational agents will converge on the 
same result in a complicated mathematical proof, we can also reasonably expect that 
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fully rational agents will converge on the same desirable thing in an intricate 
management of general and specific desires, since rationality is not an arbitrary tool. 
The desirable things on which fully rational agents converge are really the desirable 
things the normal moral agents rationally should desire" .^ Smith argues that if ordinary 
moral agents are not motivated to do the desirable thing, then there is a sort of 
incoherence between actual desires and rational desires, and such incoherence implies 
he is irrational. Conversely, if the ordinary moral agents are motivated to do the 
desirable thing, then the agent's actual desires and rational desires are managed in a 
coherent way, and they are essentially rational. 
B. Criticism 
Let us turn to the assessment of the Belief-identity claim. An immediate doubt is 
raised about whether the method of having a coherent set of desires can really make 
one more rational. Smith claims that the process of adding general desires to specific 
desires is an independent and self-sufficient process that can justify various specific 
desires. The justification of various specific desires need not be backed up by 
evaluative judgments, and without evaluative judgments acting as bolster, that process 
is already sufficient to determine the objectively desirable thing. The process in which 
every desire is justified by a relevant evaluative judgment is not metaphysically prior 
to the process in which general desires are added to specific desires^ On my reading, 
4 We must note carefully what Smith means by 'converging on the same desirable things'. Surely, it 
doesn't mean that if one agent prefers orange and the other prefer apple, then through the deliberation, 
they must agree that either orange or apple is more preferable. That is, we have an answer on which 
preference is more rational to have. However, Smith's idea of convergence is not like this. His 
convergence on the desirable thing is the convergence made by fully rational agents based on a 
particular agent's actual preferences, tastes, and differences of various people. As Smith writes, 'There 
is no suggestion that fully rational people will have the same tastes in food, clothes, and basketball 
teams. On the contrary, they will presumably be at least as culturally and individually diverse as many 
human beings throughout history have been. The claim is rather that they will converge in their desires 
about what is to be done in highly specific circumstances. (Smith, 1997，p, 89)’ In the above case of 
orange and apple, it can be that they are both objectively desirable. 
^ But Smith has admitted that the having of evaluative judgments is epistemologically prior to the 
process o f adding general desires to specific desires because 'there is a limitation on the expressive 
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Smith's idea is that by fully utilizing rationality, when we give up certain unassailable 
desires which are seemingly ad hoc and unjustifiable, the thing that the coherent set of 
desires determines as objectively desirable is just the thing that is justified by the 
coherent set of evaluative beliefs as objectively desirable. The same holds for the 
things possessed with moral content. 
However, Sayre-McCord points out that the conception of coherence is usually 
devised to accommodate the truth conditions of various beliefs. When coherence is 
held between more general beliefs and lower-level beliefs, it means that the more 
general beliefs 'have as their content considerations that both serve as evidence for 
the truth of the lower-level beliefs and find support themselves from their being able 
to explain other facts. (Sayre-McCord, 1997，p，75)，We are more rational to have a 
coherent set of beliefs than we don't because we interact causally with a world which 
is systematic and unified^. However, it is unclear that desires share this picture. For 
example, when I want to drink a cup of coffee, this desire may be subordinated to a 
more general desire ‘drink any fabulous things' in order to form a coherent set of 
desires as Smith suggests. Although I can obtain a coherent set of desires, it doesn't 
indicate I am more rational. If the general desire is not justified to have, neither is the 
specific desire subordinated to the general desire. If it is irrational for me to desire a 
particular thing, it will not be more rational for me to have it even when it 
subordinates to a general desire. When we talk about, if we really want to, the 
rationality of specific desires, a more appropriate way to justify them is by reason, but 
power of our natural language that we cannot directly characterize the structural relations among our 
desires that constitute their exhibiting maximal coherence and unity in a way that will be useful for 
doing moral epistemology. (Smith, 1997, p, 99)' 
6 This is a controversial claim. Some may just think as Existentialists that the world has no order and is 
absurd. I don't want to involve myself in this dispute. At least, we think that in some areas such as 
physics the world has an order so that we can find some universal laws. 
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not by some moral general desires. Smith has given two replies to McCord later 
(Smith, 1997，p, 93-95). The first reply is to say that when a relevant general desire is 
added, the whole set of desires would really become more coherent and more rational 
to possess. I simply skip this reply because Smith only stops at where his opponents 
disagree: The question is not the relevance of the general desire but how the general 
desire can be justified. The second reply is to draw an analogy between a coherent set 
of desires and other a priori knowledge such as mathematics and logic. Smith argues 
that even if we don't have causal interaction with a priori knowledge, their truth is 
made true because of the construction of our mind with the use of rationality. 
Similarly, even if we cannot causally interact with a moral realm, the rationality of a 
coherent set of desires is obtained by our mind construction. I cannot have a 
satisfactory reply to Smith's analogy because there is no sharp distinction between a 
priori knowledge and other so-called knowledge such as the existence of God and 
fungshui. I do not question that mathematics and logic are made up of human mind 
construction (at least no one can conclude affirmatively that numbers are independent 
objects). But apart from this minimum understanding, what else do we know about a 
priori knowledge? Smith seems to think that whatever has no causal interaction with 
us and whatever can be organized in a coherent way can be qualified for a priori 
knowledge, and we are more rational if we know these 'knowledge'. This treatment, 
however I would say, oversimplifies the issue to some extent. It may be the case that 
all a priori knowledge is knowledge that exhibit coherence but it is not the case that 
all coherent materials are a priori knowledge. It is just counter-intuitive to regard 
anything such as fungshui, after making coherent, as qualifying for a priori knowledge. 
It is plainly that we cannot draw a sharp distinction between mathematics and logic on 
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the one hand and the existence of God and fungshui on the other, but we should not 
make use of their fuzzy differences to regard them as the same thing. We should rather 
devote more effort to find out their more subtle differences. 
I think the problems in the methodology of adding general desires to specific 
desires would not spoil Smith's whole idea. For if Smith's aim is to show that right 
things are the things commonly desired by fully rational agents, we can propose 
another methodology to the justification of desirable things. The new methodology is 
just the one I have defended in Chapter 2. It suggests that we have to think about the 
objective features of various things, but not about our desires on them, before we 
conclude which of them is really desirable. Thinking in this way, it is the features of 
things, but not our general desires, that justify us to pursue them. This proposal only 
makes changes on the methodology of how something is justified to pursue. It does 
not deny that the right thing is also the desirable thing that the agents would desire to 
do if they are fully rational, and so it preserves the cash value of the Belief-identity 
claim. Thus, I replace Smith's methodology by this alternative proposal so as to make 
the Belief-identity sounder. 
After the above amendment is made on the Belief-identity claim, there are two 
further problems concerning it as a good analysis of normative reasons. The first 
problem is that not all moral theories suggest that moral agents should desire to do 
what moral reasons require them to do. Utilitarianism is a counter-example. 
Utilitarianism defines rightness in terms of the amount of welfare promoted by acts. 
An action is right if it can promote the greatest amount of welfare among other 
alternatives. Thus, for utilitarianism, an agent is right and has moral reason to 0 if 
(j) -ing is an act promoting the greatest amount of welfare among other alternatives in 
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circumstances C. Being a full-sense utilitarian, agents have to act like the omniscient 
God, who grasp the full range of information and deliberate correctly about what the 
right thing is. But, it is too fastidious for astute persons in every case to calculate the 
amount of welfare promoted by relevant but different acts, and arrive at a decision 
about which action should be done in an overall way. It is even impossible for 
ordinary moral agents to participate in the complicated calculation. To demand them 
to be a full-sense utilitarian will certainly arouse in them much more confusion. In 
some extreme cases, deep confusions may cause ordinary moral agents to stop acting. 
Therefore, according to utilitarianism, even if there is a reason to be a full-sense 
utilitarian, ordinary moral agents should not desire to do so. 
The second problem is that the Belief-identity claim does not match our moral 
experience (Copp, 1997, p，46). The Belief-identity claim suggests that a reason to 0 
is what one would desire to 0 if he is fully rational. It follows that one would have a 
desire for each reason in deliberation. Actually, this does not happen in typical 
deliberation. In deliberating what we should do, there may be a number of reasons 
supporting as well as opposing 0 -ing. When an agent reveals that he has a number 
of reasons for 0 -ing, he would not form a desire to 0 immediately. Rather, he has 
to judge more information before arriving at a decision as to whether he should really 
0 . There may be numerous considerations for each side, but it is clearly from our 
moral experience that we do not acquire a corresponding motivation for every single 
consideration (or reason). We usually acquire a motivation after the final decision is 
made, either to 0 or not to 0 . Contrary to the Belief-identity claim, there is no 
irrationality involved in this kind of deliberation in which one has no desire to act one 
way even if one has reason to act in that way?. 
7 1 am grateful to Professor Hua Tai for reminding me not to neglect the important phrase 'if he is fully 
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But these two problems are not very serious objections to the Belief-identity 
claim. Smith can admit that the Belief-identity claim does not fit very well with our 
moral experience but it may still be true of his analysis that after everything is 
considered, one will desire to 0 when 0 -ing is right if one is fully rational. 
Moreover, Smith may not favor utilitarianism, and may protest that only utilitarianism 
is an exception to the Belief-identity claim. Other moral theories such as deontology 
may fit the Belief-identity claim very well, so that when a rational agent knows 0 is 
right, he would be motivated to 0 . Here, we do not have a knock-down argument to 
refute the Belief-identity claim. I cannot refute Smith's analysis that the thing that an 
agent has reason to do is objectively desirable. Clearly mindful of avoiding sparking 
off further disputes due to the indeterminacy of the truth of the Belief-identity claim, I 
assume the truth of the Belief-identity claim at this moment and view the issue more 
broadly. Smith's overall plan is to argue for Rational Internalism. He thinks it is 
always true of rational agents to have a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires 
because coherence is simply the requirement of rationality. Rational agents will not 
have their actual desires deviated from their beliefs about what is right to do, and so 
they will always be motivated to do the right thing. Those failing to be motivated to 
do the right thing are necessarily irrational agents as they don't exhibit a coherent set 
of moral beliefs and moral desires. We can agree with Smith on the first part of the 
rational' in the Belief-identity claim, that although we normally could not obtain a desire for each 
reason in typical deliberation, Smith's requirement to have a desire for each reason is a normative 
requirement we should adhere to. This question provides a good opportunity for me to restate one of 
the concepts I disagree with Smith. Whereas Smith can propose a narrow definition of rationality that 
few people would like to use, I think the definition of rationality should not deviate from ordinary 
usage very much. By using Smith's own definition of rationality (I call it S-rationality), one can 
legitimately be charged for being irrational if he does not obtain a desire for each reason. But the 
problem is not about the legitimacy, but about which definition of rationality we adhere to and use. If 
all of us use a definition of rationality in which one is still fully rational when he only obtains a desire 
for the final decision, then there is no reason to believe that one is irrational if he cannot obtain a desire 
for each reason. And so it is where the problem of S-rationality lies. 
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story, i.e., we can agree that if an agent is fully rational, he will have a coherent set of 
moral beliefs and moral desires and be motivated to do the right thing. But I wonder 
the plausibility of the second part of the story. I suspect whether Smith has 
oversimplified the issue to conclude that it is necessarily irrational of someone if he 
fails to be motivated to do the right thing. To argue against this idea, I try to analyze 
the most important phrase in the Rationalism Internalism ‘one is irrational if he fails 
n 
to be motivated to do the right thing' in two ways . The first way is to understand the 
phrase as claiming that ‘one is necessarily irrational for failing to do the right thing'. 
The second is to understand the phrase as claiming that 'one is necessarily irrational if 
his moral judgment does not generate in him any moral desires, thereby having no 
moral motivation'^. In order to answer these two questions, I think the key thing is to 
clarify the concept of rationality. In The Moral Problem, where Smith discusses 
Bernard Williams's account of rationality, he nearly accepts all of Williams's analysis 
which consists of three conditions: (Smith, 1995, p，156): 
1. no false beliefs 
8 I want to thank Professor Hua Tai for pointing out to me that Smith's official wording of Rational 
Internalism is that 'one is not fully rational if he fails to be motivated to do what one believes to be the 
right thing', whose meaning is different from interpreting the phrase as ‘one is necessarily irrational if 
he fails to do the right thing', or ‘one is necessarily irrational if his moral judgment does not generate in 
him any moral desires, thereby having no moral motivation.' It may be possible that when one fails to 
do (as opposed to failing to be motivated to do) the right thing, he is not irrational. In my view, the 
problem arises from the ambiguity of the phrase 'being motivated to do something'. How many 
meanings could this phrase have? One meaning, as direct as it looks like, is that one has some 
motivation do A without actually doing it. In this sense, one can of course be fully rational even if he 
does not do the right thing. However, a question comes. If what counts as rational only amounts to 
having some motivation, but not actually doing any action, then Smith has to regard all those who have 
some moral motivation but do nothing else as fully rational agents As there is no clue in Smith's text to 
conclude definitely which meaning he has in mind, I decide to discuss both meanings in my thesis. So, 
when I examine whether Smith is right to say one is irrational for failing to do the right thing, I decide 
to expound my idea in two ways: One is whether one is irrational for failing to do the right thing, the 
other is whether one irrational for failing to have some moral motivation. 
9 These two sub questions have some connections. It is because if one has already been motivated to 
act morally, he must have moral motivation being generated by moral beliefs as a pre-condition. 
However, the same doesn't hold for the converse. That means the process in which a moral belief can 
generate a moral desire doesn't guarantee that one is being motivated to act for the right thing at the 
end. He may have moral motivation but his moral motivation may be overridden by other kinds of 
motivation. 
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2. all true beliefs 
3. deliberate correctly 
Later, Smith adds one more condition. 
4. a systematic justification of her beliefs and desires - she tries to achieve a 
coherence of belief and desire. 
These four conditions combine to form a definition of rationality which I call 
Smith-rationality (S-rationality). I think the S-rationality provides too narrow a 
definition. It seems that if we follow his definition, only a little amount of people 
would be counted as rational and many others are irrational. To see this, we just need 
to reflect on our common idea of rationality. Common sense tells us that rational 
agents do not have to possess all true beliefs in decision making. Because of the lack 
of time, the constraints of different situations, agents can only grasp as much 
information as he can. For the same reason, they cannot dispose all false beliefs. Even 
though an agent has collected a certain amount of information, it is not feasible for 
him to deliberate through all of them if the decision is going to be made hurriedly. For 
an urgent decision to come out, a more considerable way is to consider a portion of 
information in hand so that an agent would not go astray in the ample amount of 
information. Moreover, ordinary rational agents need not avoid all deliberation 
mistakes and achieve a systematic justification of her beliefs and desires. Provided 
that the mistake and the incoherence of beliefs and desires result from reasonable 
constraints such as the agent's deliberation ability, time limit, other people's influence, 
the agent is still rational and has made a rational decision. As David Copp says, 
'Rationality in the ordinary sense is, roughly, the combination of a disposition to 
reason correctly with a disposition to forms beliefs and perform actions that one takes 
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to be at least as well supported by reasons as any alternative. A person can be rational 
in this ordinary sense without her reasoning being fully complete. (Copp, 1997，42)， 
There are two reasons why it is not necessarily irrational for one not to do the 
right thing. The central theme of the Belief-identity claim is that the belief that it 
would be right to 0 in circumstances C is identical to the belief that, if she were 
fully rational, she would want herself to 0 in circumstances C. However, it may 
always happen in ordinary moral agents that the two beliefs are not necessarily linked 
together. If so, when an agent never know that the belief that it would be right to 0 
in circumstances C has another meaning, he is not irrational for failing to do the right 
thing. Suppose that Donald Tsang has been elected as the Chief Executive of the SAR 
government for the period of two years. From 2005 to 2007, it is true to claim that 
'Donald Tsang is SAR's Chief Executive'. Andrew, a reporter, does not know this 
piece of news and still thinks Donald Tsang is the Chief Secretary for Administration 
of SAR. One day, Andrew is dispatched to have an interview with the Chief Executive. 
When he goes into the Chief Executive's office，he only sees Donald Tsang. He is a 
little bit shocked of why the Chief Executive would leave Donald Tsang alone in his 
office. Anyway, to simplify the story, he leaves the office quickly and goes back to his 
office to report to his boss what he sees. Of course, his boss blames him, but what 
kind of blame should be appropriate? To a great extent, Andrew lacks the relevant 
knowledge, and is disqualified for a reporter before knowing more about current 
issues. However, he should not be blamed for irrational. Common sense rationality 
does not require us to know every piece of correct information. Given the constraints 
encountered by Andrew, there may be some reasonable explanations for Andrew's 
lack of knowledge such that he is suggested to know that piece of information but is 
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not irrational for not knowing it. Ordinary people who know Donald Tsang is the 
Chief Executive may be irrational to deny that they haven't met the Chief Executive 
when they have in fact met Donald Tsang in the office, because they have 
contradictory beliefs. But this piece is not inaccessible to Andrew, and so the charge 
of irrationality does not apply to Andrew. Similarly, if a person does not know that the 
claim that 'It's right to 0 in circumstances C is equivalent to the claim that 'He 
would want himself to 0 in C if he is fully rational', i.e., the Belief-identity claim, it 
is not irrational for him to know it is right to 0 in circumstances C but fails to 0 . 
The second reason why it is not necessarily irrational for one not to do the right 
thing is that the incoherence of moral beliefs and moral desires constitute one's 
irrationality only if that agent comes to value the coherence of moral beliefs and 
moral desires. Smith can certainly reply that having a coherent set of moral beliefs 
and moral desires is a minimum requirement of rationality, just as having a coherent 
set of beliefs is a minimum requirement of rationality. An agent who cannot maintain 
a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires is not even a rational agent in the 
minimal sense. But why must we have a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral 
desires? In the case of containing only beliefs, we understand the reason for having a 
coherent set of beliefs. It is because we would think in a muddled way and cannot 
defend a position if we hold ‘A’ and ‘not A, at the same time. But the demand of 
having a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires seems to be different. I don't 
quite exactly know what Smith meant by the irrationality if one have an incoherent set 
of moral beliefs and desires, but irrationality usually has two common understandings: 
The agent hold contradictory beliefs (belief both A and not A) or the agent holds some 
obviously false belief (I will not die if jumping from the roof of a building). But these 
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two senses of irrationality are not applicable to our discussion. On the first sense, 
when an agent does not do what he believes, it doesn't show he has two contradictory 
beliefs. He may believe that 0 -ing is right all the time even if he fails to 0 . 
Regarding the second sense, it is not true that an agent has some obviously false 
beliefs if whether it is necessary for one to value the coherence of moral beliefs and 
moral desires is what we are arguing at present. 
Admittedly, for a wide range of moral cases, we expect agents to have a coherent 
set of moral beliefs and desires, so that when they judge that 0 -ing is right, he will 
not just desire to 0，but also 0 . To have a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral 
desires as such is remarkably the highest hope. However, so worth may be this kind of 
expectation, the lack of the coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires does not 
constitute one's irrationality. It is because the expectation conflates reasonable 
expectation with minimum requirement of rationality. It is one thing to say that it is 
good for an agent to have a coherent set of beliefs and desires. It is quite another thing 
to say that an agent is irrational for not having a coherent set of beliefs and desires. A 
failure to the highest expectation isn't a failure on rationality. 
Of course, most of us are educated to have a coherent set of moral beliefs and 
moral desires since childhood. We cannot excuse from the charge of irrationality for 
not coming to value a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires if we fail to do 
the right thing. But even if we have believed the Belief-identity claim and come to 
value a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires, a failure to do the right does 
not necessarily commit us to irrationality. In fact, Smith's requirement is very 
stringent. It doesn't allow us to have moral desires deviated from moral beliefs in any 
cases. But we simply let people make mistakes. Provided that the abilities, the 
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objective constraints and the psychological structure of various agents, it doesn't 
matter for them not to do the right thing or to have time-lag to do the right thing. 
Minimally, if an agent's failure is reasonable, he is still a rational agent. 
Earlier, I said that there are two ways to understand the phrase 'one is irrational 
if he fails to be motivated to do the right thing' in Rational Internalism. In the last few 
paragraphs, I have analyzed one of them, namely, whether one is necessarily irrational 
for failing to do what he believes it is right for him to do. I want to discuss the second 
way — whether one is necessarily irrational if his moral judgment does not generate 
in him any moral desires, thereby having no moral motivation — now. My aim is to 
deny that in some occasions where an agent is suffering from depression or facing 
other factors, and where an agent's moral judgments cannot even generate moral 
desires, the agent is not irrational. Smith often stresses that Rational Internalism 
cannot be maintained under the affection of psychological depression. He has 
implicitly agreed that psychological depression itself is always an irrational element, 
without which moral judgments must be capable of generating moral desires. 
Nevertheless, treating psychological depression in this way is prejudicial. There are 
cases to show that having psychological depression does not imply irrationality. A 
typical example is some serious accidents. Bill, for instance, a long-term volunteer, 
has lost his parents in an accident. He has promised to do the voluntary work every 
weekend and still judges that it is right to do the voluntary work even after the 
accident. Yet, the accident bombards him very deeply. It is not that the desire to do the 
voluntary work is frail comparing to the depression resulted from his yearning to 
parents; it is that the judgments cannot even generate in him any moral motivation. 
According to Rational Internalism, the psychological depression should be suppressed. 
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But why is yearning less important than voluntary work? I see no reason at all. If we 
think that there is reason to yearn one's parents, then the depression resulted from 
yearning is also reasonable to have'^. To say Bill should continue to do the voluntary 
work in this case just mean that morality is the most important reason. But this is a 
dubious claim. At the very least, I think that forcing Bill to go on working is an 
inhuman treatment as that would cause bad psychological effects. If all these are 
reasonable, it may be rational to have depression and also rational to be devoid of any 
moral motivation while thinking the previous moral beliefs are right. 
I would like to make another point. The demand of various moral rules also 
affects the motivational effect of moral judgments. Imagine two scenarios. Annie 
passes by a cliff, seeing that a climber is hanged by a string. As anyone, Annie judges 
that it has right for her to save the climber. However, to do so, she has to go down to 
the cliff. Annie is not a sportswoman, and it is too dangerous for her to go down the 
cliff to save the climber. Judging that she may even sacrifice her life for the climber, 
she hesitates to do it. In this case, Annie sincerely judges that it is right to save the 
climber, but her judgment does not generate in her any motivation. How should we 
judge this case? It depends on our view about what is the best reason for Annie to act 
for. There are only two possibilities in this case: Saving others' life is the best reason 
or not scarifying one's life is the best reason. If ‘not scarifying one's life' is the best 
reason, then it is absolutely justified not to have any desires to save the climber's life. 
Annie is absolutely rational if she does not save the climber. What is more puzzling is 
Perhaps, we can distinguish two kinds of depression here concerning their source. The first kind is 
similar to diseases that always occur suddenly. When it occurs, we may explain why it occurs but 
cannot explain why it should occur. Another kind of depression is wholly different. It certainly has 
some feelings similar to the first kind of depression, but it also possesses a distinctive feature that the 
first kind of depression does not share: It can be explained why it should occur. The current case of Bill 
certainly belongs to the second kind. 
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how we treat Annie's level of rationality if ‘saving others' life' is the best reason. In 
my view, Annie is better regarded as timid rather than irrational. It is because Annie is 
acting for reasons, even if she is not acting for the best one. When we judge that we 
have reasons to act morally, we are also considering other considerations such as the 
cost of so doing and one's ability at the time of making the moral judgment. If the 
sacrifice is too high and the agent emphases more on his interests than on others' 
interests, then one's moral beliefs may be inert on one's motivation. Even though 
putting more emphasis on one's own interests may not be the best reason, they do 
provide some reasons so long as we also value one's life. And so, the lack of desires 
to act for the best reason can be justified, and acting on one's self-interest doesn't 
commit one to irrationality. According to our common sense rationality, an agent, by 
judging all the relevant information, needs not to act for the best reason in order to be 
regarded as rational. 
4.3 Proper-grasp Argument 
Proper-grasp argument attempts to show the necessary connection between moral 
judgments and moral desires by rigidly stipulating that an agent does not really grasp 
the meaning of a moral judgment if that moral judgment does not generate the 
relevant moral desire''. Internalists are keen to appeal to this argument because 
internalism is already presupposed in the argument: The possibility that one has no 
moral desire after having a moral belief has been imputed to the agent's improper 
grasp. This argument does not give much support to internalism as internalism is 
merely a definitional truth. It does no justice to externalism, and just eschews the 
‘ ‘ O r sometimes, it would be said that a person has not sincerely made a moral judgment if that moral 
judgment has not generated a moral desire in him. The spirit of this formulation is roughly the same as 
saying that an agent has not properly grasped the meaning of a moral judgment if that moral judgment 
does not generate the relevant moral desire. They are just two representations of the same idea. 
Therefore, I just use one representation in the main content. 
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question of what is meant by 'proper grasp'. However, internalists can still offer us 
further reasons for accepting this definitional truth. Analogy is then used as 
supplement for this missing step. One of the famous analogies is the analogy of visual 
experience proposed by Michael Smith in The Moral Problem'^. Before we look at 
the detail of this analogy, I need to note that emphasis should be placed on the form of 
the analogy rather than the content. The crucial thing to which the internalists appeal 
is the similarity which establishes a necessary connection between two objects. The 
analogy of audio experience can certainly be used if one can show that audio is a 
necessary condition for the making of genuine audio judgment. 
The analogy of visual experience starts from conditions that constitute the 
making of genuine color judgments. Imagine a person who is blind from birth and 
hence has no visual experience in his whole life. When he wants to make color 
judgments, he has to learn it through language teaching in which he learns about the 
relations between primary and secondary colors, about warm and cold colors, about 
how colors of objects supervene on properties of light reflection and about colors of 
various objects. After learning all these things, he can 'use terms with the same 
extension as our color terms, and the properties of objects that explain his uses of 
those terms are the very same properties as those that explain our uses of color terms. 
And his color judgments may be even more accurate and reliable than those made by 
sighted folk. (Smith, 1995, p, 69)' Nevertheless, even if the blind person does make 
color judgments as accurate and reliable as ours', just because of his lack of visual 
•1.； 
experience, we conclude that he doesn't make genuine color judgments. We do not 
deny that the blind person are making color judgments in a certain sense, but just 
because 'the ability to have the appropriate visual experiences under certain 
•2 For the most detail, please refer to Chapter 3，section 3.4 of The Moral Problem. 
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conditions is partially constitutive of possession of color concepts and mastery of 
color terms (Smith, 1995, p, 69)，，he is still far from making genuine color judgments 
in the strictest sense. Applying this analogy to the moral case, Smith argues, we can 
conclude that since moral motivation is partially constitutive of the possession of 
moral concepts and the mastery of moral terms, an agent is not making genuine moral 
judgments if he is not motivated by his moral judgments. 
The analogy of color judgment seems to provide a good support for Rational 
linternalism by drawing our attention to the seeming conceptual truth that visual 
experience is pivotal to the making of genuine color judgments. But David Brink has 
expressed a number of critical comments in his reply to Smith to undermine the force 
of the analogy (Brink, 1997). I think all his comments are right, and so I will only 
describe his comments with my categorization added. The categorization is that 
Brink's comment can be divided into two different categories, one opposing the 
conceptual truth that visual experience is necessary for making genuine color 
judgments and one revealing the dissimilarities between visual experience and moral 
motivation. This characterization reminds us that any arguments sharing the same 
structure of the color judgment analogy can be examined in two different ways. 
At a cursory glance, it is not clear why it is a conceptual truth that visual 
experience is necessary for making genuine color judgments. It is certainly possible 
I 
that a person who is blind from the birth can still learn how to make color judgments 
through language teaching. For example, when a blind person is asked to pick out a 
red object through a third person's hand, he can tell that person what the 
characteristics of a red object are in terms of the surface characteristics of red color, of 
the relationship between red color and other similar colors, of the affection of red 
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color on perception. If that person can pick out the correct object exclusively by his 
linguistic instruction, then we don't see why a person without visual experience could 
not make genuine color judgments, for the truth of color judgments concerning only 
the correctness of picking out the color properties. While one can reasonably doubt 
the extent such teaching succeeds, there seems to be no inconsistency if successful 
teaching can be carried out. Undoubtedly, the process of making color judgments of 
such a person may be different from that of ordinary people. But the strange process 
does not alter the truth of his color judgments. Similarly, even if a person does not 
have moral motivation after making a moral judgment, there is no reason to exclude 
him from making genuine moral judgments, for the truth of moral judgments concerns 
only the correctness of picking out moral properties. 
Yet, one may still agree that visual experience is somehow necessary for making 
genuine color judgments. To our common sense，it is hard to believe that a person 
who is blind from birth can make genuine color judgments. But how about those who 
are not blind from birth and who make genuine color judgments through visual 
experience before they are blind? Brink has argued that through managing his 
previous-made color judgments, for example, by integrating, imaging, subordinating, 
I 
he can still point out what the properties of a blue object are, and make judgments 
about the outlook of a blue object as accurate as he was not blind before. If so, this 
person is still making genuine color judgments. Or at least, he can make genuine blue 
color judgments. Similarly, before losing motivation, a person would recognize some 
moral judgments with the relevant moral motivation. After he suffers depression 
which deprives him of all moral motivation, he can still make the same moral 
judgment as before. Just as a blind person can manage his previous-made color 
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judgments through integrating, imaging, subordinating, a person without moral 
motivation can manage his previous-made moral judgment in the same way. 
The analogy is in fact not a good one if we think meticulously to realize that 
visual experience differs from motivation in a significant way as visual experience is 
cognitive state and motivation is conative state, which aims to bring out something. 
The analogy is thus split into two different parts, stating the necessary conditions of 
color judgments and moral judgments respectively. Even if we agree that both moral 
judgments and color judgments are cognitive judgments, and that certain cognitive 
states are necessary conditions for making genuine cognitive judgments, as visual 
experience is one of the necessary conditions for making genuine color judgments, 
this does not show that moral motivation, as conative states, is one of the necessary 
conditions for making genuine moral judgments. As long as one firmly holds visual 
experience is cognitive states, any analogies that aim to infer from the necessary 
connection between cognitive states and cognitive judgments to the necessary 
connection between conative states and cognitive judgments will not succeed. 
But there would be someone who thinks that visual experience is not cognitive 
state. They may regard it as a pre-cognitive or non-cognitive state on which 
representational judgments are based. This re-asserts the similarities between visual 
experience and motivation, and the analogy works again. Brink, however, points out 
that this line of thought is quite problematic. First, the proponents give us no reason 
other than mere assertion that visual experience is pre-cognitive states which do not 
represent any objects. There is at least some strong intuition to object this change, 
because when we say, for example, ‘X is blue', we mean that we have the 'blue' 
visual experience representing the surface color of the object. Second, even if we 
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concede a little bit to admit that visual experience is non-cognitive states, this still 
does not provide what Smith wants. Smith wants exactly an analogy that can show 
there is a necessary connection between conative states and cognitive judgments. To 
regard visual experience as either pre-cognitive state or non-cognitive state does not 
entail that visual experience is conative state. Comparing with desires, it is quite 
strange to say that visual experience is a kind of attitudes counting in favor of an 
object. Visual experience is in this sense crucially different from desires. All these 
show that the truth of the claim that visual experience is necessary for making genuine 
color judgments is irrelevant to the truth of the claim that moral motivation is 
necessary for making genuine moral judgments. Smith's analogy simply fails. 
4.4 Virtuous Person Argument 
Virtuous person argument is a very famous argument innovated by Smith in The 
Moral Problem (Smith, 1995, Section 3.5). This argument is different from the 
proper-grasp argument because while the proper grasp argument aims to argue for the 
truth of Rational Internalism, the virtuous person argument attempts to reflect the 
weakness of externalism. According to many internalists, including Smith himself, 
virtuous person argument is an analysis of the theoretical merits of internalism over 
externalism. Its force is not supposed to base on empirical evidence, and it attempts to 
show that internalism is conceptually superior to externalism. I do not agree with this 
and think that the truth of internalism or externalism has to be partly relied on 
people's moral behavior. I will go back to this point later. Let me characterize what 
this argument says first. 
Smith asks us to imagine engaging in a discourse about 'whether we should vote 
for the libertarian party at some election as opposed to the social democrats. (Smith, 
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1995, p, 71)’ Suppose I have already believed that it is better to vote for the 
libertarians and am already motivated to vote. You do not agree with me and think 
that it is much better to vote for the social democrats. You decide to persuade me, and 
through a series of discussion, I come to believe that I was mistaken. I now believe 
that I should vote for the social democrats instead of the libertarians. Thus, I am 
motivated to vote for the social democrats. What interests us is how to explain the 
reliable connection between the change of judgment and the change of motivation. 
Smith thinks that there are two ways of accounting for the reliable connection. One 
way is that the new motivation follows directly from the new judgment, i.e. the 
motivation of voting for the social democrats follows from my new judgment that it is 
better to vote for the social democrats (We should be familiar with this idea as it is 
mainly inspired by Nagel's idea of motivated desires). Another way is through the aid 
of ‘the disposition to act for the right thing' (R-disposition). According to this 
alternative, when I judge voting for the social democrats and thus am motivated to do 
so, that motivation is not produced by the new judgment, but by an already existing 
disposition as opposed to the first account. 
Smith thinks that internalists would opt for the first explanation and externalists 
the second (I don't think externalists need to opt for the second explanation 
necessarily. But let us grant Smith's point at this moment). Also, he thinks that this is 
the only choice for internalists and externalists. His reason, as I conjecture, may be as 
follows. Since internalism purports that motivation must be explained internally to 
moral judgments, internalists are not allowed to choose the second explanation 
because the R-disposition is an independent psychological element and is not 
internally related to moral judgments. Conversely, externalists are restricted to hang 
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on the second explanation because a commitment to the first explanation will force 
them to admit that agents are necessarily motivated to act from the motivation 
internally generated by moral judgments, a connection that they reject principally. 
Smith concludes that if externalists have to opt for the second explanation, then 
they are accused of giving a wrong explanation of the formation of virtuous persons' 
moral motivation. As externalists deny that a new judgment necessarily generate a 
new corresponding desire, they can account for the reliable change of motivation in 
the face of new judgment only by allowing particular motivations to be derived from 
the R-disposition. For externalists, as Smith describes, it seems that all motivation of 
virtuous persons is derived motivation. Virtuous persons will do particular things not 
because these particular things are valuable for their own sake, but because they are 
valuable in terms of the features of rightness. But ‘commonsense tells us that if good 
people judge it right to be honest, or right to care for their children and friends and 
fellows, or right for people to get what they deserve, then they care non-derivatively 
about these things. Good people are non-derivatively about honesty, the weal and woe 
of their children and friends, the well-being of their fellows, people getting what they 
deserve, justice, equality (Smith, 1995, p, 75)，This 'fetishistic' picture of virtuous 
person offered by externalism'^, Smith claims, is so hostile to our common conception 
of virtuous person, because 'it alienates the virtuous person from the ends at which 
morality aims. Just as it is constitutive of being a morally good person that you have 
direct concern for the person you love, so it is constitutive of being a morally good 
person that you have direct concern for what you think is right, where this is read de 
re and not de dicto. (Smith, 1995，p, 76)' 
13 'Fetishist' is originated from Bernard Williams's paper "Person, Character and Morality". He thinks 
that it is too absurd for someone's motivation of saving one's wife to be motivated by the requirement 
of duty. This person, he argued, should rather be motivated by his direct concern towards his wife. 
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I now consider the so-called choice about the explanation of motivation rigidly 
assigned to internalism and externalism by Smith. I think it is right to for Smith to 
claim that internalists must opt for the first explanation, or otherwise, its maintenance 
on the internal connection between moral judgments and moral motivation cannot be 
sustained. But it is not obviously necessary for externalists to opt for the second 
explanation. Smith may have in mind the Extreme Externalism (EE) (mentioned in 
Chapter 1)，which holds that all moral motivation is not supplied by ethical principles 
and judgments, as the only form of externalism. But externalism needs not be 
interpreted so narrowly. The Weak Externalism (WE), which I propose as the more 
plausible form of externalism, can embrace the situations in which the change of 
motivation follows directly from the change of judgments. According to WE, it is 
only false to claim that in all situations, the change of motivation is necessarily 
resulted from the change of judgments. WE allow virtuous person to have direct 
concerns for particular things. So, what remains problematic is not whether 
externalism allows for direct concerns, but whether virtuous persons do not have 
direct concerns for particular things in externalism. 
As I read it, Smith has two reasons to prefer internalism, in particular Rational 
Internalism, to externalism. He charges externalism that it allows (1) derived 
motivation and (2) indirect concerns for particular things which should rather be 
I 
directly concerned. First, if Smith charges externalism for its proliferation of derived 
motivation, i.e., virtuous persons' motivation must be motivated by derived 
motivation, then he has some misunderstandings of externalism. On WE, even if a 
virtuous person has not had direct concerns, he needs not to derive another motivation 
from the R-disposition when acting for particular things. In the view of virtuous 
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persons, why they have reasons to act for the particular things is simply that they are 
right. Apart from the tightness，there are no other reasons for which virtuous persons 
should do the particular things. So, when they do the particular things, it remains true 
that their motivation is non-derivatively one. Second, it is also doubtful why the 
virtuous persons in externalism cannot have direct concerns for particular things. 
According to WE, although it is most common for persons to cultivate in themselves 
the R-disposition that when they do the particular things, their motivation is derived 
merely from the R-disposition, this is only part of the story. Recall our externalists' 
story in Chapter 1 that after continuous moral practice, people may have developed a 
lot of particular motivation for different particular things. For example, an agent's 
motivation for respecting his parents may be derived from the R-disposition at the 
time of childhood. But he may have developed a direct concern to respect his parents 
after many years of practice. At that time, the value of respecting one's parents is no 
longer understood in terms of its contribution to the amount of one's dutifulness, but 
in terms of the features of respecting parents. More interestingly, a virtuous person by 
definition is the one who have performed moral actions for a long time. Processing 
through such a long time of moral practice, as we can reasonably suppose, virtuous 
person should have developed in themselves many direct concerns for particular 
things. Unsurprisingly, the pattern of doing moral actions of virtuous persons on WE 
is the same as those virtuous persons described by Smith. 
However, Smith may argue that what is problematic for externalism is not that it 
embraces the possibility that virtuous persons have non-derived motivation, or that 
they usually have direct concerns for particular things, but that it allows virtuous 
person to have derived motivation. The unpleasant result of this allowance is that it 
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deprives some of the value of particular things, Smith argues. The value of particular 
things is unavoidably reduced to an instrumental sense and can only have instrumental 
value in relative to their contribution to one's amount of dutifulness. This violates our 
conception of the value of particular things as we think that they are 
non-instrumentally valuable. Smith's objection looks as though when one's 
motivation is derived by the R-disposition, the value of concerning a particular thing, 
say, caring for one's intimates, is also derived from the value of duty. But this 
assumption is false. As David Brink correctly points out, there are two ways to 
interpret the sentence ‘X [the direct concern for particular things] is valued for the 
sake of Y [the duty]' (Brink, 1997，p, 29): 
1. When X is valued for the sake of Y，X's value is derivative and also contributive 
to Y. 
2. When X is valued as a causal means to Y, X's value is derivative and 
instrumental 
I do not find in elsewhere that externalists would opt for the second interpretation. 
Externalists do not have the intention to 'downgrade' the value of morality when they 
say that one's motivation for particular things has to be derived from the R-disposition. 
But then, on the first interpretation, externalists can say that even though the 
motivation for particular things has to be derived from the R-disposition, the concerns 
for particular things are not aimed at satisfying the desire of being duty. Rather, they 
contribute to the content of duty. For now, it is not that the concerns for particular 
things causally bring about one's status of duty; it is these concerns that constitute 
one's status of duty. Without these concerns, the content of duty is empty. If 
externalists have this conception of direct concern, I don't think there are good 
115 
Chapter 4 The Rejection of Rational Internalism 
.申 -
reasons to reject externalism. 
Smith has attacked the c o n c e p t i o n of the R-disposition heavily，but he seems to 
neglect one dangerous thing if he stresses too much on direct concerns. Very often, we 
have very strong emotions of direct concerns. If we over-emphasize the importance of 
direct concerns but neglect the extent to which they should be appropriately expressed, 
that will often lead to unacceptable result. For instance, in the case of parent's care to 
their children, parents are always deliberate to let their children behave improperly 
and do not tighten up their control on children's behavior. This problem can be 
remedied in two ways. One is to provide a justification for each direct concern and 
restrict the extent to which they can be e x p r e s s e d . Another is to require the motivation 
of these direct concerns to be derived from the R-disposition. Since the R-disposition 
is a disposition of duty, any further motivation derived from it is morally permissible. 
If so, the externalists' account has the merit of avoiding inappropriate obsessions to 
direct concerns. 
Actually, I do not see the badness of externalism in respect to the explanation of 
moral motivation. But I do think that there is an unwelcome result for Rational 
Internalism if the formation of our moral motivation is strictly restricted in its own 
way. I am not sure whether Smith wants to claim that there is a difference in the value 
of two kinds of motivation and whether actions motivated by the R-disposition are not 
qualified for genuine moral actions. But Smith seems to think that all direct concerns 
should only be motivated simply in virtue of direct concerns, and should not be 
I - • 
motivated by the R-disposition. To restrict one's moral motivation in this way will 
impede one's moral development. All of us would agree that there are factors that can 
affect the formation of our direct moral concerns. The scarcity of moral practice, the 
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poor deliberation ability, the lack of time, all of these would obstruct one from 
developing direct concerns for particular things. It may even be demanding for a 
moral theory to require some ill-equipped people to develop so many varieties of 
direct concerns. For them, the far better way is to cultivate in them one ultimate 
disposition, the R-disposition, and to be motivated by it. Grudging these people to 
develop direct concerns will only result in confusion. In some cases, when confusion 
is severely accumulated, they may even not to be motivated to do any moral actions. 
In my opinion, it is unwise to dispose the prolific merits of externalism, which 
concerns the hurdle of developing direct concern faced by ill-equipped people as well 
as allowing well-equipped people to develop direct concerns. 
4.5 The Rejection of Rational Internalism 
In this chapter, I have tried to reject Rational Internalism by raising several 
doubts on the claim that one is necessarily irrational if one fails to do the right thing 
and the claim that one is necessarily irrational if one has no moral motivation. On the 
one hand, I argue that if one is to be appropriately charged with irrationality when one 
fails to do the right thing, three conditions must be included. First, the agent must 
have already believed the Belief-identity claim. Second, the agent must have come to 
value a coherent set of moral beliefs and moral desires. Third, even if an agent comes 
to believe the Belief-identity claim and value the coherent set of moral beliefs and 
moral desires, he is not necessarily irrational if he fails to do the right thing, given his 
abilities, psychological structure and objective constraints. On the other hand, I argue 
that one is not necessarily irrational if one has no moral motivation when one have a 
moral belief. If some kinds of depression are justifiable, or if the demand of some 
moral rules is too fastidious, then the agent is surely not irrational not to have moral 
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motivation. All these keep reminding us that Smith's treatment is somehow polarized. 
We need much more materials than Smith's suggestion to judge whether an agent is 
irrational if he fails to be motivated do the right thing. 
Yet, contrary to the previous two chapters in which I reject Humean Internalism 
and Pure Ascription Internalism fully due to their wrong conception of moral reasons 
and motivation theory, I cannot reject Rational Internalism in the full sense. It is 
because I cannot prove wrong part of its theoretical assertion. The uncertainty 
concerns whether it is true to say that for the fully rational agents in Smith's sense， 
when they come to believe an objective moral reason, they will at the same (a) know 
Rationalism, (b) know the Belief-identity claim, (c) come to value a coherent set of 
moral beliefs and moral desires, (d) have strong will and be fully adaptive to moral 
reasons and (e) act morally. I cannot deny the existence of these agents as their 
existence is logically possible. There may exist of a little number of this kind of 
agents in this actual world. Smith's Rational Internalism may be a perfect description 
of the relation between moral beliefs and moral desires of these agents. But a theory 
should not concern a limited number of intelligent people. It must also concern the 
overall situation of the vulgar. If it is so hard for many ordinary moral agents to reach 
the standard of rationality set by Rational Internalism, we have reason to reconsider it 
if not fully reject. In the next chapter, I will consider the consequence on our moral 
behavior if we do not adhere to Rational Internalism, and the merit of believing 
externalism. 
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Chapter 5 After the Rejection of Rational Internalism 
The topic of this thesis is the rejection of three kinds of internalism. As I have 
said repeatedly, I view internalism and externalism in a broader way. Internalists and 
externalists do not just participate in the debate about the necessary connection 
between moral reasons, moral beliefs and moral motivation. They also need to take a 
stand on the nature of moral reasons and moral beliefs and a plausible motivation 
theory. Thus, I have rejected three positions along with the rejection of three kinds of 
internalism: a Humean conception of normative reasons which insists the justification 
of normative reasons (as well as moral reasons) is based on desire (in Chapter 2); the 
Nagelian motivation theory which holds that the source of moral motivation is 
grounded in moral beliefs (in Chapter 3); and a theory of rationality that holds a 
necessary relation between moral beliefs and moral desires (in Chapter 4). Besides, I 
have argued for three positive positions: an anti-Humean conception of normative 
reasons which holds that normative reasons (as well as moral reasons) are based on 
features of facts; a Humean motivation theory which holds that desire is the source of 
motivation (including moral motivation); and a theory that rejects a necessary relation 
between moral beliefs and moral desires, even when an agent is fully rational. These 
three positive views together constitute the position I call Weak Externalism (WE). 
WE competes against all kinds of internalism, including Humean Internalism, 
Pure Ascription Internalism and Rational Internalism. But if we stand firmly on the 
anti-Humean conception of normative reason and the Humean theory of motivation, 
then WE is best contrasted with Rational Internalism as they disagree with each other 
only about the necessary connection between moral beliefs and moral desires. In this 
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chapter, I want to discuss the practical significance of rejecting Rational Internalism 
and the appropriate view on the connection between moral beliefs and moral desires if 
we accept WE. I will proceed in three steps. In 5.1,1 will state two general problems 
of Rational Internalism. In 5.2, I will discuss the effect on blame if Rational 
Internalism is rejected. In 5.3,1 will handle the question as to what we should do if we 
believe WE. My main idea throughout this chapter is that an agent's level of 
rationality depends heavily on education. If an agent fails to reach the highest 
standard of rationality because of the limits of his education, he should not be 
relentlessly regarded as irrational comparative to the highest level of rationality. In my 
view, the agent should better be viewed as less rational comparative to the highest 
level of rationality, and is still fully rational given the education he has at that time. 
Similarly, if the process in which moral beliefs directly generate moral desires in 
every case marks the highest rational standard of human beings, then any failures to 
reach this highest standard due to insufficient moral education and moral practice 
does not signal irrationality. More time should be given to the agent to adjust, and he 
should be forgiven for failing to do the right thing. 
5.1 Two Problems of Rational Internalism 
In my view, Rational Internalism is an optimistic theory. It tries to offer us a 
straight-forward explanation on moral motivation — if an agent is rational, then his 
moral beliefs will necessarily generate moral desires which motivate him to act 
accordingly. Although this kind of treatment on the relation between moral beliefs and 
moral desires is somehow convenient, it is quite stiffing and superficial in my view. It 
is stiffing in the sense that it holds that the only appropriate way of producing moral 
motivation should be through moral beliefs. Other ways such as deriving from the 
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R-disposition are unacceptable in their nature. As I explained in Chapter 4, one of 
Smith's arguments against externalism is that it sometimes allows moral motivation to 
be derived from the disposition to do the right thing (R-disposition). That is a serious 
problem for externalism, as Smith explains, because we do not act directly for the 
features of different moral cases. Particular moral actions are valuable only if they 
bear a relation to the R-disposition. They are then degraded into instrumental actions 
which 'serve' the R-disposition. I have assuaged Smith's worry by saying that WE 
does accept the possibility that moral beliefs directly generate moral desires. But that 
cannot settle the issue, for Smith does not even allow any moral motivation to be 
derived from the R-disposition. To answer Smith's objection, WE replies that even if 
part of our moral motivation has to be derived from the R-disposition, the value of 
derived moral motivations won't diminish, and moral actions won't be degraded into 
instrumental actions. This is because one's moral status (or to be dutiful in the full 
sense) is constituted by all particular moral actions. Every particular moral action is 
valuable in heaping one's moral status. There is no other way for an agent to be 
regarded as dutiful unless he does all the particular moral actions. So, what matters is 
not whether the moral motivation is derivative, but how we value the derived moral 
motivation. On WE, the derived moral motivation is intrinsically valuable for their 
indispensable constitutive role in shaping one's moral status. 
If having derived moral motivation does not reduce moral worth, then WE is 
compatible with our common beliefs about moral worth. But it is incompatible with 
these beliefs if we adopt Smith's account on the formation of moral motivation, which 
produces two unwelcome results. The first unwelcome result is that many 'moral 
actions' we do everyday are excluded from the category of genuinely morally worthy 
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actions as they are done from derived moral motivation. The second unwelcome result 
is that we cannot perform any genuine moral actions until we are at an age at which 
every single moral belief can generate a relevant moral desire. Smith's stipulation on 
the formation of one's moral motivation is so stringent that we, as normal moral 
agents whose moral motivation is usually obtained through various ways, rarely 
conform to it. I am not saying that Smith's stipulation on the formation of moral 
motivation cannot be conformed in principle. My suggestion is rather that given the 
formation of moral motivation proposed by WE is not problematic and normal moral 
agents are hard to follow Smith's stipulation, there is no reason to reject WE in favor 
of Rational Internalism. 
On the other hand, Rational Internalism is superficial on the account of 
rationality. According to Rational Internalism, moral motivation can be secured by 
rationality — when one is fully rational in Smith's sense (hereafter, S-rationality), 
his moral beliefs will generate moral desires. For fully S-rational agents, there is no 
gap between moral beliefs and moral desires. However, this is possible only if there is 
a perfect world in which all agents are fully S-rational such that they can bridge the 
t 
gap between beliefs and desires by 'turning on，the button at any time they like. If 
there is really such a world, then agents can always conform to their moral beliefs, 
and as they are equipped with the S-rationality, they can be charged with irrationality 
for not doing the right thing. But our actual world, in any event, is totally different 
from the perfect world that the former world is not made up by fully S-rational agents. 
In the actual word, one's level of rationality varies with age and education. Rationality 
is an accumulated thing. The level of rationality of a particular age group depends on 
the amount of education that age group and tier receive. So, for example, if a youth 
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does not act in accordance with his moral beliefs, he may be said to be less rational 
comparing to the S-rationality. He, however, is still rational at his age, given the 
education he has received. Presumably, the most important thing here is to clarify the 
meaning of irrational. In one sense, 'irrational' means 'not perfectly rational'. In this 
sense, agents who are not motivated to do the right thing are irrational as they do not 
reach the S-rationality. In another sense, 'irrational' means 'crazy' or “abnormal,. In 
this sense, being rational only requires agents to behave normally. This sense implies 
that agents who are not motivated to do the right thing are not irrational because their 
failure still meet the standards of normal behavior. I find the first sense awkward 
because of our ordinary usage of the word 'irrational'. We will only label those who 
are not perfectly rational 'less rational', and are not likely to regard them as irrational. 
We will only label those whose behaviors are beyond the normal standard 'irrational'. 
Thus, I take the second sense as the more appropriate representation for our ordinary 
meaning of the word 'irrational'. 
If we agree that the highest level of rationality is for moral beliefs to reliably 
generate moral desires and that this level cannot be easily reached, then it is 
reasonable to expect people of different ages and education to have different degrees 
of deviance�Surely, the highest standard is attractive but we can reach it only by 
persistent moral education and practices. The more moral education and moral 
practices you have, the closer and more possible you come to the highest standard. 
I Even Smith would accept this point. In his reply to McCord about his complicated analysis of the 
Belief-identity claim, Smith writes, 'Although I am confident that the complexity in the analysis I have 
offered is not merely a function of something that I bought to the analytic enterprise, as a philosopher, I 
am not quite sure how to prove that this is so. One point to keep in mind, however, as we think about 
this issue, once it is agreed that the complexity is fixed by that degree of conceptual complexity, 
whatever it is, that is required in order best to explain the inferential and quasi-inferential dispositions 
possessed by someone who is competent with a concept, we should be very wary of trusting any of our 
own pretheoretical convictions about the complexities of our concepts.' (Smith, 1997, p, 104-5) 
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But when the amount of moral education and moral practices an agent receives is very 
little, it is easy for him to fail to do the right thing. As the failure is reasonable given 
the capacity of the agent, he is not in any sense irrational. 
5.2 Rejection of Rational Internalism and Appropriateness of Blame 
Blame is common in everyday life. It is commonly supposed that when blame 
takes place, the aim is to redirect the behavior of the blamed person or group. So, for a 
person who has been told to have mistaken some moral reasons, it would be strange 
from our perspective for him to accept all the new reasons but behave in the same way. 
We hope that blame can lead to changes in his beliefs as well as his behavior . The 
value of blame is diminished if either of these two aims does not succeed. Smith 
articulates this common idea more systematically in Rational Internalism. He says that 
a fully S-rational agent will be fully responsive to normative reasons by being 
motivated to act in accordance with the requirement of normative reasons. As moral 
reasons are a kind of normative reasons with distinctive content, a fully S-rational 
agent will also be motivated to do the right thing. If an agent is not motivated to do 
the right thing, it indicates they are not responsive to the requirement of moral reasons. 
So, on Rational Internalism, a failure to do the right thing necessarily implies a failure 
on rationality, and these agents ought to be blamed. However, to give an appropriate 
blame is not that simple. If we take the view on the relation between rationality and 
moral education described in section 5.1, it reminds us examining the issue more 
2 It may be argued that blame has a third kind of usage, namely, to point out the wrongness of an action 
to an agent when he does an immoral act. When blame is used in this way, it doesn't matter whether it 
will bring along some desirable effects such as changing the agent's beliefs or behavior. The occurrence 
of these desirable effects does not affect the value of blame used in this way. While I admit that blame 
has this usage, and using it in this way is also valuable, I think it is less relevant to our discussion of 
internalism. It is because internalism focuses on the connection between moral beliefs and moral 
motivation. Blame should be used to give sense to that connection, and that connection makes sense 
only if blame is used to change agent's beliefs and behavior. If the only sense of blame used in 
internalism is to point the wrongness of the agent, it does not indicate the distinctive features of 
internalism. 
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carefully. The main idea is that as different levels of rationality are based on the 
accumulation of education, an agent who cannot reach S- rationality is not necessarily 
irrational, and he may not have to be blamed irrational for failing to do the right thing. 
In what follows, I will try to use this main idea to discuss the appropriateness of 
blame. 
I think we can roughly distinguish two senses of blame if we reflect on what we 
can do in moral persuasion. In my view, the following three steps are the most we can 
do in moral persuasion, if not appealing to violence. When seeing that one's behavior 
is wrong, the opposing party will deploy persuasion by asking the person why he has 
to 0 , and then list the reason for not 0 -ing. In cases where listing the reasons for 
not 0 -ing is not enough to change the agent's idea, the opposing party needs to show 
the importance and the weight of the listed reason comparative to the reason 
previously held by the agent. Lastly, if the outcome of the first two steps is not fruitful, 
the opposing party may look for contradictions in the wrongdoer's views. By these 
three steps, the wrongdoer may come to understand the more justified reasons and 
reject the reasons he previously acted on. However, the above persuasion is limited in 
power. In many typical cases, it can only help the agent to understand what he should 
do now and that he did something wrong in the past. But this is a change in his beliefs, 
and although we can say that it is prior to a change in behavior, it does not secure the 
later when it occurs. Since there are two kinds of changes when moral persuasion 
takes place, we can distinguish two senses of blame. The first sense is that the agent in 
question is blamed for denying the existence of moral reasons. The second sense is 
that the agent in question, by disposing of the bad reasons and knowing what moral 
reason he has now, is blamed for not changing his behavior. These two senses of 
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blame are often confused, and we have to separate them before determining which 
kind of blame can be appropriately applied to an agent. 
I deal with the first sense first. Before moral persuasion, two conditions prevent 
one to be blamed for not knowing the moral reasons. The first is that the agent in 
question is mentally retarded. The second is that the agent, even if he has normal 
intelligence, does not have enough resources such as time limit and situational 
constraint to deliberate clearly and carefully. But one is appropriately blamed for not 
knowing the moral reasons if he (a) reaches the normal standard of intelligence, (b) 
has enough resources to deliberate clearly and carefully and (c) the moral reasons in 
question are not difficult to grasp. After moral persuasion, an agent can be blamed for 
denying the moral reasons if his deliberation ability has reached the normal standard, 
because it is reasonable to believe that anyone who reaches the normal standard of 
deliberation ability but denies the moral reasons is merely tricking rather than really 
not knowing it^. But if an agent is very poor in the deliberation ability, then even after 
persuasion, he should not be blamed for denying the moral reasons as he never 
understands what moral reasons are. 
I now turn to the second sense. I think there are two conditions that excuse an 
agent from being blamed for not changing his behavior after the persuasion. The first 
condition has been mentioned in Chapter 4. I have said that in order for an agent to 
be counted as irrational if he fails to do the right thing, he must have already accepted 
the Belief-identity claim (an agent has a reason to 0 in her actual circumstances just 
in case, if she were fully rational, she would want herself to 0 in her actual 
3 I can't say what the normal standard of deliberation ability really amounts to. Maybe it is something 
like Intelligent Quotient. But I cannot give a concrete method of determining this normal standard and 
the correlating IQ numbers. All these have to be conducted by psychologists. However, intuitively, we 
believe that a normal standard of deliberation ability is essential to comprehend reason. 
126 
Chapter 5 The Situation after the Rejection of Rational Internalism 
circumstances). If an agent never has the Belief-identity claim in his mind, then he 
should not be charged with irrationality if he does not act in accordance with his 
moral belief, because in his mind, ‘ 0 is right' means only ‘ 0 is right' but not that 
'you should want yourself to 0 if 0 is right'. Just as a person is perfectly rational 
for not knowing the result of ‘1 multiplied by 2' is the same as that of '0.5 multiplied 
by 4，and only knows ‘1 multiplied by 2 equals 2，，a moral agent is perfectly rational 
for not knowing that ‘ 0 is right' can be analyzed as ‘One should desire to do 0 if 
0 is right' and only knows ‘ 0 is right' means ‘ 0 is right'. This precondition for 
the charge of irrationality is reasonable because if we don't have it, then we would 
slip into the absurdity of labeling irrational on all innocent people who do not know 
the Belief-identity claim. If all these make sense, the appropriateness of the second 
sense of blame has to be judged from case to case, depending on whether an agent has 
already accepted the Belief-identity claim. If one has really accepted the 
Belief-identity claim, then one may be blamed for not changing his behavior, 
depending on other factors such as his psychological status and the amount of moral 
practice, which I will discuss in the next paragraph. But if the agent does not have the 
Belief-identity claim in his mind, then he should not be blamed for not changing his 
behavior definitely. 
The second condition that excuses an agent from being blamed for not changing 
his behavior after moral persuasion is his actual psychology. Supposes an agent 
sincerely believes that he ought to stop lying. But he continues to lie. As we can 
reasonably suppose, he continues to do so because he is accustomed to lying for many 
years. He has already developed a deep, entrenched disposition to lie. So, we cannot 
expect him to change his behavior immediately after recognizing a new reason. He 
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may want to end his long-term bad behavior but the motivation to refrain from telling 
lies is weaker than his stubborn disposition. We certainly meet many of these people 
in our lives, but we seldom say they are irrational. We do so because of two reasons: 
The limited power of rationality and the condition for the change of behavior. 
Pessimistically, we do not believe that the strength of a rational agent's moral desire 
can always override his other emotions. When one's behavior is not changed in 
accordance with the new reason, we suspect whether the power of rationality itself is 
really equally powerful among different people. We think different education levels 
affect the power of rationality. For a wide range of cases, if an agent does not change 
his behavior, it does not mean that he has not tried his best to change. He may have 
tried his best given his level of rationality. It is just the case that his poor level of 
rationality does not have enough power to lead him to undergo the change. Indeed, 
people with bad habits are like depressed people who have got greatly depressed after 
the death of parents and who cannot recover from depression even after receiving 
psychological t h e r a p y T h e y share the similarities of being affected by strong 
emotions and being unable to change their psychological make-up for a short period 
of time. Mostly, we would not blame the deeply-depressed people. We should also 
maintain the same assessment on people with bad habits on the basis of their 
similarities. Negatively, the strength of moral motivation, we think, is not simply 
constituted by moral beliefs. There are many factors that affect the strength of moral 
motivation. Moral education is one of the factors. I would presume that probably, the 
less moral education one receives the weaker one's moral disposition. For those 
failing to change their behavior, we usually hesitate to blame them if we find that their 
4 Sometimes, we would even incline to think that it is irrational for deeply-depressed people to force 
themselves to recover from depression within a short period of time. 
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weak moral motivation results from the lack of moral education. We prefer to give 
them more moral education and more time to adjust. So, at last, as it is uncertain how 
much moral education can make one rational, we don't have a simple criterion to 
judge whether an agent must be blamed for not changing his behavior. 
5.3 Weak Externalism and Morality 
I have not refuted Rational Internalism completely. I cannot do so because it is 
logically possible to have perfect agents whose capacity of rationality is as Smith 
describes. If these perfect agents exist, they are capable to act morally in every case. 
But if our actual world is not made up of these perfect agents, we need to find another 
way to guide our agents to act morally. So, what can we say about the relation 
between moral beliefs and moral motivation if Rational Internalism is not acceptable? 
Should we totally abandon the demand that we should act in accordance with our 
moral beliefs? I think that internalists have misconstrued WE at this point. WE aims 
to subvert the necessary connection between moral beliefs and moral desires stated by 
Rational Internalism. But doing so does not imply adopting a nihilistic view. WE is 
readily to retain a connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation but it 
reminds us not to think that as a necessary connection. WE would rather suggest that 
what we can expect at most is that the more moral education and moral practice one 
has, the more reliable the connection is. Therefore, I propose the following picture to 
accommodate the connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation and our 
common use of rationality at the same time. 
Through moral education and moral practices，we may develop a disposition, say, 
the R-disposition, to do the right thing. When an agent comes to have a moral belief, 
his R-disposition will confer moral motivation to him. The agent then has moral 
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motivation to do particular moral actions. There is no formula to calculate the relation 
between the increase in moral practices and the increase in the strength of the 
R-disposition. Basically, the more moral actions one has done, the stronger the 
R-disposition he has. The stronger the R-disposition is, the more reliable the 
connection between moral beliefs and moral motivation is. We cannot expect a child 
to have the R-disposition with the same strength as moral veterans. We would rather 
expect that many agents with weak R-disposition always fail to do the right thing. For 
those who do not have a strong R-disposition, we allow them to develop it gradually. 
Even if they cannot always act in accordance with moral demand, we are likely to 
encourage them to practice more and not to blame them to arouse dejection. We may 
even give greater support and encouragement to badly-habited agents and children 
who have a little amount of moral experience, and allow them to use more time to 
change their behavior than we usually allow moral agents. It is just cruel to follow the 
suggestion of Rational Internalism to demand these people to change their behavior 
through appealing to rationality as their psychology cannot bear this abrupt change. 
To demand them to do moral action is not in any sense different from asking them to 
do something impossible in the psychology of normal human beings. On the other 
hand, the R-disposition is perfectly compatible with the way via which moral desires 
are directly generated by moral beliefs because it does not affect their formation. For 
those agents whose moral beliefs can always generate moral desires, the R-disposition 
is just a useful partner which provides a stronger, rampant underlying moral 
motivation for the agent. So, no matter which kinds of agent you belong to, the setting 
of R-disposition is a useful tool to lead us to act morally. 
It may be complained by internalists that WE is an aimless theory that does not 
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try to build up the connection between moral beliefs and moral desires as quick as 
possible. People who stick to WE would just be wondering about what to do when 
they come to have a moral belief. It is too 'realistic' that it leaves too many choices 
for agents who make excuse for not doing moral actions by saying that they have to 
build up their moral disposition gradually and do not have enough moral motivation 
currently. Morality seems not to be a special constraint on them. Internalists may go 
on to argue that although Rational Internalism is a demanding theory, it gives a correct 
direction for agents that when anyone comes to have a moral belief, he must act 
accordingly. Perhaps the thing that determines the comparative attractiveness of 
Rational Internalism and WE now is no longer their theoretical consistency, but our 
view on demanding theory and realistic theory. Actually, WE hopes that everyone, if 
possible, would act morally when they have moral beliefs, but it concerns more what 
different people can actually do. It sees the ability of different people as a continuum. 
Each agent's ability to act morally, as I have said, depends on the factors such as the 
level of moral education, the amount of moral practice and the psychological make-up. 
So, even though everyone should act morally when they have moral beliefs, not 
everyone can act morally. If a lot of people cannot adhere to Rational Internalism, 
what is the significance of constructing such a demanding theory and blaming agents 
for not acting morally repeatedly? It is more useful to give him more time to adjust. 
WE is just this kind of theory. Although an agent will take more time to act morally, it 
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